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ABSTRACT

Cronenwett, Megan, M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University,
2011. “Accounting for the Role of the Public in Democratic States’
Counterterrorism Policies: A Comparative Case Study of Spain and the United
Kingdom”.

Democratic states are more susceptible to terrorist attacks and yet have the most
responsibility to ensure their counterterrorism responses are in accordance with
democratic principles. Respect for the rule of law and the freedoms of speech and press
are just a few of the principles ingrained in democratic philosophy and likewise, by the
very nature of a democracy, democratic states must be held accountable to their
citizenries. These factors, however, can be a cause of dissention and can lead to a
dangerous overreaction or a disproportionate response by democratic states in their
counterterrorism policies, including leading to the very undemocratic response of
restricting civil liberties. This thesis researches and analyzes the counterterrorism policies
of Britain and Spain and applies the theory of Moral Panics to evaluate how Moral Panics
has influenced their respective counterterrorism policies to account for the discrepancy
found between the British and Spanish state responses to terrorism.

Key Words: Terrorism, counterterrorism responses, fear and terrorism, disproportionate
response, overreaction, terrorism and public opinion, Moral Panics theory
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Introduction
Section I: Statement of the Problem
A.
Introduction
It is well known that terrorism is not a new concept, however, the ways in which
democratic states deal with the threat of terrorism today and considerations of the
implications of their counterterrorism policies are relatively new. Regarding a state‘s
counterterrorism policies, democratic states face an important dilemma regarding how to
find the right balance between maintaining state security and upholding civil liberties,
and how to address any imbalances between the two. The focus and intent of this thesis is
to explore how and attempt to explain why Britain and Spain, both being European
democracies having had very similar experiences with both domestic and international
incidents of terrorism, have enacted quite different counterterrorism measures. This thesis
includes key concepts in the history of terrorism in both Britain and Spain, discusses the
existing literature, and presents the research question and the methodology utilized to
analyze this comparative case study through the application of the sociological concept of
Moral Panics.
The theory of Moral Panics is introduced below, and justification is given as to
why this theory has been chosen in the attempt to explain the divergence in Britain and
Spain‘s respective counterterrorism responses, but, first, a few alternative explanations
are addressed that could explain this difference. Firstly, one could hypothesize that the
difference between the British and Spanish counterterrorism responses could be
explained through the nature of the most recent terrorist attacks committed in their
respective states and the subsequent threat perception. In the Spanish case, the response
1

to the terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004 (11/M) was reactionary. After initially blaming
the Spanish terrorist group ETA1 for the 11/M attacks, the Spanish public became aware
that the attacks were perpetrated by Islamic terrorists and were related to the Spanish
military‘s presence in Iraq. Consequently, in the 2004 Presidential elections that followed
just days after the 11/M attacks, Spaniards voted the party they deemed responsible for
11/M, the Popular Party, or PP, out of office and as such largely believed the terrorist
threat to be over.2 Contrary to the Spanish reactionary response, the British response was
largely forward looking; legislation was enacted that would, with any luck, prevent future
terrorist attacks. This hypothesis can be ruled out due to the fact that one could attribute
the (ir)rational response of the Spanish citizenry to vote the PP out of office to acting out
of fear; fear for what might happen if the PP were to stay in office, which in turn, allows
for the theory of Moral Panics to possibly explain the public‘s reaction.
A second hypothesis one could offer as an alternate explanation to the theory of
Moral Panics concerns the history of terrorism and democracy in the two countries.
Whereas while the British Government did enact undemocratic policies against the Irish
Republican Army, IRA, they were not as repressive as the Spanish policies, especially
regarding the state-sponsored death squads used, unsuccessfully, during the Spanish dirty
war to thwart ETA.3 Even if one were to argue that the Spanish tactics were less
repressive than the British, this still does not account for the fact that the Spanish
democracy is much younger than British democracy and, as such, confidence in the
1

Euskadi ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland and Freedom
Partido Popular or Popular Party; the PP led by José Maria Aznar was deemed responsible for
the 11/M attacks and, therefore, in the 14 March 2004 elections, the PSOE, Partido Socialista
Obrero Español or Spanish Socialist Workers‘ Party, led by José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, was
elected to office.
3
The Spanish state-sponsored death squads were the Grupos Antiterrorista de Liberación, GAL,
or Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups
2

2

Spanish democracy is less stable, especially in the minds of older Spaniards who still
remember well the times of General Francisco Franco‘s, former dictator of Spain, rule
just over three decades ago.
One could offer many different hypotheses as to why the British and Spanish state
responses to terrorism have taken two very different courses. However, as should be
evident, the public has some role to play in these competing explanations. It is for this
reason that the theory of Moral Panics emerges as having strong prospects to explain how
these two very similar liberal democratic states have taken two very dissimilar
approaches to counterterrorism, especially in the post-9/11 world. Next, an overview of
the theory of Moral Panics is given, and why it is this author‘s belief that the theory of
Moral Panics can offer some insight into how democratic sates construct their
counterterrorism policies.

Moral Panics overview:
The theory of Moral Panics is borrowed from Political Science‘s sister field of
Sociology and adapted for purposes of this thesis to the study of terrorism, and, in
particular, counterterrorism responses, in the attempt to explain the differences between
the British and Spanish state responses to terrorism. The theory of Moral Panics is
adapted in order for the theory to offer more insight into the study of terrorism and
counterterrorism. These adaptations include excluding the aspect of morals and immoral
behavior. While it is noted that morals may have an impact on the design of
counterterrorism policies it is not within the scope of this thesis to address these potential
impacts.
3

Moral Panics is a term that was coined by Stanley Cohen ―as a means of
characterizing the reactions of the media, the public, and agents of social control on the
youthful disturbances‖.4 According to Cohen, during a moral panic:
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become
defined as a threat to societal values or interests; its nature is presented in
a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral
barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other rightthinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and
solutions; ways of coping are evolved or … resorted to; the condition then
disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible.
Sometimes the subject of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is
something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears
in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except
in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and
long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in
legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself.5
There are many reasons why the application of the theory of Moral Panics may be
advantageous or beneficial to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism approaches.
Firstly, as Goode and Ben-Yehuda state, ―an investigation of the moral panic emphasizes
that social reactions to a new and seemingly threatening phenomenon arise as a
consequence of that phenomenon‘s real or supposed threat to certain ‗positions, statuses,
interests, ideologies, and values‘‖.

6

It is within this context that the author finds the

application of Moral Panics to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism policies
particularly promising. Secondly,
[T]he question of the appropriate social and legal control of the
responsible parties almost inevitably [author‘s emphasis] accompanies the
moral panic. Moreover, legislation and its enforcement are usually seen as
only one step; for those for whom the behavior in question is seen as a

4

Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 24
Ibid
6
Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 30
5

4

threat, measures such as education, socialization, normative changes,
prevention, ‗treatment‘ and ‗cures‘ will be suggested and debated.7
Noting this, the application of Moral Panics appears even more beneficial to the study of
counterterrorism responses to provide insight into why it is that democratic states enact
certain acts of legislation.
Thirdly, examining how the public responds to acts of terrorist violence,
especially within their own state, can explain the very antagonistic feelings for the
terrorists and their goals, and given that ―the key ingredient in the emergence of a moral
panic is the creation or intensification of hostility toward and denunciation of a particular
group, category, or cast of characters‖ the two coincide very well.8 Fourthly, given the
fact that some countries treat terrorism as a crime in their counterterrorism approach (i.e.
whereby the state ―only‖ charges a known or suspected terrorist with existing or newly
drafted and implemented crimes, through what is known as the ―law enforcement
approach‖ to counterterrorism), and one of the central features of a moral panic is the
attempt to criminalize certain behaviors, again the two overlap and the study of both
could be mutually beneficial.9 Lastly, and related to the previous, ―no examination of the
moral panic is complete without a consideration of legislation and law enforcement‖, and
this is due to the fact that ―legislation and law enforcement are two of the most obvious
and widely resorted-to efforts to crush a putative threat during a moral panic‖.10
Considering the extent to which counterterrorism approaches are related to legislation

7

Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 32
Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 74
9
Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 82
10
Ibid.
8
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and law enforcement, it can be easily understood how this would apply to the study of
terrorism and counterterrorism approaches.
It is argued in this thesis that the difference between Britain‘s and Spain‘s
respective counterterrorism policies can be, at least partially, explained using the theory
of Moral Panics. Goode and Ben-Yehuda list five actors as parties who can attribute to a
moral panic: the press, public, agents of social control or law enforcement, lawmakers
and politicians, and action groups.11 This thesis shall look at how each of these five actors
have or have not attributed to the creation of a moral panic in Spain and the United
Kingdom. The indicators of a moral panic according to Goode and Ben-Yehuda are: a
heightened level of concern, an increased level of hostility, substantial or widespread
agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing
group members and their behaviour, disproportionality, and volatility.12
The intention of this thesis is to utilize the theory of Moral Panics in the attempt
to fill a void in terrorism and counterterrorism literature by analyzing the role the public
plays in a democratic state‘s counterterrorism policies. This is especially true noting the
importance of the public in contemporary democracies, as the public is an essential
component of a democratic government. The theory of Moral Panics affords the author
the ability to analyze the differences between the British and Spanish states‘ responses to
acts of terrorist violence and the theory will be used as a framework to help examine how
these democracies construct their counterterrorism policies.

11
12

Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 24
Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 33-41
6

B: The Research Question
Why have Britain and Spain, while being relatively similar in their institutional
and regulatory structure, taken such different approaches in their counterterrorism
policies? While there are many factors, both internal and external, domestic and
international, that help to shape a democratic state‘s counterterrorism policy, for purposes
of this comparative case study the focus will be on the public and its effect on British and
Spanish counterterrorism policies.
This comparative case study employs John Stuart Mill‘s ―method of difference‖,
otherwise known by Adam Przeworski as ―most similar systems‖, in the attempt to
explain the divergence found between the British and Spanish counterterrorism
responses. According to Van Evera, ―we pick similar cases to reduce the number of
candidate causes or effects that emerge: the more similar the cases, the fewer the
candidates, making real causes and effects easier to spot‖.13 Furthermore, ―if case
conditions are uniform, we can discount third-variable influence as a cause of observed
within-case covariance between values on IV [independent variable] and DV [dependent
variable]‖.14 As stated by Przeworski and Tuene, ―it is anticipated that if some important
differences are found among these otherwise similar countries, then the number of factors
attributable to these differences will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms
of those differences alone‖.15 In other words, the logic behind applying Mill‘s ―method of
difference‖ in this comparative case study is such that by comparing similar cases, one

13

Van Evera, 23
Van Evera, 52
15
Przeworski and Tuene, 32
14

7

can control for a large number of variables and, therefore, be able to offer explanations
based on the discrepancies found among the common variables.
C. Sub-questions
What role, and to what extent, do Moral Panics play in a democratic state‘s
counterterrorism approaches? Will the theory of Moral Panics contribute to
understanding public opinion and its effect on counterterrorism policies?

D. Literature Review
Introduction:
The literature on British and Spanish counterterrorism responses demonstrates
that there are a number of different options democratic states may utilize in their
counterterrorism policies. While there are competing arguments put forth by various
scholars regarding British and Spanish counterterrorism responses, there are several
common themes in the literature. The themes in this literature review highlight the array
of options available to democratic states when crafting their counterterrorism policies and
responses, and focus on the role of the public in each of these different types of
responses. This review organizes the spectrum of counterterrorism responses into the
following: conciliatory options, legalistic options, repressive options, and warlike
options.16 Each of these categories is subsequently addressed in this literature review.
Additionally, alternative hypotheses regarding these types of responses are examined.

16

While other scholars discuss these four categories Martin adequately names the different
categories and therefore they are borrowed Martin, Gus Understanding Terrorism, Challenges,
Perspectives, and Issues, pp. 478-479
8

Conciliatory Options
Conciliatory options incorporate the ‗softest‘ available options a democratic state
has the ability to apply in its counterterrorism initiatives. Conciliatory options include the
following: diplomacy, concessions, and social reforms.17 Conciliatory options often
appear to be the least desired alternative for democratic states to employ because it is
often feared that if the country negotiates with terrorists, it will appear too ―soft‖, and,
moreover, some countries follow an official [emphasis added] policy not to negotiate
with terrorists, which consequently, makes this option very unlikely, if not impossible, to
pursue, or at least openly pursue. Furthermore, as Nacos highlights, the public may also
disapprove of negotiating with terrorists.18 However, not all countries are opposed to
conciliatory options and several democratic states have engaged in concessions or
negotiations with terrorist organizations either openly or secretly, disguising them as
―talks‖ or ―dialogues‖ (e.g. Spain with the Basque terrorist organization, ETA).19
A further complication with conciliatory options is that even if a democratic
government is willing to talk and negotiate with a terrorist organization, the group itself
may not be willing to negotiate, especially in the case of trying to negotiate peace deals.
As Gross aptly writes, ―in the eyes of the terrorist organization, peace is a ‗death blow‘
that will lead to its disbanding, and therefore, no circumstances can exist that will cause
the organization to enter into a peace treaty with its ‗democratic enemy‘ and cease
fighting it‖.20

Likewise, ―a state organ that signs a peace treaty with a terrorist

17

Martin, 478
Nacos 2008, 284
19
Shabad and Ramo, 463
20
Gross, 56
18

9

organization will be according recognition to that terrorist organization, an outcome that
is inconceivable‖.21
While terrorist groups are unlikely to negotiate a peace deal with a democratic
state this does not necessarily imply that the organization will not try to get the state to
concede or give in to its demands in other ways, such as through enacting societal
reforms that grant the terrorist organization, or the interests of the group of persons it
represents, greater political representation. This is due to the fact that ―it is thought by
many terrorist organizations that democracies are ―more coercible and less resilient,
making their capitulation to terrorists‘ demands more likely‖.22
As a democratic government is held responsible to public opinion, conceding to a
terrorist organization often takes some convincing. Hoffman and Morrison-Taw discuss
how democratic governments can persuade the public through the use of ―legitimizing
measures‖ which can be put in place in order to ―build public confidence in the
government and support for the counterterrorist campaign‖.23 Hoffman and MorrisonTaw assert that ―legitimizing measures can encompass a wide variety of actions and
legislation: political concessions to ethnic or religious minorities; economic measures to
ameliorate housing and employment inequities or deficiencies; defensive steps to protect
the public from terrorist reprisals‖.24 Conceding to terrorist groups and affording them
political concessions in the form of permitting them some (or more) political involvement
allows the terrorist organization to actively take part in the government, which yeilds the
added benefit that they are then less likely to use acts of violence or terrorism because
21

Ibid.
Borer and Freeman, 66
23
Reinares 2000, 9
24
Ibid.
22

10

they then have something to lose. On the other side of public opinion, if a terrorist
organization were to succeed in gaining sympathizers, or instilling enough fear in the
general population, the populace might push the government to concede to the terrorist
organization‘s demand(s).
Under the umbrella of conciliatory options one could devise a hypothesis stating
that the divergence found between the British and Spanish counterterrorism responses
can be attributed to the governmental structure of federalism in Spain. It is true that the
Spanish system of federalism affords its different regions a great level of autonomy such
as the right to self-governance. As such, one could be led to believe that this could lead to
stronger or more repressive regional counterterrorism measures especially noting the fact
that ―the regional police authorities are competent for terrorist activities on the regional
level,‖ however, it does not.25 This is due to the fact that the Spanish national government
retains the authority to respond to terrorist threats on the national and international levels
as Spanish criminal law grants the national government universal jurisdiction over
terrorist offences.26
One could argue that this competing authority and responsibility for
counterterrorism measure could impede stronger counterterrorism approaches, and that
the lack of any major new counterterrorism measures enacted by the Spanish government
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks is an example of such. This, however, is not the case, as the
legislation that was previously enacted to counter the terrorist threat from ETA can also
be used to counter the new terrorist threats Spain faces and, therefore, more restrictive
counterterrorism measures were deemed unnecessary. This is especially true noting the
25
26

Martínez, 534
Ibid.
11

fact that Spain‘s experience of ETA terrorism has a long history of being international in
dimension, as parts of the Basque Country are found in France. In sum, the structure of
federalism and the competing authority for counterterrorism measures found in Spain are
not sufficient, or at least not in and of themselves, to explain the divergence between the
British and Spanish counterterrorism responses.

Legalistic Options
One of the most discussed aspects of counterterrorism measures is the two-sided
issue of how democratic states employ the rule of law. The literature addresses this issue
firstly, by noting how democratic states have the obligation to counter terrorism through
the rule of law, and secondly, how breaches of the rule of law cause more damage to the
democratic system than the threat of terrorism itself does.
One of the foremost principles of a democratic government is respect for the rule
of law or following Gross‘ description, respect for the rule of law is ―a central and basic
component of democratic society‖.27 Alonso and Reinares take this a step further in
claiming, ―there is no other way for democratic institutions and collective actors than
acting, in accordance with the rule of law, to guarantee fundamental rights and civil
liberties‖.28 Nacos addresses the importance of ―decisive defensive and aggressive
responses to terror‖ but highlights the fact that these responses shall not come ―at the
expense of the moral high ground that belongs to those who respect the law and
humanitarian principles‖.29

27

Gross, 59
Alonso and Reinares 2005, 277
29
Nacos, 2008, 184
28
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While it may appear contrary to democratic principles that a democratic state
would ever violate the rule of law, the opposite is unfortunately true. Democratic
governments have cited many different reasons as to why it was deemed necessary to act
outside the rule of law. Jiménez offers the following list of justifications democratic
states have given for breaching the rule of law: ―the processes of law are too
cumbersome, that the normal safeguards in the law for the individual are not designed for
an emergency and that, given the often indiscriminate violence perpetrated, the terrorist
deserves to be treated outside normal law‖.30
While this list of justifications may seem reasonable, or rational, as Schmid
highlights, ―there are also practical considerations which make it very much more in the
government interest to remain within the law in pursuing terrorism than going outside
it‖.31 The most significant reason why a democratic state would not want to venture
outside the rule of law in its counterterrorism measures, aside from the fact that this is
highly undemocratic, is that by acting outside the rule of law, the democratic government
is helping to justify the terrorist group‘s actions. This is especially true considering
terrorist organizations often claim the repressive measures of a democratic state as
justification for their actions. As Woodworth writes, ―one of its [terrorism‘s] greatest
dangers lies in the way in which terrorism tempts democracies to take short cuts, to break
their own best rules. Terrorists win when democracies become less democratic in
response to the terrorist threat‖.32 There is much truth to this statement which is
exemplified by the Spanish dirty war experience with ETA, in which Spain tried to

30

Schmid, 129
Ibid.
32
Woodworth 2004, 169
31
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combat ETA through dirty war tactics (i.e. the use of state-sponsored death squads) that,
consequently, produced the reverse of the intended outcome; instead of stopping ETA,
the Spanish state lost legitimacy and actually helped ETA to gain more legitimacy and
increase its membership.33
In addressing why democratic states must continue to abide by the rules of law
even when terrorist organizations do not, Gross writes:
If we were to allow a democratic state in its war against terror to breach
the laws of war on the grounds that the other side also breached them, we
would not thereby be helping the state to defeat its enemy; we would be
helping the enemy to defeat us. We would also undermine the rule of law
and the stability of civilized society. We would cause democratic states to
lose their character. We must avoid this result at all costs.34
Another aspect of legalistic options addressed in the literature is the expansion
of police and executive powers. Democratic states have expanded the powers of law
enforcement and intelligence agencies both in an attempt to thwart terrorist attacks
through preventative measures and also as lessons and consequence of their unfortunate
experiences with terrorism. The broadening of police powers has taken many different
forms. One example of such is exemplified by the fact that Spain and the U.K. both
expanded ―powers to collect data from private companies … particularly with regard to
telecommunication providers [who] are obliged to retain certain communication data‖.35
Furthermore, in Britain‘s Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act of 2000 provisions
were made ―for the enhancement and extension of police powers which are only loosely
or not at all connected to terrorism. […] Even more far reaching are the provisions in

33

Woodworth 2004,173-174
Gross, 59
35
Krieger, 59-60
34
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Part 3 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act [ATCSA] 2001, which
dramatically extend the disclosure powers available to public authorities‖.36
While it may seem logical a state would expand its police force‘s powers in a time
of emergency, such as during the threat of a terrorist attack, this expansion of police
powers is a concern to some, including human rights advocates. Roth demonstrates this
concern in the ―Human Rights Watch World Report 2004‖ by writing, ―enticing as such
enhanced power might be in the face of the unpredictable and often lethal threat posed by
terrorism, it threatens basic due process rights and the essential liberty such rights
protect.‖37 While human rights advocates and others have criticized the expansion of
police powers, the literature also emphasizes how these expansions, in some respects,
have been made possible by the public‘s willingness to forgo privacy and other civil
liberties in exchange for security. However, as Smith notes, ―it takes enormous political
courage to resist being swept along the tides of populist sentiment that, if succumbed to,
will risk trampling upon the very liberties that western democracies are seeking to
protect‖.38 In other words, even though public opinion is an integral factor of a
democracy, democratic states need to exercise caution when employing extreme
counterterrorism methods even when public sentiment is in favor of seemingly Draconian
counterterrorism methods.
A state‘s domestic counterterrorism measures also have implications for domestic
and international law. In order to implement many of the legalistic options discussed
above and the repressive and warlike options that are addressed below, states have had to

36

Grote 2004a, 616
Roth, 1
38
Smith, 76
37
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modify their laws. This has occurred in a number of ways including revising old
legislation, creating and passing new legislation, and the more extreme case of derogating
from international treaties. A major source of contention regarding these laws is that the
newly created or revised legislation, and especially the derogations from certain
international treaties, have had severe implications for civil liberties.
Under legalistic options one might design a number of hypotheses that could be
used to explain the divergence found between the British and Spanish counterterrorism
policies and responses. The first would be that the difference between the two countries‘
counterterrorism policies and responses could be attributed to the fact that Britain, unlike
Spain, lacks a written Constitution and that it has functioned throughout most of its
history without a Constitutional Court. While this may be true, it is not sufficient to
explain the divergence. Britain has numerous domestic laws and is party to all of the
international conventions related to terrorism, and, is a member of the European Union
which, as such, suggests that there are various domestic and international laws and norms
that the British state is held accountable to regardless of the fact that the British lack a
written Constitution.
Additionally, it could be argued that the lack of sufficient checks and balances
within the British Government could explain this divergence, but as Britain has domestic
courts and is also held accountable to a number of courts within the institutional
framework of the European Union, the absence of a Constitutional Court does not explain
the divergence either. This is especially true regarding the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) as any laws that may be deemed to violate human rights are subject to
judicial review within the ECtHR. Moreover, with the enactment of the Human Rights
16

Act of 1998, the British ―courts were given … a power to declare that Acts of Parliament
were incompatible with the Convention [European Convention on Human Rights or
ECHR]‖, and this demonstrates that there is indeed a system of checks and balances that
the British government is subject to.39
It could also be hypothesized that the enactment of emergency powers such as the
Prevention of Terrorism Acts used between 1974-1989 regarding Northern Ireland and
the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005 could be used to explain the divergence in
counterterrorism policies set forth by Spain and the U.K., but this claim would be invalid.
Spain has also enacted emergency legislation and has counterterrorism legislation that
can be utilized to suspend a person‘s fundamental rights if they are suspected of, or found
guilty of, being involved in terrorist activities.40 Moreover, the ability to suspend a
person‘s fundamental rights on an individual basis is found in Article 55 (2) of the
Spanish Constitution.41 In sum, the absence of a Constitution or Constitutional Court, a
system of checks and balance, and the enactment of emergency legislation are not
sufficient, or at least not in and of themselves, to explain the difference between the
British and Spanish counterterrorism responses.
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Una ley orgánica podrá determinar la forma y los casos en que, de forma individual y con la
necesaria intervención judicial y el adecuado control parlamentario, los derechos reconocidos en
los artículos 17, apartado 2, y 18, apartados 2 y 3, pueden ser suspendidos para personas
determinadas, en relación con las investigaciones correspondientes a la actuación de bandas
armadas o elementos terroristas. (An organic law could determine the form and the cases in
which, in an individual form [manner] and with the necessary judicial intervention and adequate
parliamentary control, the rights recognized in Article 17, paragraph 2 [limiting preventative
detention to 72 hours] and Article 18, paragraphs 2 and 3 [regarding home invasions and keeping
personal communications private, respectively] may be suspended for specific persons, in relation
with investigations of activities of armed bands or terrorist elements.)
40
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Repressive Options
Repressive options can coincide with the legalistic options available to democratic
states in their counterterrorism measures, but they differ regarding the fact that the
repressive options are designed to be more punitive than the legalistic options. Examples
of repressive options include economic or political sanctions. One of the issues found in
the implementation of sanctions is that ―imposing and enforcing such sanctions requires
exceptional cooperation between the nations of the free world‖.42 In other words, these
sanctions need to be enforced multilaterally, and not just unilaterally, in order for them to
be truly effective. While unilateral sanctions can have some impact on a terrorist group,
the terrorist group would be more likely to comply with the sanctions if they are
implemented multilaterally.
While the subject of the restriction of civil liberties has been previously discussed,
it merits full attention under repressive options. A theme found in the literature of
counterterrorism responses is related to how counterterrorism measures can adversely
effect the rights of innocent civilians caught in the middle of the process of trying to
capture suspected or known terrorists and prosecute them for their crimes. Some scholars
maintain that there is a ―widespread view that the freedoms and liberties in democracies
constrain how they fight terrorism‖.43 However, as Krieger expresses, this is not always
the case:
Privacy, press and protest are inherent characteristics of the liberal
conception of freedom. In times of terrorist threats, limitations of these
rights re-establish the balance between freedom and security in favor of
more security. Thus, many observers fear that human rights might become
a collateral damage of the war against terrorism. In order to prevent such a
42
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collateral damage, legal systems restrict permissible limitations on human
rights. Legislation must be foreseeable, proportionate and it must provide
safeguards against possible abuses.44
What is apparent from Krieger‘s statement is that, on one hand, security is of the
utmost importance for a state when the threat of a terrorist attack is imminent but, on
the other hand, in the state‘s attempt to maintain the security of their citizenry, it is
inevitable that a certain amount of civil liberties and human rights will be abused. Many
different types of civil liberties can be potentially abused in a democratic state‘s
counterterrorism initiatives as evidenced by PoKempner‘s warning, ―one aspect of the
social harm [of counterterrorism policies] is that many innocent people‘s rights are
inevitably abrogated in the search for the real terrorist‖.45 The civil liberties abuses
most likely to have an effect on the average citizen range in scope from unlawful search
and seizure to recovering private telecommunication data to restricting speech.
It is imperative that democratic states hold their democratic beliefs steadfast
when combating terrorism because to otherwise do so, would render the state
undemocratic. It is, however, possible for democratic states to temporarily modify or
impose restrictions of civil liberties in order to combat a terrorist threat, but ―to keep
these modifications of restrictions in place for too long would damage, not help, the
democratic state‖.46 According to Hoffman and Morrison-Taw, ―there is a fine line
between the imposition of emergency measures and the restriction of civil rights‖ and
this is one aspect of counterterrorism measures that democratic states cannot afford to
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not heed to.47 This is especially true when one takes into consideration the fact that, ―a
democracy that permits itself to deviate from respect for these values [the rule of law,
the separation of powers, the independence of the judicial authority, and recognition of
principles of social morality and justice at the core of which lie human rights] – even for
a limited period of time – is not a bad democracy, but from a substantive point of view,
it is not a democracy at all‖.48 Again, as aforementioned, even if these restrictions are
advocated for, or even just supported, by the public, the state must be vigilant and
ensure they do not violate the democratic principles the state is built upon.

Warlike Options
The last, and most extreme, group of options democratic states have to combat
terrorism are warlike options which include: war, covert operations and torture. One of
the more prevalent themes present in the literature is the fact that democratic states have
the ability, if not the right and obligation, to engage in military operations against
terrorist organizations or other states, in order to protect their citizenry. One of the
greatest rights afforded to sovereign states is the right to self-defense, and as Gross
notes, ―we have seen that self-defense is an exception to the theory whereby disputes
are resolved by the normative structures of the rule of law: either within the state, by the
authorities responsible for the enforcement of the law between states; or on the
international level, in accordance with the UN Charter‖.49 Gross additionally claims that
for a state to protect its citizens by means of self-defense is ―a moral obligation‖ and
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―that it is not only the right but also the legal and moral duty of the democratic state to
use appropriate measures, including force, to thwart the dangers posed to the security of
its citizens‖.50
Furthermore, the right to self-defense against a terrorist threat is recognized and
enshrined in domestic and international law. As Gross writes:
A state threatened by a terrorist organization is entitled to act against the
organization as such; a measure taken by the state will not be deemed to
be a breach of Article 2(4)51 of the Charter [of the United Nations], since it
will amount to the use of limited and temporary force directed solely at
removing the terrorist threat. So long as the activity is not directed against
the civilians or property of the state in which the terrorists are located, and
it is not intended to conquer territory or achieve political gains, the use of
force will not constitute a violation of territorial integrity of sovereignty
and therefore will not be contrary to Article 2(4) of the Charter [of the
United Nations].52
Additionally, the Security Council ―has recognized the need to equate acts of terrorism in
general – at least acts of terrorism of extensive force, quality, and scope – with armed
attacks in the sense of Article 5153 of the Charter‖.54 However, even in light of
international recognition of the right to self-defense, democratic states would still benefit
from the exercising caution or being prudent in choosing any of the warlike options to
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Gross, 27
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations.
52
Gross, 40-41
53
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
54
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combat the threat of terrorism. As Nacos points out, ―overreaction undermines the moral
fabric of a society that is victimized by terrorists and plays into the hands of terrorists and
the assumptions central to their calculus of violence‖.55
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of a democratic state‘s response to the threat
of terrorism is the use of torture. In the post-9/11 world, torture came to the forefront of
the debate on appropriate counterterrorism measures. Some argue that torture is
justifiable due to the fact that information to prevent future attacks can only be obtained
through torture, while other experts and scholars, including legal expert Henry Mark
Holzer, claim that ―torture of whatever kind, and no matter how brutal, in defense of
human rights and legitimate self-preservation is not only immoral; it is a moral
imperative‖.56 Furthermore, torture does not always yield useful information. As one of
the head Investigating Judges of the Spanish National Court said, ―I come from the
country of the Inquisition … we had to learn from experience that torture, and
mistreatment and degradation, do not work‖.57
Another controversial aspect of counterterrorism measures is that of indefinite
detention. The greatest, and most frequent, argument in favor of indefinite detention is
that known or suspected terrorists pose a security threat and they, therefore, cannot be
afforded the luxury of freedom. Additionally, democratic states are unable to legally
extradite known or suspected terrorists to countries where they could face persecution or
the death penalty and, therefore, the state has no choice but to keep the terrorists in
indefinite detention. As Brigitte L. Nacos notes, ―to defeat evil, we may have to traffic in
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evils: indefinite detention of suspects, coercive interrogations, targeted assassinations,
even pre-emptive war. These are evils because each strays from national and international
law and because they kill people or deprive them of freedom without due process. They
can be justified only if they prevent the greater evil‖.58 Nacos‘ argument, however,
implies that these ―evils‖ are justifiable, as evidenced by the public support or at least
toleration of places such as Guantanamo Bay in the post-9/11 world, but her argument,
nonetheless, is a source of great contention. On the other side of the debate, human rights
activists claim that indefinite detention goes against a person‘s rights, regardless if they
are a terrorist or not, rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Conclusion
As evidenced in the preceding pages, democratic states have a wide range of
options available to them when constructing their counterterrorism policies. Brigitte
Nacos, in citing Paul R. Pillar, writes, ―‗whether one likes it or not, or thinks it should
happen or not, public opinion affects policy decisions.‘ Conversely, governments, too,
depend on propaganda and at times even on high fear appeals to enlist public support for
anti- and counterterrorist initiatives‖.59 There is a significant void in the literature on
democratic states‘ responses to terrorism that analyzes the role that the public has in
determining which policies the democratic government should adopt to counter terrorism.
This void is very important to address, especially considering the fact that by its very
nature, a democratic state must be accountable to the public and its opinion. It would be
advantageous to study and analyze what, and to how great an extent, the role the public
58
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plays in how a democratic state implements counterterrorism measures in order to gain a
better understanding as to how and why democratic governments choose the
counterterrorism measures they do.

Section II: Procedure
E. Methodology/Research Design
The operationalization of the research will include using Goode and BenYehuda‘s theory of moral panics as a framework or method to organize, test, and analyze
state policies subsequent to the terrorist attacks of 11/M and 7/7 in the attempt to account
for the missing piece in counterterrorism literature of the role of the public in democratic
states‘ counterterrorism policies. For purposes of this thesis the dependent variable (DV)
will be the British and Spanish state counterterrorism responses and the independent
variable (IV) will be the indicators of a moral panic. The indicators of a moral panic
according to Goode and Ben-Yehuda are:


A ―heightened level of concern over the behavior of a certain group or

category and the consequences that that behavior presumably causes for the rest of
the society. This concern should be manifested or measurable in concrete ways.‖;


An ―increased level of hostility toward the group or category regarded as

engaging in the behavior in question … not only must the condition, phenomenon,
or behavior be seen as threatening, but a clearly identifiable group in or segment of
the society must be seen as responsible for the threat‖;


―[S]ubstantial or widespread agreement or consensus … that the threat is real,

serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group members and their behavior‖;


Disproportionality – ―there is a sense on the part of many members of society

that a more sizeable number of individuals are engaged in the behavior in questions
than actually are, and the threat, danger, or damage said to be caused by the
24

behavior is far more substantial than, is incommensurate with and in fact is ‗above
and beyond that which a realistic appraisal could sustain‘‖;


Volatility – the moral panic ―erupt[s] fairly suddenly (although they may lie

dormant or latent for long periods of time, and may reappear from time to time)
and, nearly as suddenly, subside. Some moral panics may become routinized or
institutionalized‖.60

The following data sources will be used to evaluate whether Goode and BenYehuda‘s indicators of a moral panic were present in Britain and Spain:


Opinion polls to gauge public sentiment and reactions,



Information regarding Action Groups



Statements by British and Spanish heads of government,



Statements by British and Spanish heads of opposition,



Newspaper content (e.g. headlines, articles, editorials, etc.)
o For the Spanish case, editorials are chosen from El País, the most
widely read newspaper in Spain. The editorials for the British case
are taken primarily from The Times, but supplementary articles also
come from The Guardian, The Irish Times, and other newspapers.



Actions (or inactions) of the British and Spanish security forces



British and Spanish legislation related to terrorism

Moreover, this thesis researches Britain and Spain‘s responses to domestic
terrorism with the IRA and ETA, respectively, and then compares the countries‘
responses to domestic terrorist incidents with their responses to incidents of international
terrorism. For the purpose of this thesis, the time period from which the British response
to its problem with Irish Republican terrorism will be set as beginning with the Troubles
and the Irish Republican Army/Provisional IRA (IRA/PIRA) split in 1969 and ending
60
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with the Good Friday Accords in 1998; the time period from which the Spanish response
to its problem with ETA will be set as starting with the beginning of democracy in Spain
in 1978 and ending with ETA‘s declaration of a ―permanent‖ ceasefire in 2006. The
findings are then used to compare Spain‘s response to the 11/M and Britain‘s response to
the 7/7 and 21/7 terrorist attacks, and additionally highlight the role moral panics has or
has not played in these states‘ counterterrorism policies. Lastly, the findings of this
comparative case study are analyzed to offer suggestions for other democratic states and
their counterterrorism initiatives.
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Chapter 1: Public Opinion Data
Spain61
Looking at the case of Spain, throughout the time period of this thesis, terrorism
was almost always listed as one of the top two priorities citizens felt the Spanish
Government should tackle. One exception to this was in 1985 when terrorism fell behind
not only unemployment but also concern for the necessity of ―a more effective fight
against drugs‖.62 There were also exceptional cases in which terrorism took first place on
the list of concerns of the Spanish people (i.e. ahead of the concern regarding
unemployment). One such case was in 1997 when terrorism was the top concern for
54.8%63 of the Spanish citizenry and again in 2000 when terrorism was considered the
leading problem by 72.1%64 and 81.5%65 of Spaniards, in November and December of
2000, respectively. What makes these last numbers even more interesting is that at the
beginning of the new millennium, 53% of those surveyed also believed that Spain would
61

Note: The data for this thesis was collected from El País and El Mundo for the Spanish case,
and The Times of London and The Guardian were consulted for the British case. When data were
unavailable in any of the major newspapers, other reputable sources of public opinion, including
public opinion research companies or groups were consulted. As a last resort or as a measure to
gather additional necessary information, a Lexis Nexis search was performed. In an attempt to
maintain the integrity of this work, an attempt has been made to not use any non-domestic
sources of information as a primary data resource and therefore, it is only used as such when no
other relevant information could be found or used. The outside sources do serve as a means of
supplementing the data with certain quotes regarding some information.
62
Survey done by La Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas (The Spanish Magazine
of Sociological Investigations)
63
―El 48% de los ciudadanos juzga ‗regular‘ la situación política, según el CIS‖, El País, 26
March 1997
64
―El 72% considera que el terrorismo es el primer problema de España‖, El País, 29 November
2000
65
―La preocupación de los españoles por el terrorismo crece 10 puntos‖, El País, 28 December
2000
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finally achieve an end to terrorism.66 In other words, even though Spaniards were
concerned about the threat of terrorism, they were optimistic the threat of terrorism would
soon end. This is true even in light of the fact that the Spanish public was often
pessimistic when it came to ETA‘s various ceasefire declarations. For example in
February 1999, after the 1998 ―indefinite truce‖, 71% of those Spaniards interviewed
believed it was ―perfectly possible‖ for ETA to return to using arms.67 However, half of
the Spanish citizenry believed that the Spanish Government had done more for the peace
process than ETA.68 Therefore, even though the Spanish case demonstrates a large
amount of pessimism toward the maintenance of ETA‘s ceasefires, at least half of the
public believed that the Spanish government was doing its share, or more, in trying to
achieve peace.
In the post-9/11 world concern for terrorism within the Spanish society also
exhibited some volatility. Much like with the pre-9/11 world, most of the data indicate
that terrorism was second to unemployment for most of the research period, but a few
months after the September 11th attacks in New York and Washington D.C., in December
2001, 74.2% of those surveyed believed the fight against terrorism should be ―the
principle objective‖ of the Spanish society in the next five years.69 Terrorism again
became the primary concern in Spain in the last months of 2002, at which time debate
was raging as part of the larger decision to declare all political parties with terrorist ties
illegal, which included Herri Batasuna, the so-called political wing of ETA. In October
2002, 65.4% were ―in favor or very supportive‖ of ―criminalizing Batasuna‖, compared
―El 53% cree que se logrará por fin acabar con el terrorismo‖, El País, 2 January 2000
―Los españoles apoyan la prudencia en el proceso de paz‖, El País, 8 February 1999
68
Ibid.
69
La intolerancia de los españoles con los inmigrantes creció durante el primer año de la Ley de
Extranjería, según el CIS‖, El País, 24 January 2002
66
67
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with the 52% who believed similarly in 1992,

70

and 56.2% believed that the measure

would be a ―very or fairly [important] advance‖ for the fight against terrorism. 71 The
degree of concern for terrorism then fell to its lowest percentage since September 2000 in
January 2003. This was largely due to the Prestige oil spill off the coast of Spain which
was viewed as an ―ecological disaster‖, and consequently, it seized some of the concern
previously placed with terrorism as 28% of Spaniards identified the Prestige disaster as
one of the main problems facing Spain.72
Furthermore, while ―terrorism‖ (emphasis added) declined percentage-wise on
the list of principle problems plaguing Spanish society, the 2003 Iraq War climbed the
list of concerns, which has obvious links to the greater U.S. ―Global War on Terror‖. In
fact, in March 2003, the war in Iraq constituted the second most serious problem for
Spaniards with 35.7% of those surveyed stating so, ahead of terrorism at a close 35.5%.73
Therefore, in total, it can be stated that over 70% of Spaniards were concerned with some
aspect of terrorism. Moreover, it was very apparent that Spaniards opposed the Iraq War
not only from the beginning, but from the first mentions of possible ―interventions‖ in
Iraq. Interestingly, this could be considered the beginning of what was to come almost
exactly one year in the future, as Spaniards tripled their support for the Spanish Socialist
Workers‘ Party (PSOE) just days after the 2003 Iraq War began.74

―El 86% de los españoles se opone a que se acorten las penas a los terroristas, según un sondeo
del CIS, El País, 8 July 1992
71
―Dos de cada tres encuestados por el CIS rechazan una Guerra contra Irak‖, El País, 30 October
2002
72
―Los españoles sitúan el desastre del ‗Prestige‘ como tercer problema del país‖, El País, 31
January 2003
73
―El PSOE saca al PP seis puntos de ventaja‖, El País, 30 March 2003
74
Ibid.
70
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The Iraq War was not the last time during the research period in which public
opinion was markedly volatile. Polls done exactly one month before the 11 March 2004
attacks in Madrid listed terrorism as the second most important problem in Spain for
36.4% of those polled, after, unemployment for 57.3%. However, in an opinion poll done
by SER, the Spanish Society of Radio, days after the 11/M attacks and the general
election on 14 March 2004, terrorism was once again cited as the main problem afflicting
Spanish society by 62.5% of those asked, compared to unemployment with ―only‖
46.1%.75 Furthermore, although immigration had been considered a problem, albeit
minor, from time to time throughout the research period, after the 11/M terrorist attacks,
immigration remained within the top four main problems afflicting Spanish society. Most
of the time it was listed as a concern behind unemployment, terrorism, and the newly
discovered Islamist terrorist threat, but it even topped the list in October 2005.76
There is perhaps some just cause behind this concern, even if it does appear to
have been somewhat late to occur. Several facts could have alerted the Spanish public to
the increasing threat of extremist Islamic terrorism, but, for some reason, it did not appear
to do so except on very rare occasions. According to Jordán and Horsburgh, for nearly 15
years before the 11/M attacks, dating back to the early 1990s, there was a ―continued
presence of individuals linked to jihadist groups in Spain‖.77 Additionally, many of the
9/11 hijackers had ties to Spain and several studies, including one released by Europol in
December 2003, declared Spain‘s involvement in the United States‘ invasion of Iraq as
an additional risk for Spain. Moreover, Al Qaeda released the document, ―Jihadi Iraq,

―El PSOE parte con 10 puntos de ventaja sobre el PP‖, El País, 23 March 2004
Instituto Opina (Opinion Institute) surveys from May 2004, September 2004, December 2004,
September 2005, and October 2005.
77
Jordán, and Horsburgh, 209-229
75
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Hopes and Dangers‖, in December 2003 and it listed Spain as the ―weakest link‖ in the
U.S. Coalition Forces, claiming that the Spanish public would not tolerate more than two,
maximum three, attacks before removing their troops from Iraq.

Furthermore, this

document specifically mentions the Spanish election period as a good time to strike.
Regardless of these facts, Spaniards were not very concerned about immigration from
Islamic countries or Islamist terrorism, or terrorism at all, in the months leading up to
11/M. This holds true even though those surveyed by the Center for Sociological
Investigations, or CIS, in 2002 listed the ―political instability of North African countries‖
as the top ―focus of international conflict that could affect Spanish security‖. 78 A CIS
survey from November 2003 demonstrated that 40.6% of Spaniards believed that there
were ―too many‖ Latin Americans in Spain while the second, behind unemployment with
63.6%, most pressing problem for 40.7% of those surveyed was ETA terrorism.79

80

Perhaps, even more telling is the fact that in February 2004, after the Al Qaeda and
Europol publications, terrorism did not even figure into the main personal concerns of
Spanish citizens.81
It should go without saying, but is worth mentioning, that terrorism has had a
fairly permanent place in Spain as one of the major problems plaguing Spanish society.

―Dos de cada tres encuestados por el CIS rechazan una guerra contra Irak‖, El País, 30 October
2002
79
―La vivienda es el tercer problema que más afecta a los ciudadanos, según el CIS‖, El País, 23
December 2003
80
This concern over Latin American immigration demonstrates that immigration in Spain, as in
most other developed countries, is usually not considered problematic until either there are
problems directly caused by those immigrants (e.g. terrorist attacks), which is not often the case,
or when those immigrants are taking jobs that the native citizens need due to high levels of
unemployment, which as has been previously addressed, has been a very important concern for
Spaniards for a very long time.
81
―El terrorismo vuelve a ser la principal preocupación de los españoles, según el CIS‖, El País,
27 April 2004
78
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This is due to a number of factors, including not only the continued threat of terrorism,
primarily from ETA but increasingly from international terrorist groups as well, but
additionally from new laws and declarations passed through Parliament, including: the
very controversial debate regarding whether to reinstate the death penalty for terrorists,82
the quite controversial amnesty and reinsertion programs for repentant etarras, or
members of ETA, the outlawing of political parties affiliated with terrorist groups, and
the numerous ETA truces and ceasefires. Even with the permanence of terrorist violence
and issues related to terrorism and terrorists, in the time frame of this research, there are
some very noticeable highs and lows in Spanish public opinion regarding terrorism,
which leads to the conclusion that the public in Spain has had, insofar as the public
opinion data support, a quite volatile relationship with terrorism. It is also possible to
state that the Spanish public opinion, at times, demonstrated an increased level of
hostility, and disproportionality, especially regarding the debate surrounding and support
for the possible reinstatement of the death penalty. Lastly, it is also true that throughout
most of the research period, there was substantial agreement that the threat of terrorism
was real, serious, and cause by the wrongdoing members and their behavior, which at
times, especially in the aftermath of major terrorist attacks, was heightened.

82

It should be noted that while the reinstatement of the death penalty may appear fairly
unimportant to some, or at least not appear to be an extreme or disproportionate measure, in the
context of having previously abolished the death penalty based on arguments such as sentencing
someone to the death penalty directly contradicts their right to life and even establishing a
maximum prison sentence, the mere discussion of potentially reinstating the death penalty in
Spain should be viewed as being an extreme response.
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United Kingdom
For most of the research period, the United Kingdom, much like Spain, had a
much higher level of concern for unemployment, and also taxes, than for terrorism. This
does not, however, mean that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was not an issue for the
British, because it, indeed, was. Concern for the IRA and its activities, however, was not
viewed as a major threat, unlike unemployment, until it (re-)emerged as the ―predominant
issue in British politics‖ in 1982.83 One of the main additional reasons why the IRA never
seemed to quite top the charts of public concern is because in 1988 two things happened.
Firstly, the National Health Services started to be ―consider[ed] [as] the most urgent
problem facing the nation‖,84 and secondly, British officials acknowledged that
―terrorism is no longer a national problem‖.85 Lastly, as in Spain, concern for the
environment, second only to the poll tax, also topped the list of concerns facing British
society for a brief time.
Perhaps what really sets British sentiment regarding terrorism apart from Spanish
sentiment is that the IRA enjoyed a fairly decent amount of public support, much more so
than ETA, especially in the beginning. It must be noted, however, that most of this
support was directed toward the IRA‘s ―idealism‖, 32% in 1978, and not a general
approval or support which was only 2% in 1978.86 Furthermore, the British public has
fairly consistently supported talks between the British Government and the IRA,
including, at times, Sinn Fein. Moreover, public support for talks between the parties

Simpson, Jeffrey; GAM, ―Unemployment top concern, U.K. poll finds‖, The Globe and Mail,
24 September 1982
84
DeYoung, Karen, ―The British Love Their National Health Service; But Can It Survive?‖, The
Washington Post 15 March 1988
85
―Bruges to Rhodes‖, The Times, 26 September 1988
86
―Provisional IRA warning of 10-year Ulster War‖, The Times, 9 May 1978
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steadily increased over time, from 43% in 1984, in favor of direct talks with Sinn Fein, to
51% supporting the inclusion of Sinn Fein in 1991, to 59%, of either party or both, in
1993, to 85% in the Republic and 56% in Northern Ireland in 1996 without a ceasefire,
and 94% and 80%, respectively, with a ceasefire in place.87
The apparent overwhelming support for talks should not be taken as is and
without further consideration. It must be noted that the reason there existed so much
support for talks between the British Government and the IRA, and later Sinn Fein, is
because more than half of those who supported talks believed that they would lead to
peace. Furthermore, the research also makes it apparent that the British society was not
averse to the idea of using harsher methods in the pursuit of peace. Similar to the case of
Spain, the British public largely supported reinstating the death penalty for terrorists,
which is evident by the fact that support for reinstating the death penalty for terrorists
stood at 70% in 1982, and at 93% in 1983.88
No analysis of British public opinion would be complete without mentioning the
withdrawal of British forces from Northern Ireland. According to The Times, ―every
opinion poll taken in Britain since the present troubles has shown a majority in favour of
withdrawal from the province‖.89 While this quote is from 1986, it completely captures
the public‘s sentiment in favor of the withdrawal of British forces from Northern Ireland,

Johnson, Paul, ―Support in poll for talks with IRA/Opinion poll on British attitudes to Ulster‖,
The Guardian (London), 27 August 1984; ―Poll calls for return of internment to halt sectarian
killings‖, The Observer, 20 October 1991; ―Poll Questions Ulster Link: Most want talks with
Sinn Fein if violence renounced – Major tells Unionists he will not accept joint sovereignty‖, The
Guardian (London), 10 November 1993; ―Momentum for talks builds as Major joins ‗right‘ side;
Irish peace process: PM makes IRA an offer it will find hard to refuse‖, The Independent
(London), 1 March 1996
88
―Police drop plan to issue IRA Photofit picture‖, The Times, 26 July 1982; ―Retributive Justice‖,
The Times, 20 June 1983
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which only increased with the passage of time. Another example of the attitude most in
the U.K. held toward Northern Ireland is the following excerpt:
―We‘ve done 10 polls over the last 15 years.‖ Said Mr. Worcester [of the
polling firm Market & Opinion Research International]. ―They show that
the British public don‘t lay awake nights worrying about Northern Ireland.
They lay awake worrying about their jobs, whether their car will be stolen,
or about the National Health Service.‖ After 25 years of bloodshed, in
which hundreds of British soldiers lost their lives, polls indicate most
people in Britain would be happy if Northern Ireland drifted away across
the Atlantic. ―They seem more concerned about it in Boston than in
Britain,‖ Mr. Worcester said of Northern Ireland.90
Another noticeable aspect of public opinion data in the U.K. regarding the IRA is
that there is a definite link between governmental policies and views and the public‘s
opinion or view of the IRA and levels of violence. For example, in 1985, when asked, ―If
present policies continue unchanged, do you think people will become more attracted or
less attracted to revolutionary violence?‖ 62% replied ―more‖, and to the question ―Do
you think acts of political terrorism in Britain will be more or less common?‖ 52%
replied ―more‖.91 Additionally, when the August 1994 ceasefire broke down, an opinion
poll ―indicated that more than 70% of people in the [Irish] Republic held the British
government responsible for the collapse of the ceasefire‖.92
In the aftermath of the 7 July 2005 (7/7) and 21 July 2005 attacks in London,
opinion polls found a large majority of citizens in favor of Britain‘s new or updated
counterterrorism measures, including the proposed 90-day detention for suspected
terrorists. This, however, is only one example of the long ―habit of home secretaries (of
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both parties) to use the results of public opinion polls … to ease the passing of
controversial decisions and legislation, especially when their intent is to diminish rights
and civil liberties‖.93
Quotes such as ―terrorism is no longer a national problem‖ 94 compared with ones
such as ―the Northern Ireland problem is clearly the most serious human problem facing
the British Government‖,95 demonstrate that the public opinion regarding IRA terrorism
has been quite volatile. In the British experience, moreover, if a comparison is made
between what the public has to say about governmental policies both before and after the
7/7 attacks in London, it would appear as if there may be a disproportionate response to
the 7/7 attacks, even though public opinion polls were used to pass legislation both before
and after the attacks.
In concluding this section, an examination of the data is necessary to help
determine if the theory of moral panics will be useful in explaining the divergence
between the British and Spanish state responses to incidents of terrorism in their
respective countries.96 From the examination of Spanish public opinion data, it is quite
obvious that terrorism has been one of the top, and most widespread, concerns for the
Spanish citizenry throughout the research period. There have also been some very
noticeable increases and decreases regarding the concern for terrorism, reflecting
volatility. The unwillingness of the Spanish public to re-integrate terrorists into society,

―All politicians want to be popular with voters. But rule by opinion poll is not what democracy
is about‖, The Guardian (London), 9 November 2005
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without them having completed their full prison sentences, and moreover, the vast
support at times for arguably disproportionate counterterrorism measures such as the
reinstatement of the death penalty demonstrate that there was, at various points during the
research period, an increased level of hostility toward the terrorists. An additional
example of this is the vast public support for criminalizing the Basque political party and
so-called political wing of ETA, Herri Batasuna. Public opinion in Spain, therefore,
reflects all five indicators of a moral panic.
Turning now to the British public opinion data, it must first be stated that the
British citizenry appears to have had a lesser amount of concern for terrorism than their
Spanish counterparts, although terrorism is still a notable concern for the British public,
at times even becoming volatile. Moreover, much like the Spanish case, this concern, at
times, reveals the presence of an increased level of hostility toward terrorists regarding
policies such as detention or imprisonment and the death penalty. Although the IRA
terrorists enjoyed a higher level of public support for their cause than their ETA
counterparts did, making it appear as if the criterion of ―substantial or widespread
agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing
group members and their behaviour‖ is not met, the converse is actually true. This is due
to the fact that although the IRA enjoyed a higher level of public support than ETA, a
significantly larger percentage of the British populace still disapproved of the IRA and its
actions. Lastly, there is some evidence of disproportionality present in the British public
opinion data on terrorism, especially regarding the consideration of measures such as the
reintroduction of the death penalty.
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In summary, evidence from public opinion data, especially regarding the support
for the reinstatement of the death penalty and the criminalization of certain political
parties offers support for the argument that moral panics were present in both of the case
studies.
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Chapter 2: Action Groups Data

While it is true that a democratic government must be held responsible to its
citizenry, it is also true that many citizens of democratic countries do not participate in
government, or at least not directly, and even those who do directly participate (e.g. by
voting in elections) can have their voices fade without the right amount of pressure. As a
collective voice is louder than an individual voice, action groups can serve as a means to
ensure that the voice of the public is heard.97 For this reason, an examination of action
groups in both Spain and the United Kingdom is included in the attempt to further
understand the role that the public plays in shaping democratic states‘ counterterrorism
policies. Much like in any democratic country, British and Spanish action groups are
vastly diverse and advocate for a variety of different causes; however, for purposes of
this thesis only those actions groups related to the British and Spanish battles against
terrorism are discussed. As examined below, these groups have voiced their opinions, in a
variety of ways, on many of the prominent issues found in the research on British and
Spanish counterterrorism responses. Furthermore, and while it should go without saying
that no action group can be successful in all of its endeavors, some action groups have

For purposes of this thesis, ―action groups‖ are defined as an organized association, group, or
organization which attempts to influence the government regarding certain actions or policies;
these can be similar to the lobbies found in the United States. Furthermore, due to the fact that
there is a vast number of action groups present in the research cases, some of which are founded
in the name of a single victim of terrorism, only a limited number of action groups are discussed
in this thesis due to their influence or size or for the purpose of example or explanation.
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had or contributed to considerable success in aiding victims of terrorism and, overall,
helping their societies to overcome the threat of terrorism.

Spain
As mentioned above, Spanish action groups have expressed their views and
voiced their opinions on many of the topics found in the research of the Spanish state
response to terrorism that were previously discussed. These topics include: the possible
reintroduction of the death penalty, hosting dialogues with ETA, the Spanish policy of
reinsertion, and criminalizing Herri Batasuna (HB). Each of these topics is addressed
below.
As discussed above, the potential reinstatement of the death penalty was a quite
controversial or polemical topic. Not unsurprisingly, many of the associations in favor of
the protection of human rights, including Amnesty International, were strongly opposed
to the possible reinstatement of the death penalty. What is perhaps more surprising is the
fact that many of the victims of terrorism and family members of the victims were
opposed to the death penalty as well.98 This is important to note because not only are the
action groups supposed to be the voice of the victims but, moreover, due to the fact that
some of the victims of terrorism became involved in the action groups only after their
personal experiences with terrorist violence, and hence, brought their beliefs and
sentiments along with them, they could, therefore, easily influence the different action
groups.

A similar situation is found regarding the case of holding a dialogue or

negotiating with ETA. For example, a father whose son was an ETA militant killed in a
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confrontation with the Spanish Guardia Civil, said regarding holding a dialogue with
ETA, ―I am against ETA, but a supporter of anything before they continue killing‖. 99
Turning now to the criminalization of Herri Batasuna, many of the action groups,
especially the Associación de Víctimas del Terrorismo, the Association of Victims of
Terrorism or AVT, were very much in favor criminalizing ETA‘s alleged political wing.
In fact, the Associación de Víctimas del Terrorismo requested the criminalization of HB
through a complaint to Judge Baltasar Garzón.100 More importantly, two of AVT‘s
lawyers at the time stated to Ismael Moreno, a judge in the Audencia Nacional, the
Spanish National Court, that ―it would be difficult to establish a direct connection
between ETA and HB, for which legal rodeos [stretches of the truth]101 would have to be
devised to demonstrate this possible link‖.102 This quote illustrates the Association‘s
determination to outlaw HB, even if it meant using questionably legal loopholes or
maneuvers. It should be noted that some of the action groups were not only concerned
with the criminalization of Herri Batasuna, but instead, some groups, such as La
Federación Provincial de Asociaciones de Vecinos or the Provincial Federation of
Neighborhood Associations, advocated for the criminalization of all political parties of
the extreme right.103 This reflects what can, perhaps, be considered a disproportionate

―Víctimas de la violencia reclaman dialógo con ETA para conseguir la paz de Euskadi‖, El
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response, or at least the attempt of such, given the fact that not all of the political parties
of the extreme right had any affiliation, alleged or otherwise, to any terrorist organization.
The last issue to discuss here concerns the reinsertion of prisoners convicted of
terrorist offenses. This topic also offers one of the best examples of how different action
groups held competing beliefs on a number of topics, including that of the reinsertion
policy. Javier Concuera Atienza, a member of La Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos del
País Vasco, the Pro Human Rights Association of the Basque Country, perhaps not
surprisingly, voiced the belief that reinsertion ―had been demonstrated to be one of the
appropriate measures‖ to obtain a ―democratic and peaceful coexistence‖. 104 On the other
hand, members of the Associación del Víctimas del Terrorismo stood firm in their
conviction that the reinsertion of prisoners should not happen, which they believed for a
number of reasons, including as according to Paulino Baena, former spokesman of the
AVT, that ―the policy of reinsertion of etarras is a response in an attempt to justify the
movement of Amedo and Domínguez to third grade to avoid ‗possible revelations‘‖.105
106

One of the principle reasons why action groups such as the AVT were so
adamantly opposed to the policy of reinsertion was because they were against the
reduction of prison sentences that accompanied the reinsertion. To illustrate, the AVT
rejected ―any measure that ‗benefit[ed]‘ the etarras, and ask[ed] for the complete
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fulfillment of the convictions given by the Audencia Nacional‖.107 Additionally, as stated
by an AVT Catalonian delegate, ―it is incomprehensible that a terrorist is condemned to a
sentence of including hundreds of years and after seven or eight years they are already
out on the streets‖.108 Perhaps the best way to demonstrate how vehemently opposed the
AVT was to the policy of reinsertion is the fact that they were able to collect nearly
1,100,000 signatures asking ―for the complete fulfillment of the sentences, so that
terrorists fulfill their sentences and with the constitutional limit of 30 years of prison‖.109
While the collection of more than a million signatures in favor of their position
regarding the policy of reinsertion was a huge accomplishment for the AVT, as it would
be for any action group, perhaps the best evaluation of the role played by Spanish action
groups in influencing public opinion is through the numerous demonstrations they
organized. These demonstrations largely occurred in the main Spanish cities (e.g.
Barcelona, Madrid, Pamplona, etc.) but were also present throughout the country, and
were held in support of, or against, a number of different issues related to terrorism. A
few examples of these demonstrations include: demonstrations against certain proposed
pieces of legislation, against terrorist attacks on businesses and the revolutionary tax, and
general demonstrations in favor of peace. Looking first at demonstrations against
proposed legislation, when ―la Ley de Seguridad Cuidadana‖, the Law and Order Act,
was proposed, between 7,000-15,000 people in Madrid demonstrated against the
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proposed law due to it being ―the most serious attack against the Constitution since its
birth‖.110
While it may seem unusual for businesses to organize demonstrations against
terrorism, in Spain they have a vested interest in doing so given the fact that ETA has
repeatedly targeted them in at least two ways. The first way is through the imposition of
the ―revolutionary tax‖, which ETA would demand from business owners to help fund
their operations, and any refusal to pay this ―tax‖ could lead to kidnapping, and
subsequently, ransom demands, or even to the threat of their murder or that of a family
member. It is important to note that this ―revolutionary tax‖ is unlike any other tax in
which small denominations are usually taken, because, on the contrary, ETA earned a
substantial amount of money via their ―revolutionary tax‖ revenues. For example, in only
two of the numerous examples of ―tax collections‖, ETA demanded that Miguel
Juareguiberri pay 30 million pesetas ($258,501.53), and that a further two entrepreneurs,
Fransico Irazusta and Jacinto Irogoyen, pay 25 million pesetas ($215,417.94).111
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second way in which ETA targeted businesses was by directing their attacks against
specific sectors, namely the tourism industry. Consequently, this hurt businesses
economically, if not also physically, aggravating, for example, ―even more so the difficult
situation of unemployment in Andalucía‖, a major tourist destination.113 An additional
example of a demonstration held, at least in part, by businesses is that of a demonstration
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held in the aftermath of an ETA attack against a commercial center in Barcelona, in
which some 70,000 people participated.114
Perhaps the action group most involved in hosting demonstrations is Gesto por la
Paz de Euskal Herria or Gesture for the Peace of the Basque Country. This action group
is responsible for organizing numerous demonstrations including a memorable threekilometer (1.86 mile) human chain in Pamplona in which some 7,000 people attended to
―Join the peace‖.115 An additional example of their demonstrations is one that was held
annually to commemorate the anniversary of Gandhi‘s death in which between 40,000150,000 people participated.116
To conclude this discussion of demonstrations, it is imperative that what is
perhaps the most well-known demonstration in Spanish history be addressed, that of the
demonstration held in the aftermath of the 11/M terrorist attacks in Madrid. Given the
fact that a mere three days after the attacks elections were to be held, an additional sense
of urgency existed to discover the perpetrators of the attacks, and for this reason on the
13 March 2004, ―after 6pm, some 5,000 people, convened via mobile messages [SMS or
text messages], concentrated before the PP headquarters [in Madrid] … shouting: ‗Before
voting, we want the truth‘‖.117 While perhaps in light of some of the other demonstrations
discussed above 5,000 attendees does not appear to be a large number, given the facts
that this demonstration was truly publically driven via text messages, that demonstrations
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against the 11/M attacks were held the day before, and that it was indeed illegal for the
demonstration to take place, this demonstration is all the more significant.118
The last aspect of action groups to be discussed is that of their successes. As
mentioned above, Spanish action groups have not been successful in all of their attempts,
often because many of the action groups had opposing views on many of the topics
discussed. However, Spanish action groups have had a number of significant
achievements, some of the most important of which include: working with universities to
offer scholarships to victims of terrorism, influencing the establishment of a
governmental office for the assistance of victims of terrorism, and advocating for the
collection and distribution of indemnifications for the victims of terrorism or their family
members. Regarding offering university scholarships to victims of terrorism, the AVT
and the Universidad Complutense de Madrid created a special statute to offer, inter alia,
free tuition, scholarships, and psychological care to those affected by terrorism.119
Perhaps the action groups‘ most important successes were those that led to the
disbursement of millions of dollars worth of indemnifications to victims of terrorism or
their family members. It should be noted that the AVT and other action groups were not
solely responsible for the collections of indemnifications and that the Spanish
government, and later the Council of Europe, also required indemnifications but,
nonetheless, the AVT and other action groups were instrumental in a number of ways in
obtaining these collections.120
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One of the principle ways in which the AVT in particular was able to help victims
of terrorism and their families collect indemnifications was by beginning ―legal actions to
make freed terrorists have to start compensating for the economic debt that they have
with their victims‖ in which they asked the Prosecutor of the Audencia Nacional to
garnish the wages of freed etarras that had a paying job.121 122 However, perhaps none of
these recouped indemnifications would have been possible without the AVT‘s creation of
a foundation, under their same name, that had the specific aim to seek funds for the
―moral and economic help‖ of the victims of terrorism and their families.123 In many
ways this office was the precursor to the Spanish Minister of Interior‘s creation of the
Office of Assistance to Victims of Terrorism. The AVT had much to do with the
establishment of this Spanish government level office dedicated to victims of terrorism
considering they had advocated for indemnifications for nearly 15 years before its
establishment and the fact that ―the creation of this center occurred after the Ombudsman,
Fernando Álvarez de Miranda, recommended, in his annual report before the Courts the
19th of June, a revision of the existing legislation on state indemnifications for acts of
terrorism‖.124
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To conclude, from the review of the data regarding Spanish action groups, it can
be stated with certainty that they were able to influence not only public opinion, by
collecting petition signatures and organizing demonstrations or marches, but also policy
making, especially that of collecting indemnifications for the victims of terrorism. It is
also apparent that with the case of the criminalization of Herri Batasuna, for example, the
action groups themselves did, at times, use or support questionably legal means to
achieve their goals, which is, perhaps, explainable, however, not justifiable, due to the
fact that many of the members of the action groups had been victims of terrorism
themselves. Regardless of the logic behind their methods, while the action groups did not
exhibit much volatility, which is perhaps due to the fact that a large number of action
groups, representing different views were present in Spain, it is evident that a number of
action groups did express a heightened level of concern, an increased level of hostility,
and, again, although there was some contention among the different action groups,
substantial or widespread agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and
caused by the wrongdoing group members and their behavior, and disproportionality,
especially with regard to criminalizing political parties, or aiming to do so. In other
words, the examination of the data on Spanish action groups shows some evidence of
four of the five indicators of a moral panic.

United Kingdom
British action groups have expressed their views and voiced their opinions on
many of the same topics found in the research of the British state response to terrorism
that were previously discussed. The following focuses, however, on some additional
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aspects of the topics previously addressed such as the numerous examples of legislative
and security measures that were introduced to help combat the threat of terrorism and the
importance of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Additionally, topics
not previously discussed such as advocating for victims of terrorism to receive monetary
or other support, demonstrations or protests, and prisoners‘ rights are discussed.
Much like in the case of Spain, and other democratic countries, one of the
principal ways in which action groups in the United Kingdom expressed their beliefs was
through organizing demonstrations or protests. These demonstrations were held for a
number of reasons, but a primary reason was to express dissatisfaction with the different
legislative and security measures that the government was debating or enforcing,
especially regarding internment and the lack of inquiry, or independent inquiry, into
alleged ill treatment, or even torture, of prisoners. It must be noted that in the case of the
United Kingdom, organizing, or even attending, protests is especially important due to
the fact that emergency legislation regarding the situation in Northern Ireland had made
marches illegal and, therefore, attendees or organizers could be, and at times were,
arrested and prosecuted which, furthermore, even extended to a number of members of
Parliament.125 Moreover, the protests were significant because they did contribute to a
number of successes such as getting the British and Irish governments to abandon a plan
―to introduce legislation allowing on-the-run (OTR) terrorists to return to Ireland and
benefit from an amnesty‖.126 127 It is also worthwhile to mention that just as action groups
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in the U.K. organized a number of marches, they also were responsible for cancelling
them. For example, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) successfully
pled for the cancelation of a civil rights march that was planned against the sending of
additional British troops into Northern Ireland in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.128
To further examine the responses of British action groups to proposed or enacted
legislative or security measures the topics of internment or detention without trial and
allegations of ill treatment or torture and how they relate to violations of civil liberties are
reviewed. Many of Britain‘s action groups were founded solely to protect civil liberties
(e.g. the British Irish Rights Watch, the National Council for Civil Liberties, Northern
Ireland Civil Liberties Association, etc.), and while other groups advocated for the
protection of civil liberties as well, these associations in particular questioned and
condemned the practice of internment. Much like in the Spanish case in which a number
of the members of different associations had been personally affected by terrorist
violence, a number of these civil liberties advocates personally experienced internment
and, therefore, knew what the conditions were like which, perhaps, caused them to be
more critical than they might otherwise have been.129
Action groups were also passionate about attempting to condemn the government
for its actions or inactions regarding allegations of torture. They were not, however,
always successful in achieving this at a governmental level, which led some U.K. action
groups to take their cases to the European level. One such example was when the
Relatives of Bloody Sunday Victims and the British Irish Rights Watch took their case to
―the European Commission on Human Rights [ECoHR], after the British government‘s
128
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refusal to reopen inquiries into the [Bloody Sunday] killings‖. 130 An additional example
regards British Irish Rights Watch, the Committee on the Administration of Justice
(CAJ), Inquest, and Liberty (previously the National Council for Civil Liberties) taking
the case of the 1988 killings in Gibraltar to the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) to determine if the shooting ―breached Article Two of the European Convention
on Human Rights [ECHR] which guarantees the right to life‖. 131 It is worthwhile to
mention that some of the action groups were not satisfied with trying individual soldiers
for their actions and instead called for the government to be condemned for its actions.
For example, according to NICRA, ―individual soldiers who carried out their orders are
not to blame, but rather the Prime Minister of the day and his Cabinet who took the
decision to use torture. These are the guilty men who must be punished.‖132 In sum, while
only a small amount of action groups took cases to the European level, it does attest to
the fact that these associations were not going to stop until they had done all they
possibly could have to get justice for the victims and, more importantly, that they had the
support to do so.
It should also be mentioned that a number of U.K. action groups, were adamant in
their belief that civil rights applied to all, and as such, should be protected for all, which
included prisoners. One of the reasons why some action groups advocated for the
protection of civil liberties of prisoners is because according to them, ―the real victims…
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have been the families and relatives of the prisoners‖.133 This statement was made
regarding the use of the ―Special Secure Units‖ which ―provide a very restricted setting in
which prisoners often remain confined for many years‖, and demonstrates that however
much the families of prisoners grieved over knowing their loved one was in such a cell,
that the action groups were also concerned about how the prisoners were housed and their
overall well-being.134 Organizations such as Relatives for Justice were especially
concerned for the well-being of prisoners during the hunger strikes of the 1980s which
was attributed to the fact that some of the prisoners‘ convictions were based on
―uncorroborated testimony‖, and called ―for emergency legislation to ensure there are no
further convictions on uncorroborated testimony‖ which they hoped could be passed and
then applied retroactively.135 Lastly, it must be noted that one of the principle reasons
why the action groups advocated for the rights of prisoners is due to the fact that a report
published by numerous groups including: British Irish Rights Watch, the Committee on
the Administration of Justice, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, and Liberty (National
Council for Civil Liberties) claimed, ―the prisoners‘ issue … must be central to the peace
process‖, and that ―the current Home Office treatment of prisoners is actually damaging
and destabilising the peace process‖.136 In other words, some action groups believed the
fate of the peace process rested on the treatment of the prisoners and, therefore, they took
the conditions of their treatment quite seriously.
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One of the other main concerns of many of the action groups in the U.K. was to
improve the lives of the victims of terrorism. This was done in a variety of ways
including providing housing and campaigning or lobbying to receive aid, monetary and
otherwise, to help the victims. One of the major action groups committed to obtaining the
funds necessary to help victims of terrorism is the National Association of Victims
Support Schemes.137 This association has arguably been quite successful at lobbying for
additional funds, or at least not a reduction in funds, and the fact that ―Labour would
discuss with the National Association of Victim Support Schemes what sums they needed
to provide services they regarded as essential‖ demonstrates the influence the Association
could, and often did, exert.138 An additional example of the influence the National
Association of Victim Support Schemes could exert is demonstrated by the fact that it
was recognized that ―victim support schemes were ‗one of the most helpful developments
of recent years‘‖.139 Moreover, much like in the Spanish case, in the U.K. convicted
terrorist offenders are liable for having to pay indemnifications to their victims. However,
this would not entirely ease the financial burden of assisting the victims, due to the fact
that, as Martin Wright, of the National Association of Victim Support Schemes, noted,
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―the problem is that offenders sometimes cannot pay‖ and as such the Association would
continue to lobby for government support.140
While the topic of international cooperation has been previously discussed, it also
merits exploration in the discussion of action groups. While it is true that cooperation
among democratic governments is commonplace, the notion of action groups actively
seeking to achieve its aims by cooperating with other action groups is not as common.
However uncommon it may be, the logic behind their desire for collaboration was such
that ―if you have an international network of [terrorists] exchanging training and
expertise [then] why can‘t you have an international network of victims working to help
each other?‖.141 As such, the Families Acting for Innocent Relatives (FAIR) partnered
with Fundación Colombia Herida, Wounded Colombia Foundation, to petition the
Colombian government to extradite the ―Colombian three‖ and to ―lobby for the
Colombian government to fund members of Colombia Herida to visit Ireland so that they
can lobby the Irish government‖.142 143
In conclusion, British action groups, have been successful in achieving an
improvement in the lives of victims of terrorism through economic and other forms of
aid, and in assisting and maintaining the integrity of the democratic system by protesting
against legislative or security measures that could curtail civil liberties, and by ensuring
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that those who used these questionable or illegal methods or those who were responsible
for others using them, faced the consequences of their actions or inactions. Furthermore,
from the review of the data regarding the British action groups, it can be stated with
certainty that they were able to influence not only public opinion, by, for example,
organizing or calling for the cancelation of demonstrations or marches, but also policy
making, especially with regard to collecting indemnifications for the victims of terrorism.
While British actions groups did not exhibit much volatility, it is evident that a number of
action groups did express a heightened level of concern, an increased level of hostility,
and, although there was some contention among the different action groups, substantial or
widespread agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the
wrongdoing group members and their behavior and disproportionality. In other words,
the examination of the data on British action groups shows evidence of four of the five
indicators of a moral panic.

55

Chapter 3: Statements of Heads of Government and Opposition

As evident by the countless definitions proposed by scholars, democracy can be a
difficult concept to define. Larry Diamond, for example, defines a liberal democracy as
―a political system in which individual and group liberties are well protected and in
which there exist autonomous spheres of civil society and private life, insulated from
state control‖.144 Adam Przeworski alternatively defines an electoral democracy as ―a
civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices are
filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage‖.145
These definitions of democracy are included to stress the importance of the public in
democratic states. For purposes of this thesis a democracy is defined as including the
following: free, fair, and contestable elections with universal suffrage; the freedom of
expression and representation regardless of ethnicity, gender, age, occupation, sexual
orientation, religion or any other factor; freedom of speech, belief, and opinion and the
right to legally voice opposition through individual or collective action, and to have it
heard through multiple channels; respect for civil liberties, and equality and protection
under the law. Furthermore, many scholars consider a parliamentary system of
government, the system in both Britain and Spain, the preferential form of governance
because, compared to presidential systems, it is believed to be more stable and to offer ―a
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better hope of preserving democracy‖.146,147 If counterterrorism policies are alleged to be
in contrast with democratic principles this could severely damage the reputation
parliamentary governments have earned.
Lawmakers and politicians have fairly self-explanatory roles to fulfill in a
democracy; those of creating laws and of implementing policy. According to Goode and
Ben-Yehuda, both lawmakers and politicians, however, can play an additional role, that
of creating a moral panic.148 This section reviews statements made by members of
government, from both the ruling and opposition parties, in an attempt to account for
what role, if any, lawmakers and politicians have played in creating a moral panic in
Spain and the United Kingdom.149 As the previous section on public opinion makes
apparent, both ETA and the IRA have enjoyed varying levels of public support. For the
purpose of this section, it is necessary to focus on the role played by lawmakers and
politicians in recognizing this public support and the greater role of the public and how it
affects lawmakers and politicians and their actions.

Spain
One of the most dominant themes found in the research of statements from
Spanish heads of government and opposition regarding terrorism refers to democracy and
the affects terrorism has, or could have, on democracy, most notably, the fear that
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terrorism is going to, or could, overthrow the democratic system in Spain. Statements
expressing this concern are just as common in the first years of the new democracy in
Spain as they are into the 21st century. Statements such as, ―it is classic to give in
situations of political impotency legal draconian answers that imply the amputation of a
part of democracy itself‖,150 and ―ETA is the worst enemy of the liberties of the Spanish
people and of the Basque people‖151 are quite common in the research. Statements such
as these imply, or overtly claim, that terrorism is a threat to Spanish democracy, and
given the fact that concern for terrorism was a primary concern for Spaniards, perhaps,
the heads of government and opposition made statements such as these so that they
appeared to acknowledge this concern. However, although much is said that appears to
try to invoke a panic in the Spanish public about the strength of their democracy, Spanish
politicians seem to have balanced this panic with statements such as: ―regardless of
terrorism, democracy has continued settling itself in Spain‖.152
It should be noted that the terrorist organization ETA was not viewed as the only
threat to Spanish democracy. In much of the research, the mere attempt or willingness to
negotiate with ETA was portrayed as being enormously destructive to Spanish
democracy. This held true even in light of the fact that Javier Solano, Minister of Culture
at the time, recognized that ―there has been, there are, and there will be contacts‖ between
governmental representatives and leaders of the military faction of the terrorist
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organization, ETA.153 For example, even though Adolfo Suárez, President of the Union
of the Democratic Center (UCD) party at the time, believed it was ―logical‖ to take
advantage of ―an opportunity of dialogue‖ if it presented itself, and the Basque Provincial
Government agreed, a spokesperson for the Minister of Interior said that it would be
―politically rude‖ and ―an absolute depreciation to those who have been victims of
terrorism‖ to hold negotiations between the Spanish Government and ETA.154 An even
more illustrative example of the catastrophic effects negotiating with ETA was thought to
bring Spain is the following quote from a delegate of the Basque Government:
―negotiating now with ETA not only would lay the groundwork for the collapse of the
democratic State but moreover would be an example of an unspeakable strategic
blunder‖.155 Regardless of the aforementioned remarks regarding how negotiating with
ETA would damage Spanish democracy, negotiations or ―talks‖ or ―dialogues‖
continued. Perhaps the reason for continuing to hold the dialogues was best stated by
Mariano Rajoy, Minister of Government at the time: ―we have to do the impossible so
that it becomes possible‖.156
As the implementation of new legislation, or the modification of existing
legislation, is one of the factors in determining whether a moral panic is present, and
heads of government are responsible for initiating and carrying out modified or new
policies, a brief mention of such is necessary at this point, but is addressed in greater
detail later in this thesis. Regardless of the fact that throughout the research period many
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different modifications of existing counterterrorism laws or new counterterrorism laws
were implemented, for the most part, Spanish politicians appeared averse to overstepping
their boundaries and were willing to work within the constraints of the democratic system
to achieve their counterterrorism objectives. For example, Manual Fraga, President of the
Popular Alliance, stated that a ―priority has to be given to the problem [of terrorism]
utilizing normal, legal means including states of exception, to combat it‖.157
On the other hand, however, the statements clearly reflect how this was not
always the case. For example, when José Maria Aznar was first running for election, he
stated that if he ―made it to govern [won the election], he would modify the penal code so
that terrorists would rot in jail‖.158 This statement produced backlash, including from
Felipe González, Prime Minister at the time, who replied to Aznar‘s statement by stating,
―the Constitution is a text passed by referendum by the immense majority of the Spanish
people and although it is not written in stone‖ he predicted that this modification to the
penal code ―would have some type of problem‖.159 González additionally stated that it
was one thing to know that terrorists deserved the maximum sentence and the maximum
amount of contempt but that it was another to ―play with such important pieces as the
Constitution and its purposes‖.160
The last factor that needs to be examined here is that the research demonstrates
that politicians often had to try to convince the Spanish public that the means taken in the
counterterrorism fight were necessary and proportionate. For example, when the Egin
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newspaper, a Basque newspaper believed to be promoting ETA‘s goals, was closed due
to the fact that it was often supportive of the terrorist group, many members of the
Basque and Spanish governments had to defend this decision as it was widely viewed by
the public as an infringement of the freedom of the press. An example of this is the
statement by a spokeswoman for the Basque Government who claimed that even though
the closing of Egin was ―an unusual measure‖, she had ―confidence in the prosecution
and the proportionality of the measure‖.161 It is well known that when certain things must
be said aloud that they are, more often than not, contrary to what they are claimed to be,
and as such, it must be mentioned that Article 571 of the Spanish Penal Code makes it an
offense to work ―in the service of an armed band, organization, or group‖, and
demonstrating support for a terrorist organization could very well be considered to be
working in the service of the group.
As one might presume, and as the research demonstrates, the relationship between
the public and politicians is not always the easiest, and in fact, it can be quite contentious
at times, and, occasionally, even outright adversarial. There are times in which the
government will heed what the public believes or says, other times in which it attempts to
keep the public ―under control‖, and lastly, further occasions when politicians blatantly
ignore the public or appear to simply be unconcerned about what the public believes. The
following statements offer some illustration. Regarding heeding what the public says,
politicians have ―manifested concern that polls reveal a certain loss of image as a
consequence of … uncertain results in the areas of the exterior and terrorism‖.162 It is
noteworthy to mention that this specific quote comes from an election period and,
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therefore, the ruling party was concerned about not being re-elected due to their ―loss of
image‖. Additional examples were found that refer to trying to keep the public ―under
control‖ or, in other words, there are numerous examples of statements in which Spanish
politicians appear to be trying to prevent the Spanish public from overreacting to various
circumstances. For example, regarding the potential reinstatement of the death penalty,
Miguel Boyer, Minister of Economy and Finance at the time, believed it was possible to
eradicate terrorism working within the constraints of the democratic system, and he tried
to avoid the arguably disproportionate response of reinstating the death penalty by
stating, ―it is possible to defend society against terrorism without violence, without
resorting to torture and without reinstating the death penalty‖.163
Lastly, as aforementioned, at times it was quite evident that Spanish politicians
did not care about or heed to what the public thought. Quotes such as ―to govern based on
surveys is an error of the highest caliber‖,164 ―the Government and the Popular Party do
not act thinking in the next elections, but instead of the next generations‖, and ―we [the
Spanish government] are not willing to trade votes for security‖165 all demonstrate that
the Spanish government did not always pay attention to what the Spanish populace
wanted, and instead did what it believed to be in the best interest of its citizenry even
when it contradicted what the citizens wanted. An example of such would be when Spain
sent troops to Iraq in 2003 when 91% of Spaniards were against doing so.166
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In conclusion, while it is absolutely true that at times Spanish politicians appeared
to be inciting fear or panic, especially regarding the affect terrorism has, or could have,
on Spanish democracy, it is also true that Spanish politicians were at times very
cognizant of how their words would resonate with the Spanish public and, as such, they
attempted to ease fears that could have led to a panic. With that being said, it is possible
to say that Spanish heads of government and opposition exhibited a number of the
different indicators of a moral panic to a small extent. In other words, the data concerning
Spanish heads of government and opposition demonstrate a heightened level of concern
and substantial or widespread agreement that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the
wrongdoing group members and their behavior, and to a lesser extent, or by a small
number of politicians, an increased level of hostility, disproportionality, and volatility.

United Kingdom
Turning now to the case of the United Kingdom, the following examination of the
role played by British politicians in the creation of a moral panic, or lack thereof,
demonstrates that British politicians have often behaved very similarly to their Spanish
counterparts, especially with regard to British politicians‘ sentiments toward the public,
mainly concerning opinion polls, and also the seeming contradictions found between
public sentiment and governmental actions or policies. However, some differences
between the British and Spanish politicians are also evident.
As was demonstrated with the public opinion poll data, the IRA enjoyed a higher
level of support among the British public than ETA did among the Spanish public. This is
important to recall because the research reveals a link between the British government‘s
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policies and support for the IRA. For example, Conor Cruise O‘Brien, a Labour Member
of Parliament (MP) at the time, wrote, ―if London is asking Dublin to discountenance and
discourage the IRA, it should try itself to refrain from acts and omissions which are likely
to spread sympathy for the IRA‖.167 Another example of a statement that reflects the
relationship between the British government‘s policies and support for the IRA comes
from Danny Morrison, an ex-Sinn Fein spokesman, in the aftermath of an attempt on the
life of former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and multiple members of her cabinet,
in which he recognized that had the bombing resulted in their deaths that ―it would
probably have led to Draconian security measures in Northern Ireland [and] past
experience has shown that this always leads to increased support for the terrorists‖. 168 It
should be noted that even though the IRA enjoyed more public support than ETA did in
Spain, British politicians, not unlike their Spanish counterparts, were quite averse to
granting concessions to the IRA or holding negotiations or talks with them, or at least
publicly doing so. As the General Secretary of the Ulster Unionist Party at the time, Mr.
Jim Wilson, stated, ―it would certainly strain relations if it emerged that senior civil
servants, some of whom may have been talking to us, had been talking to representatives
of the IRA‖.169
Another noticeable commonality between the British and Spanish politicians is
the description of terrorist attacks as attacks against their respective democracies.
Regarding the same attacks on the former Prime Minister and members of her cabinet,
Mr. Brittan, the Home Secretary at the time, stated that the purpose of the attack was ―no
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less than to strike a blow at the heart of our democracy‖. 170 Even though Mr. Brittan was
stressing the importance of the terrorist attack and the disastrous consequences it could
have led to, he also made the following statement declaring to the British public that,
―those who believe that terror can prevail against democracy understand neither the
members of this House – nor the British people‖.171 Similar statements were also made
in the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks in London by former Prime Minister Tony Blair such
as the following stated just days after the London attacks: ―[this country] will not be
defeated by such terror, but will defeat it and emerge from this horror with our values,
our way of life, tolerance and respect for others undiminished‖.172 The former Prime
Minister Tony Blair stated this even though he ―promised there would be the ‗most
intense police and security service action to make sure we bring those responsible to
justice‘‖173 and emphasized that, ―it is important that we respond by keeping to our
normal lives and doing what we want to do because to do otherwise is in a sense to give
them [the terrorists] the very thing they are looking for‖.174
It must be mentioned that while terrorist attacks could not destroy British
democracy, British politicians at times appeared to be headed down that road themselves.
This is especially true regarding the proposals and implementation of new security
measures. Statements reflecting the need for expanded or new counterterrorism measures
are present throughout the research period. For example, Francis Pym wrote in 1974, ―the
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need for a vigorous security campaign against terrorism remains a high priority‖ and this
sentiment only continued to repeat itself in the aftermath of the July 2005 attacks in
London.175
Even though the introduction of arguably disproportionate measures (e.g.
internment, the creation of a national identity card, etc.) was considered necessary prior
to the July 2005 attacks, after the attacks it became evident that the counterterrorism
measures were becoming increasingly extreme in nature, or even disproportionate,
especially for a democratic state. For example, even though Western liberal democracies
are thought to be ―beacons of liberty‖, in the aftermath of the London attacks, the British
government established a ―hierarchy of freedoms‖ in which, for example, ―the freedom
not to be filmed by a camera is not as great as the freedom to have a fair trial‖.176 Before
jumping too quickly to any conclusions regarding the potential disproportionality of the
British government‘s counterterrorism measures, it must be noted that much of what the
British government did regarding its counterterrorism or security measures, had the
backing of the public. For example, returning to the example of the creation of a national
identity card, it was stated that ―public opinion overwhelmingly supports the principle of
identity cards‖ and, moreover, that the government had been elected on a manifesto that
included identity cards.177 It is, however, necessary to remember that as previously
mentioned in the public opinion poll data section, ―it ha[d] long been the habit of home
secretaries (of both parties) to use the results of public opinion polls … to ease the
passing of controversial decisions and legislation, especially when their intent is to
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diminish rights and civil liberties‖.178 While some British politicians did indeed use
public opinion to support their arguably disproportionate counterterrorism measures,
there were also British politicians who cautioned against the use of these disproportionate
measures and emphasized the importance of staying within the confines of the democratic
system when combating terrorism. For example, David Cameron stated that there should
be ―rigorous implementation of existing powers. And nothing which undermines that
which we are trying to defend: our shared values of freedom under the rule of law.
Everything we do should be consistent with the rule of law‖.179
It is of equal importance that British politicians, not unlike their Spanish
counterparts, do not always appear to be concerned about what the British populace has
to say or think. In fact, British politicians have at times even contradicted themselves on
their views of public opinion. For example, Margaret Thatcher said, ―the heart of politics
is not political theory, it is people and how they want to live their lives‖ 180 and then a few
years later said, ―she took no notice of opinion polls. ‗There‘s only one poll I‘m
interested in, and that‘s the one on election day.‘‖181 Therefore, even though the public
has a vastly important role to play in a democratic state, it can be stated that when the
public is in agreement, British politicians will surely emphasize this fact in order to
accomplish their objectives, and when the public opposes them, they carry on with the
intent of realizing their predetermined goals, seemingly oblivious to public opinion. One
could also argue that the British politicians, at least once elected, do not let the opposing
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public opinion concern them. This can be illustrated with the following quote from Mr.
Britton, ―let it be said in the plainest terms – the only way to get rid of a government is by
the ballot box‖.182
In conclusion, British politicians are in many ways very much like their Spanish
counterparts, especially with regard to the apparent disinterest in public opinion even
though both are considered to be democratic states. British politicians have used some
fairly extreme language to refer to their counterterrorism endeavors and the threat
terrorists pose to the democratic state, but this language has often been balanced out with
statements referring to the strength and integrity of British democracy. One important
contrast found in the British case is the prevalence of exceptional measures in the
aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist attacks in London. Furthermore, as previously noted,
British politicians and the British public appeared, more often than not, to have had a
very contentious relationship, in the aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist attacks. It
became more apparent that the British government would do anything it deemed
necessary to eradicate the terrorist threat and prevent more terrorist attacks from
occurring, regardless of the effect this would have on civil liberties or human rights. The
example of the ―hierarchy of liberties‖ above offers a compelling illustration of this. An
additional example is that of a statement by Sir John Weston, a British diplomat, who
believed that Parliament should endorse any necessary measures to curb the domestic
terrorist threat brought on, in part, by ―Labour‘s hasty importation into British statute law
of the European Convention on Human Rights‖, and invited those who wished to
challenge the U.K. to do so ―if they dare‖.183 Statements such as the previous one that
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illustrate that in the aftermath of the July 2005 attacks the British Government was
willing to take whatever counterterrorism or security measures it deemed necessary to
protect the U.K. from another terrorist attack. It is also due to statements such as this that
evidence supports the involvement of British politicians in creating a moral panic in the
aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist attacks. In sum, the data concerning British heads of
government and opposition demonstrate a heightened level of concern and substantial or
widespread agreement that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing
group members and their behavior, and an increased level of hostility, disproportionality,
and volatility.
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Chapter 4: Editorial Data

Liberal, western democracies are well known for providing and safeguarding a
number of different liberties and freedoms, including the freedom of the press, which has
direct links to freedom of speech. While it must be noted that some newspapers may
choose to self-censor, or even apologize for publishing certain information, by and large,
newspapers are deemed free to publish the information they choose, which includes
information that the democratic government would rather it not publish.184 Furthermore,
and more importantly, this freedom to publish what the individual writers or editors
decide can grant the newspaper an incredible ability to influence public opinion. This
influence on public opinion, as it regards terrorism and the states‘ counterterrorism
responses, is analyzed in the cases of Spain and the United Kingdom below. This section
reviews editorials published in both Spain and the United Kingdom and discusses the
most important and prevalent trends found in the research. For the Spanish case,
editorials are chosen from El País, the most widely read newspaper in Spain. The
editorials for the British case are taken primarily from The Times, but supplementary
articles also come from The Guardian, The Irish Times, and other newspapers. These
newspapers were chosen due to the facts that they are widely read in their countries and
for reasons of accessibility.
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Spain
Many of the same topics discussed in the previous sections regarding public
opinion and statements of heads of government and opposition are also present in
editorial content. One topic examined in the previous sections was how politicians relied
upon the notion of democracy as a sort of rallying cry to combat terrorism, which was
evident in statements such as those that called terrorist groups and their actions ―threats to
the fabric of a democratic society‖. The research demonstrates that editorials reflect a
similar situation. In fact, the threat terrorism poses to the democratic system in Spain is
one of the most prominent themes found throughout the research of Spanish editorials.
The most notable aspect of the research on Spanish editorials is that they express great
concern for maintaining the integrity of the democratic system. This concern is expressed
through a number of different ways including: their remarks as to how the Spanish
government has gone against, or is not acting in accordance with, the Spanish
Constitution and other laws, editorials regarding the reinstatement of the death penalty,
the pardoning and reinsertion of terrorists, and overall, any attempt by the Spanish, or any
other democratic government, to step outside the confines of the democratic system to
fight terrorism.
For a fledgling democracy perhaps it is self-evident that editorials would express
great concern for maintaining the integrity of the state‘s democratic institutions, including
such integral parts as its constitution. It is, however, not insignificant that this theme
continuously appears throughout the research period. One such aspect found in the
literature is that of ensuring that the provision for extraordinary measures is implemented
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only in the case of extraordinary situations. As noted, the Spanish editorials express great
concern over the implementation of extraordinary measures, such as prolonged detention
or violations of habeas corpus, to combat terrorism. One editorial, for example, stated, ―it
is also incomprehensible that this same tribunal [of the Spanish National Court] was able
to keep for almost two years in provisional prison the accused of a crime that was later
considered unfounded.‖185 What is perhaps even more important is the fact that the
editorials suggest that these extraordinary measures are useless in the fight against
terrorism. The following excerpt offers one example of how the extraordinary measures
are inefficient:
Predictably, the Antiterrorism Law has been of no use when fighting
political violence in this country. Article 86 of the Constitution conditions
[in original] the use of decree-laws in cases of ‗extraordinary and urgent
need‘ and explicitly and expressly prohibits [in original] enactment when
it affects ‗the rights, duties, and freedoms regulated under Title I‘.186 The
new decree-law extends the validity of a law that establishes substantial
cuts to habeas corpus, the inviolability of the home, and secrecy of postal,
telephone, and telegraph communications guaranteed by articles 17 and 18
of the Constitution.187
A further example is the following in which an editorial claimed, ―the proven inefficiency
of the antiterrorist law – unconstitutional for many reasons – to fight against terrorism
only, will be comparable to its patent utility to frighten the population.‖ 188
One of the central reasons why the editorials reflect the ineffectiveness of the
extraordinary measures is that they express the belief that the democratic system is
Editorial, ―Jueces y terrorismo‖, El País, 23 November 1991
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already powerful enough to combat terrorism without implementing exceptional
measures, which may, perhaps, be a reason why Spain has not implemented many
extraordinary counterterrorism laws or policies, especially in the aftermath of the GAL
fiasco.189
The reality is that, ultimately, the Government finds itself with the fact
that there exist laws that are more than powerful – and some that are
doubtfully constitutional to fight against terrorism. … But it would be a
dangerous error if the Government were to walk the slope of panic on this
issue. … Moreover, the experience of the so-called Law of the Defense of
Democracy teaches that these types of threats are not those that succeed in
defeating terrorism, but rather those that stir its waters. The Government is
not obliged to offer miracles in its fight against ETA, but it is, in
exchange, obliged to not make mistakes in its repressive response.190
Additionally, ―operations such as that culminated by the Guardia Civil with the
disarticulation of the Araba command [a faction of ETA responsible for 39 deaths] show
that the democratic State has the capacity and legal means to face the challenge of
terrorists so that their criminal activity does not go unpunished.‖191 This theme is also
present in the aftermath of the 11/M attacks. For example, one editorial, written a few
months after the 11/M terrorist attacks stated, ―experience indicates that more efficient
than changing legislation is to apply with tenacity and [use] existing legislative
means‖.192
One interesting aspect of the editorial research is that they express concern that
perhaps the divergence from the democratic constitutional system is not necessarily
intentional, but instead, that it is to some extent derived from the assumption of power.
For example, ―this legal withdrawal is, however, a worrisome manifestation that the
189
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heights of power can dizzy those who occupy the positions to the point of temporarily
forgetting their own past and to jeopardize its credibility‖. 193 This is important because,
again, for much of the research period Spain had not been a consolidated democracy for a
very long time, and consequently, it is easy to see why concern for maintaining its
democratic stability is repeatedly raised in the editorials, especially, when this can lead to
the slippery slope of the erosion of civil liberties and other non-democratic methods of
counterterrorism.
An additional aspect of the research to be addressed regarding the editorial
viewpoint on the government going against the Spanish Constitution is that the editorial
research reflects the fact that constitutional freedoms, liberties, and rights are applicable
to all Spanish citizens, including alleged or convicted terrorists, but that they are useless
when there is no confidence that the state will protect and respect them. An example of
such is the following: ―Guarantees that, obviously, protect all, including terrorists, but
taking care of its inaccurate or inexperienced legal formation and routine in its
application does not serve the purposes of those who do not believe in them and combats
with fury the institutions that endorse them.‖194 This belief is also apparent in the
aftermath of the 11/M attacks in Madrid, especially regarding combating the threat of
Islamic terrorism.
The last aspect of the research to be addressed here focuses on the importance of
staying within the confines of the Spanish Constitution and not using exceptional
measures in the battle against Islamic terrorism. Here, two aspects are significant. First,
the editorials explain that changing the existing counterterrorism legislation, specifically
Editorial, ―El Gobierno, y las garantías constitucionales‖, El País, 9 April 1983
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the Antiterrorism Pact, would not help defend or protect Spain from the threat of Islamic
terrorism because Islamic terrorists are not interested in taking part in Spanish
democracy. For example:
It would be unrealistic to pretend to go further and convert the agreement
[the Antiterrorism Pact] in the framework for eventual shared initiatives
against Islamic terrorism. The pact, and its specific content, only makes
sense against ETA. … It is artificial to try to apply these principles to Al
Qaeda, that neither intends to change the Spanish Constitution to include
self-determination, nor negotiate political accords with legal
organizations, nor pretends to negotiate anything with the Government. It
would trivialize the pact to pretend that, since it is called antiterrorist, [that
it] provides guidance to deal with any terrorism.195
The second aspect of importance here is that the editorials caution that focusing
too much attention on the threat of Islamic terrorism, as real as it is, could lead to the
egregious error of not continuing to focus on the threat posed by ETA. For example, in
one editorial it is argued, ―one last consideration is that it would be an error that this
reinforcement of the fight against Islamic terrorism was made at the cost of the fight
against ETA‖, and that, moreover, ―maintaining political efficiency and judicial firmness,
as well as democratic unity, against this group [ETA] is now the essential condition so
that it does not blight the (realistic) expectation of its final defeat.‖196
As should now be apparent, Spanish editorials overwhelmingly stress the
importance of staying within the democratic system (i.e. by using measures true to a
democracy) in the counterterrorism fight and, moreover, this theme is clearly
demonstrated throughout the entirety of the research period. Moreover, the Spanish
editorials do not hesitate to question the Spanish Government when the press believes it
is stepping outside the boundaries of the democratic system. One example of an editorial
Editorial, ―Canalizar sin banalizar‖, El País, 11 May 2004
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expressing the belief that the Spanish Government should stay within the confines of the
democratic system is the following:
Many times we have had the opportunity to note that together with the
destruction and damage directly caused by the criminal barbarity of ETA
should also account for the moral damages in the social body, the discredit
of democracy and its methods, the perversion of authority or the leniency
before the violation of the basic values of the rule of law. The inadmissible
and cruel torture … by ETA mobsters cannot be pretext or reason for the
State apparatus to lose its nerve. The maxim that against terrorism
anything goes is unworthy of any democratic sensibility, but is moreover,
and as verified, stupid.197
An additional emphasis in the editorial research is that no individual falls outside the rule
of law. For example, ―in the rule of law, no violent death – not even those produced by
security forces in the legitimate fight against terrorism – falls outside the scope of
investigation by an independent and impartial body such as the judicial.‖198
It should not be surprising that the editorials address issues that were
demonstrated to be of great concern in the previous sections. Controversial issues such as
the possible reinstatement of the death penalty, the possibility of negotiating with
terrorists, and granting them amnesty or pardons are all discussed in the editorials.
Regarding the death penalty, the editorials clearly reflect the notion that the potential
reinstatement of the death penalty is not something that should be considered, especially
not given the justification for the reinstatement. In discussing how the death penalty was
abolished not only from many European countries‘ ―penal legislations, but also [in the]
public opinion in almost all of Europe‖, one editorial explains how the case has changed
so that ―today [written in 1978] the people of the West are shown favorable to the death
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penalty for a pure and terrible reflection of what has been called legitimate defense.‖199
The controversial topic of negotiating, or ―talking‖, with terrorists is also addressed in the
editorials and it is blatantly obvious that the editorials express an opinion in favor
negotiation. In fact, one editorial states, ―dialogue is a path that no civilized Government
can renounce, especially if from the dialogue the eradication of violence could be
derived.‖200
The editorial research regarding the pardoning of terrorists is multifaceted. On the
one hand, the editorials highlight the fact that the pardoning could be taken advantage of,
while on the other hand, they express a belief that the pardoning can be beneficial to
ending the terrorist threat from ETA. An excerpt demonstrating the first aspect is the
following:
Because no sane [person] could honestly ask for pardons for those who,
the day after leaving prison, were ready to commit [atrocious] murder …
And only the disappearance of violence in the Basque Country would
make a change in the prisoner‘s situation imaginable. But this is well
known by those who obscenely manipulate the mobilizations in favor of
amnesty as one more piece of a strategy of provocation and death.201
Turning now to the second aspect, editorial statements such as ―any attitude that
could put a definite end to the violence and facilitate coexistence within our rule of law
could only be well received by the lovers of peace and progress. To feed the fighting
inexorably leads to catalyze the tensions and play [into] the violence‖ clearly demonstrate
how the pardoning of terrorists could be advantageous in winning the counterterrorism
fight against ETA.202 An additional example is as follows:
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It is surprising – although the data had already been revealed by other
previous studies – that there are more Basques willing to accept a change
to the Constitution and the Statute [of Guernica] than granting amnesty to
ETA prisoners.203 Surprising, because without a doubt it would be more
viable to [with]draw the prisoners than undertake legal reforms of doubtful
democratic legitimacy – in the measure that a minority [were to] impose
their points of view to the majority – and that would require a difficultly
attainable consensus.204
The previous statement is of extreme significance not only because it demonstrates how
the editorials remain true to their steadfast belief in the necessity of staying within the
democratic system, but more importantly, it also makes a very powerful statement in that
even though a greater percentage of Basques are willing to accept changing the
Constitution and the Statute of Guernica than granting amnesty to imprisoned etarras,
that these legal reforms would not likely be very democratically legitimate, and,
therefore, this excerpt can conceivably be viewed as a plea to politicians to resist popular
will for the sake of the integrity of Spanish democracy.
The topic of reinsertion is also discussed in the editorial research. It is important
to note that the editorials discuss not only the reinsertion of convicted etarras but also
that of officials convicted for their role in the GAL and Spain‘s Dirty War. The topic of
reinsertion is also multifaceted. Editorials acknowledge the hesitation many had toward
reinsertion but maintained:
[I]f the gradual reinsertion of Amedo and Domínguez serves to make it
understandable to the enemies of this policy toward the etarras that the
best way to end almost three decades of deaths and pain caused by
terrorism, then it is worthwhile to bear the malaise caused to many
Spaniards [because of] the certainty that they will not finish the sentences
they deserve.205 206
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Another important aspect of reinsertion present in the editorials, both before and after the
terrorist attacks of 11/M, is that reinsertion may help to alleviate some of the
radicalization of terrorists. For example, one editorial states, ―to close the ways of
incorporation into society of these ex-terrorists that have abdicated violence not only
would foment the irrationality of the groups of prisoners already committed to crime. It
would feed also the numantinismo of terrorists already in freedom and of their political
environment.‖207 An example from after the attacks of 11/M is an editorial that discusses
the radicalization of the prison population, especially of those of Maghreb origin. While
it is not within the scope of this thesis to address in detail the aspects of radicalization, it
is, nonetheless, worth highlighting that the presence of a large number, more than 10% of
those imprisoned in Spain, of Arabs in Spanish prisons ―favors the psychological
influence of radical leaders that offer the small-time offenders to continue doing what
they were doing – for example, falsifying mobile phone [SIM] cards – but now to the
service of a greater cause‖.208 Considering the ties the terrorists responsible for the
attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington, D.C. had to Spain, and the 11/M train
bombings in Madrid, this process of radicalization in Spanish prisons is not anything to
be taken lightly.
Perhaps one of the more significant aspects of the research is that the editorials
rightfully continue to note that the counterterrorism struggle is a long-term battle and
advise that terrorism cannot and will not be easily or quickly eradicated. Furthermore, the
Per the Manual Dictionary of the Spanish Language: ―Refers to the members of a Spanish
secret society at the service of liberal ideas that emerged after the establishment of absolutism
(1832)‖ or ―the Republican soul and national-catholic heart‖ or a symbol of heroic or last-ditch
resistance, specifically refers to the remains of an ancient city, Nomantia, near present-day Soria
in the Castilla-León province of Spain that lies just outside the Basque Country. Here it is used in
the context of serving as a symbol of heroic or last-ditch resistance.
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editorials express the opinion that not only is full domestic governmental cooperation and
action necessary to combat terrorism, but also that multilateral action (i.e. collaboration
among local and state, Spanish and European Union or other international or
multinational institutions) is essential to eliminating the threat of terrorism.
The inevitability that the terrorist fight will be a long-term battle is present
throughout the research period. While it is noted that the ―problems of social coexistence
in the Basque Country are quite older than the actual political regime of freedoms‖, and
that ―a good part of their roots [are found] in the blind politics of the dictatorship, that,
with its simplicity and lack of historical vision, was the most valuable ally of the
flourishing of the armed groups‖, editorials explicitly explain that the counterterrorism
battle is a long-term battle.209 For example, an editorial from 1978 states, ―we will have
terrorism with democracy as we had it with the dictatorship. There will always be
marginal groups that include in their analysis the factor of ‗the worse, the better‘‖.210
Another example is the following in which the editorial writers claim, ―the Prime
Minister rightfully asks for ‗tenacity‘ and ‗perseverance‘ in the counterterrorism fight and
encourages social mobilization against the outrage.‖211
The importance of full government cooperation and support in the fight against
terrorism is demonstrated by the following example: ―if there is a terrain in which all
parties should avoid conflict it is that of the antiterrorist fight. … Terrorism has lost the
battle in Euskadi and in all of Spain, and what is needed now is that all those who have
been its activists or defenders realize it. Conflicts between democrats in this terrain only
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grant balls of oxygen to those that deny this reality.‖212 The editorials also highlight how
Spanish politicians have almost an obligation to work together to put an end to the threat
of terrorism to avenge the deaths of all those who saw their demise in terrorist attacks.
The following, written about a dialogue with ETA, offers an example:
The moment could have arrived to open the process of dialogue
contemplated in article 10 of the Pact of Ajuria Enea [because] for the
moment there exists an ―unequivocal will‖ from ETA to renounce
violence.213 But this very text established the rule of democratic majority
for any accord of a political nature. It would be unacceptable for those
who carry the precedent of more than 800 deaths on their backs.214
The necessity of governmental cooperation as an integral part to combating
Islamic terrorism is also made apparent in the aftermath of the 11/M attacks in assertions
such as, ―in any case, it will be essential that the measures [to combat Islamic terrorism]
adopted by the Government have the maximum parliamentary support.‖215 Or when the
editorials claim, ―it is justified that the King continue to insist in the necessity of calming
the political life and that [political] parties work with an integrative spirit. … the concern
that this partisan confrontation produces [is] far removed from the willingness to
compromise that made the transition [to democracy] possible‖.216
Related to the topic of full domestic governmental cooperation is the imperative
aspect of multinational action and collaboration in the counterterrorism fight. The
importance of collective action in combating terrorism is of significant relevance not only
because the editorial research demonstrates multilateral action is necessary to combat
terrorism in Spain, but additionally because it reflects the view that this is the model for
212
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the democratic world to combat terrorism and, furthermore, the Spanish editorials after
the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., the 11/M attacks in Madrid, and the
7/7 attacks in London, are steadfast in their belief that multilateral action is the only way
to combat international terrorism. For example, even though the following statement was
written with regard to former U.S. President Clinton‘s actions in Sudan, it demonstrates
the Spanish view, or at least that depicted in the editorials, of the importance of
multilateral collaboration, ―to rush is not good advice in the fight against terrorism.
Unilateral actions, omitting international rules also is not the way‖. 217 The editorials,
moreover, reflect the belief that the necessity of multilateral action or collaboration
should be quite obvious. For example, regarding how Britain and France alerted Spain to
sleeper cells operating in Spain, an editorial asserted that this ―demonstrates once more,
as if it were necessary, the importance of the collaboration or even of joint police action
between countries that face a terrorist threat that does not have borders and that can be
felt anywhere‖.218
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks Spanish editorials promptly noted that attacks
of this magnitude were not just an attack against the United States for its past misdeeds or
mistakes even though it was ―the biggest attack ever suffered by the United States on
their own territory‖, but that ―above all it is an integral aggression against its political
system, against democracy, and the free market. In short, against everyone with whom
we share the same democratic principles that were so costly to obtain in our country.‖219
Moreover, the editorials quickly noted ―Spain is one of the United States‘ allies in the
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Atlantic system of defense [NATO] and should act as such.‖220 The editorials,
furthermore, affirmed that although ―this indiscriminate terrorism, fruit of the most
evident fanaticism, is the new central threat that to which democracies should face‖, that
they must do so ―with methods specific to their values.‖221 The Spanish editorials
additionally expressed the duty of allies to help one another in the counterterrorism fight,
in that the international character of terrorism ―favors the concerted action of all
nations‖.222 Lastly, editorials showed how the nature of the terrorist threat can serve as a
mechanism for politicians to overcome their differences and work together. One such
example is the following editorial published three weeks after the 7/7 attacks in London:
―the generalized threat of Islamic terrorism has made Blair and Zapatero put away their
differences. Pragmatism unites a lot, above all in times of crisis. [Even] more [so] when it
represents parties of the same family [i.e. political parties in democratic states]‖.223
What is, however, perhaps even more significant is that the Spanish editorials do
not shy away from addressing other democratic states‘ counterterrorism policies when
they believe they are dangerously close to falling, or have fallen, outside of the
democratic framework in an attempt to hold them accountable for their questionably
democratic methods. This is especially true regarding the United States in the aftermath
of the 9/11 attacks and regarding Britain after the 7/7 attacks in London. The most
worrisome aspect concerning both Britain and the U.S. is the possibility of indefinite
detention of suspected or known terrorists which is made blatantly apparent from the
manner in which the Spanish editorials address Guantanamo Bay. Perhaps of greater
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importance to the editorial writers, is their certainty that Guantanamo Bay serves only as
a threat to democratic societies, especially through the way in which it serves as a means
of fomenting hatred. For example, one editorial claimed, ―Guantanamo has converted
into a lighthouse of shame … Guantanamo is not an isolated case. Its existence feeds the
hatred that feeds violent fanatics as a horrendous showcase of the excesses of the socalled ‗war against terrorism‘‖.224 Or, how it is moreover claimed, ―legal arguments
aside, we are before an immoral act by a superpower that extends the extraterritoriality of
its laws in an almost universal form to protect their own citizens and soldiers. … Acting
in this way takes away all credibility of the alleged policy of promoting democracy and
human rights in the entire globe‖.225 Of no less significance, the Spanish editorials even
assert their responsibility in holding their democratic allies accountable. For example,
one editorial declared, ―it would be lamentable if in defense of the ‗strategic partner and
ally‘ [the United States], the Spanish Government did not insist in bringing light to on the
shameful CIA flights for the capture and illegal delivery of prisoners.‖226
To summarize this section, while the Spanish editorials reflect a concern for the
sanctity of not only their democratic system but also that of their democratic allies, the
editorials also clearly reflect a belief that the democratic system is strong enough to
withstand and win the war against terrorism as long as it is fought with means true to the
system, which is reflected in excerpts such as the following: ―the danger is that a party or
a ruler is considered in a situation that some sociologists call post-democratic, in which
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they feel authorized to do whatever they please once they have obtained power the polls.
Fortunately, there are still counterweights in democracies.‖227

United Kingdom
Many of the same issues discussed in the previous sections regarding public
opinion and statements by heads of government and opposition are also present in the
research on British editorials. In the case of the United Kingdom, these include the
following: democratic constraints, concessions to terrorist organizations, the possible
reinstatement of the death penalty, the need for collaboration in the fight against
terrorism, and that the fight against terrorism will not be easily or quickly won. As will be
demonstrated, the most striking aspect of the research is that the editorials continuously
express the belief that a steady hand in counterterrorism policy is what is viewed as being
imperative to winning this battle and not necessarily the protection of democratic
principles which is markedly different from the Spanish case. Of special relevance is the
opinion expressed in the editorials that terrorists are not worthy of any special privileges
or rights conferred upon political prisoners by international law. Some editorials refer to
political leaders or public figures, namely religious authority figures, who often reflect
the belief that terrorists should indeed be granted special political status because they are
treated differently than other criminals. For example:
The demand is for political status, a recognition reflected in the nature of
the regime to which they are subjected, that they are not as common
criminals are. Some concession in that direction would not only be likely
to be reciprocated by the better behaviour of the prisoners says Dr O
Fiaich: it is in fact their due. They are [in original] in a different category
from common prisoners. They have been convicted by courts which have
no juries, usually on the basis of a type of evidence which has been shown
227
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to be unsafe by the Amnesty [International] report on police interrogation
in Northern Ireland.228
Excerpts, however, such as ―the terrorist chooses violence as the instrument of first
resort. Yet for some reason we have come to distinguish terrorism from violent crime
when we should not make such a distinction. The act is the same. It is criminal violence
against people who are not at war‖ are illustrative of the opinion that terrorists are
unworthy of any special treatment due to the political aspects of their fight.229
The editorial research reveals that editorial writers had few qualms about even the
more extreme measures Britain implemented to combat terrorism which included:
internment, prolonged detention, and the potential reinstatement of the death penalty.
Furthermore, the editorials also discuss certain violations of civil liberties as being
imperative to counterterrorism efforts and, as such, imply that some violations are to be
viewed as unimportant, or at least not as important as others, as they contribute to a
greater good. For example, in discussing the possible introduction of a national identity
card to help monitor border crossing between Britain and Ireland, one editorial claimed,
―many of us do already carry several different forms of identification for financial or
security purposes. It cannot be said that adding a national identity card would greatly
reduce our freedoms‖.230 While perhaps there is some truth to that statement as
theoretically a national identity card would not reduce freedoms, it becomes a
questionable measure when it is to be implemented to monitor the movement of peoples.
The editorials do, however, express concern over some counterterrorism measures
and suggest that if they were not justifiably used, then criminal charges should be brought
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against those who implemented them. The following excerpt is quoted at length because
it offers a good example of the view expressed in the editorials:
The Times believes that internment was justified when first used and that it
continues to be an essential part of the struggle against the IRA. But it
believes also that if such [a] drastic measure is to be used, and in particular
if it is to be maintained, it should be free from criticism on the grounds of
inadequacy of safeguards or the ill-treatment of detainees by those
responsible for custody. It is of the utmost importance that detainees and
internees be treated according to the law, strict as that law may be. The
Special Powers Act (Northern Ireland), which has been referred to as the
most powerful anti-terrorist legislative measure in the Western world,
contains disturbingly few safeguards … If, as appears to be the case, there
was no legal justification for the methods of interrogation used, it could
render some interrogators liable to a criminal charge of assault, for there is
little doubt that some, possibly all, [of] the actions found to constitute
physical ill-treatment would prima facie amount to that offence. … But
the importance of the interrogation issue is not so much whether or not it
will lead to consequences in the courts, but that as grave a matter as the
treatment of detainees must be government by law, and by specific
statutory authority for what is done. In our view it is absolutely necessary
to combat terrorism in Northern Ireland by imprisonment without trial. We
do not believe that this harsh but necessary policy can be maintained
without public support, unless the legal and administrative safeguards
provided are rigorously adhered to.231
As the excerpt illustrates, the editorials do express concern for staying within the
constraints of the democratic system, as they argue that the more extreme measures need
to be justified through laws or other legislative measures. It is interesting to note,
however, that when proper legislative measures were found to be lacking, some editorials
advocated for tougher counterterrorism measures and even proposed the means for the
new measures. For example one editorial claimed, ―an intensification of the military
effort is now the only way of achieving the necessary success‖, and further proposed a
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―new Government of Ireland Act‖, which included a number of suggestions as to how
their institutions should be modified and powers redistributed.232
A further example as to how the editorials demonstrate both their belief that
extreme measures are imperative to winning the battle against terrorism and how this
battle must be fought within the democratic framework regards how legislation created to
be permissible in times of emergency, should be used only during those emergency times,
regardless of how effective the legislation may have been. The following excerpt
demonstrates this belief:
The Home Secretary is on record as saying that the law on the prevention
of terrorism … has resulted in a diminution of terrorist activities in
England. The police believe it too. … Exactly what contribution the law
has made is unquantifiable and for that reason there have been calls for the
law to be abolished, on the grounds that any Act which so interferes with
normal civil liberties should only be permitted if there is proof positive
that it is achieving the object for which it was designed. It is also
understandable that during a period of relative quiet, an Act which was
originally passed in an atmosphere of considerable tension, in
circumstances approaching an emergency, should be regarded with some
suspicion. … It is difficult to see how the Act can be applied without there
being an attendant derogation from the rights to which persons held under
the normal criminal law are entitled. … For the time being, at least,
continued trust must be placed in the opinion of the authorities who say
that the Act is having some effect in combating terrorism. There is no
evidence the other way, nor is it being suggested too strongly that the
police are abusing the powers given to them. Nevertheless the operation of
the Act must be carefully monitored, and scrutinized and debated by
Parliament at regular intervals. It must not become a permanent part of our
statute book through default or be nodded through year by year through
apathy. … Care must be taken that the Act does not outlive the emergency
for which it is intended, or stand to be used, without express parliamentary
procedure, against a threat of a different kind. 233
This editorial, moreover, offers the example of the old Alien Act as proof that legislation
intended to be used only for emergencies can outlive its usefulness or value and,
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furthermore, as a sort of warning that if it has happened in the past, it could happen again,
and to warn of the possible ramifications that could follow when emergency legislation is
kept active longer than necessary.
An additional aspect of the research present throughout the entirety of the
research period is that of concessions to terrorists, which are described in the editorials as
something to be avoided. In other words, the editorial research demonstrates that editorial
writers hold the belief that granting concessions to terrorists is not an option that should
be explored by the British Government, and fully support their official position not to
negotiate with, or offer concessions, to terrorists. Simply put, ―there are no concessions to
be given to violence‖, and ―negotiations under duress simply will not take place‖,
especially not when they have been demonstrated not to work.234 Therefore, to answer the
question ―whether to resort to concession or coercion‖ the editorials support the latter
option.235
The most coercive policy adopted by the British Government to combat terrorism
is arguably that of internment without trial. The editorials reflect a belief that internment
may not be the best, or most democratic, strategy but that it is necessary under the
circumstances. The following excerpt offers an example:
Internment without trial, or detention as it is now officially called, is
running sore in the province. … It is of great propaganda value to Irish
nationalists and Britain‘s enemies, and since it is an undoubted derogation
from standard conventions on human rights it is an embarrassment to
Britain among her friends. Also, the internment question stands, or is
repeatedly said to stand, in the way of political reconciliation in the
province. There is a lot to be said for getting rid of it. But not as things
now are.236
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On the other hand, however, editorials also exhibit concern for how these coercive
measures are implemented. For example, as the following excerpt demonstrates, even
though certain policies adopted by Britain to combat the threat of IRA terrorism were
deemed lawful, the editorials still plea for prudence in their application.
The treatment of these prisoners is fully justified in law and custom. It is
justified also in the new case law of international human rights. The
European Commission of Human Rights found that the convention which
it interprets gives the prisoners no right to special status or to the main
concessions they are claiming in respect of clothing, work, free
association, visits and lost remission[s]. The commission enjoined the
British authorities to be more flexible in the face of persistent breaches of
prison discipline. They have responded to that injunction. It is not enough
that a government has justification for its policies; it must choose them
prudently; and the test of prudence is found in their consequences.237
In sum, although the editorials stress the importance of prudence in applying
coercive counterterrorism measures, they still overwhelmingly support the British
Government‘s policy of not granting concessions to terrorists, especially when it is found
to be justifiable or lawful. Furthermore, and as discussed below, the editorial plea for
prudence is also evident in the debate surrounding the potential reinstatement of the death
penalty.
One of the more controversial topics regarding Britain‘s counterterrorism policies
is the debate that surrounded the potential reinstatement of the death penalty. As
discussed below, the editorial remarks regarding the death penalty are multifaceted in that
they debate how the reinstatement of the death penalty would be within Britain‘s legal
and moral ability, the extremely high level of public support for the reinstatement, and,
lastly, how the reinstatement would not be beneficial for a number a reasons.
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As the following statement illustrates, the main reason why the editorials reflect a
belief that the reinstatement of the death penalty is within Britain‘s legal and moral
ability is that the editorials argue that combating terrorism is similar to fighting soldiers
on the battlefield. For example, one editorial states, ―we believe, therefore, that the
morality of capital punishment in terrorist cases is at one with the morality of killing
enemy soldiers in the conduct of justifiable and defensive war‖.238 While, however, the
editorials state the reinstatement would be permissible, they also explicitly express the
strong conviction that the death penalty should only apply to those convicted of terrorist
offenses and not to other (i.e. common) criminals. To illustrate, one editorial claimed:
We do not believe that there is any case for reintroducing the death
penalty for ordinary murders. … Here we have a situation which is
deliberately made into one of war against innocent civilians. At present the
war is carried on by the IRA with security against any worse penalty than
imprisonment, except for those who blow themselves up with their own
bombs.239
It is important to recall that public opinion also strongly approved of the reinstatement of
the death penalty in Britain, which is also addressed in the editorials. For example,
editorials noted, ―there will also be widespread public demand for the reintroduction of
the death penalty‖ ,240 and also discussed public opinion poll results such as one which
reflected an overwhelming majority [93%] of men and women in favor of ―the execution
of terrorists convicted of murder‖.
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In short, while the editorials expressed the belief

that ―capital punishment for terrorist offences is both morally permissible, and feasible‖,
they also thought that ―it would be strategically damaging‖.242
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There are two main reasons why the reinstatement of the death penalty for
persons convicted of terrorist offenses would be ―strategically damaging‖, or, in other
words, a disadvantage to the overall counterterrorism battle. Firstly, as demonstrated by
the following excerpt, it is argued that the reinstatement of the death penalty would not
deter dedicated terrorists from carrying out further attacks and that it may, instead, even
contribute to their commitment to their cause.
The availability of the death sentence on conviction of murder would add
to that risk [i.e. add to the terrorists‘ existing risk of being killed in the
‗course of their operations‘] but not so decisively as to drive away many
of those who had already accepted the risk. Some might drop out, some
potential recruits might fade away, but for the secret armies quality
matters more than numbers, and the average quality, if fanaticism is a
measure, would not fall. If the understanding of deterrence is widened to
include the defeat of terrorism among its objects, then the argument
against executing convicted Irish republican terrorists gathers pace. It is
not possible to conceive of circumstances in which the execution of death
sentences imposed by British courts under normal safeguards provided by
law would weaken the will or capacity of Irish republican organization
committed to subversive violence. It is only too easy to imagine how
judicial executions would harden their will and enhance their capacity to
rebel. Modern Irish-British history tells the tale. 243
While touched upon in the last excerpt, the second reason why the reinstatement
of the death penalty would be a disadvantage to Britain is that it could serve as a means
of recruitment or support for the terrorists. The following excerpt discusses exactly how
that could happen:
It is clear that capital punishment for terrorists would lead to further
terrorist outrages of one sort or another … obviously if it cannot be shown
that capital punishment will help in the main campaign these
consequential casualties are merely a waste of lives. … One only has to
ask whether executions would or would not tend to isolate the IRA still
further from their Irish Catholic communities to see that they could not do
good. Therefore, it would be contrary to the major strategy of defeating
the IRA to reintroduce capital punishment. That must be the conclusion.
Capital punishment for terrorist offences is both morally permissible, and
243
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feasible, though it would cause causalities on our side, but it would be
strategically damaging. It would give the IRA an advantage which it is not
in our interests to give them. They would lose a comparatively small
number of active men who, having been caught, would in any case be
subject to long-term imprisonment but they would gain support that they
could not otherwise gain. That is why most senior policemen and most
senior Army officers and civil officials in Northern Ireland, and most
senior policemen and the judges in England do not want capital
punishment for these terrorists. Those who command the fight against the
IRA believe that it would make the fight more difficult for them. … The
ability to catch them is more important than the punishment which is
inflicted on them after they have been convicted. It would certainly be
wrong to punish those we catch in such a way as to win support for their
movement.244
In sum, while the editorials affirm that the British government would have had the
ability to reinstate the death penalty, they stand firm in their belief that the disadvantages
far outweigh the advantages, and hence, regardless of the feasibility of the reinstatement
and the overwhelming public support in its favor, that it should not be considered because
to enact such measures would only be detrimental to Britain‘s counterterrorism fight.
Turning now to an imperative facet of the counterterrorism fight, the British
editorials also stress the importance of collaboration in combating terrorism. One, if not
the main, reason why transnational cooperation is absolutely necessary to combat
terrorism is the transnational nature of terrorism itself. One example of how this necessity
was exhibited was in a discussion of the existing ―high level of cooperation between the
member-states of the [European] Community on the subject [of combating terrorism]‖ in
the statement that ―the relative ease with which political criminals can cross frontiers and
the contacts which terrorist groups have with each other make it imperative that terrorism
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be treated not as [a] national but as a European and international issue, and that the fight
against it should be coordinated in every effective way‖.245
A notable aspect of cooperation examined in the editorials is that coordination in
counterterrorism efforts, especially between Britain and Ireland, is perhaps best done
covertly which is demonstrated by the following statement: ―The two governments
should consult and if possible concert their plans, though it is better for the health of Dr
FitzGerald that they not be seen to do so. It was over-evident cooperation with the British
in a matter of security that was part of Mr Jack Lynch‘s [former Taoiseach] undoing‖.246
This holds true even given the fact that editorials claim, ―the effectiveness of any
counter-terrorist policy in its security aspect depends crucially on Anglo-Irish
cooperation, which in turn depends on how Britain deals with the unsettled minority in
the North‖.247 The last, and perhaps most important, aspect of cooperation addressed in
the British editorials is that they describe terrorism as being a threat to the democratic
system and democracies throughout the world, and as such, state their belief on the
importance of cooperation to combat this threat against democracy in statements such as,
―[it] is hard to see how democratic states can justify any cant which inhibits cooperation
against so-called ‗transnational terrorism‘‖.248
One of the last aspects of the editorial response to Britain‘s counterterrorism
policies is that they caution that the counterterrorism battle will not be easily or quickly
won, and as such, called for patience and unity in vigilance ―if terrorism of this kind [in
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reference to IRA terrorism] is to be contained and in due time defeated‖. 249 This aspect of
the fight against terrorism is also present even when discussing the successes of
counterterrorism measures.
Even though the security forces have generally been successful in recent
years in containing IRA terrorism on the mainland, it is no surprise that
the organization retains the ability to make occasional attacks. They prove
that vigilance is still necessary – though even then skilled terrorists will
always find opportunities unless the whole country is to be turned into an
armed camp.250
It is worth noting that even though the previous excerpt stresses the need for ongoing
vigilance, it also highlights the fact that ―skilled terrorists‖ will always have the ability to
attack unless drastic measures are adopted by Britain, which illustrates the fact that
Britons will have to decide between liberty and security if they ever want to completely
eradicate the terrorist threat. This is remarkable especially due to the fact that even after
the 7/7 attacks in London, ―almost three-quarters of the public [73%] believe[d] that it is
right to give up civil liberties to improve our security against terrorist attacks‖. 251 This
demonstrates that much of the British public agreed or believed that perhaps the best way
to ensure liberty is through greater security measures.
The last aspect of counterterrorism addressed by the British editorials to be
discussed here is that they call for the importance of not veering off track in the
counterterrorism battle. In other words, they reflect the necessity of continuing to combat
terrorism on all levels and from all terrorist organizations and not to lose the headway
gained against one group due to an over-emphasis on another. For example, with regard
to Catholic and Protestant terrorism, one editorial stated, ―it should be possible to
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condemn one without in any way minimising the other‖. 252 Moreover, in the aftermath of
the 7/7 attacks, the editorials reflected great concern for the stress placed on countering
radical Islamic terrorism in exchange for continuing to combat IRA terrorism. One
example making this evident is one in which how funds for the British intelligence
agency, or MI5, are distributed is discussed, and it is mentioned that ―since the [7/7]
bombings, MI5 has been trying to divert as much of its resources towards countering the
threat from radical Islamic terrorism‖, and is called upon to redirect some of their efforts
back to combating the IRA.253
In sum, as it has been made evident, the editorials reflect an agreement with
Britain‘s tough, seemingly legitimate, however questionable, counterterrorism measures.
Although the editorials suggest that a hard-line approach to terrorism is necessary, they
do, however, largely support these measures because they have been deemed lawful.
Moreover, the editorials also express the need for caution or prudence in the application
of counterterrorism measures so that they do not backfire and end up causing more
detriment than benefit. This reflects, to some extent, that the editorials are fairly balanced
when discussing counterterrorism measures and the threat terrorism poses, at least when
the measures fall under, or are covered by, existing laws or when new legislation can be
created to make them lawful.
To conclude this section, a review of how the data on editorials fit into the moral
panics model needs to be examined. While it is true that the editorials do acknowledge
the substantial threat of terrorism, meeting the criterion of a heightened level of concern,
they also overwhelmingly emphasize the importance of staying within the framework of
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the Spanish democratic system to combat this threat which does not reflect an increased
level of hostility, disproportionality, or volatility. In other words, the data from the
Spanish editorials largely does not appear to fit the moral panics model. The case of the
United Kingdom reflects the opposite. While it is true that some of the U.K. editorial data
reflect the need for prudence in the counterterrorism battle, the data express a larger
amount of support for controversial measures, including those that could potentially
violate civil liberties, if they are included in the British counterterrorism legislation. This
reflects an increased level of hostility, a heightened level of concern, volatility,
widespread agreement that the threat is real, and disproportionality, or, in other words, all
of the indicators of a moral panic.
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Chapter 5: Security Forces Data

This section reviews the role of ―agents of social control or law enforcement‖ in
creating a moral panic. According to Rothe and Muzzatti:
As those responsible for the enforcement of norms, codes of conduct, and
law, rule enforcers are a vital part of the moral panic. These
groups/organizations, particularly the police, prosecutors, and the judiciary
are expected to detect, apprehend and punish the folk devils. These agents
present the social situation as one that teeters on the brink of chaos if it
were not for them, deviance/crime and all that it entails would abound.
They present themselves as the ‗thin blue line‘, which separates order and
civilization from mayhem and anarchy. Depending upon the content and
strength of the discourse, it often includes calls for increased numbers of
rule enforcers and more extensive authority (i.e., greater power) for
them.254
While in the literature on moral panics, ―law enforcement‖ refers to members of
non-military security forces (e.g. police forces) and members of the judiciary who create
laws to support these forces, due to the fact that both Spain and the United Kingdom
have, at least on occasion, used their military forces as a part of their counterterrorism
approaches, their military forces are also included in this discussion. This inclusion is
especially necessary given the fact that the military forces were utilized when the, actual
or perceived, threat of terrorism was considered exceptionally severe that additional
force, if only to the extent of joint operations, was deemed necessary. Moreover, this
inclusion is warranted given the fact that ―the creation of a moral panic can assist ‗in the
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development of special squads and task forces‘‖.255 Additionally, much like a number of
other democratic countries, there is no doubt that security forces within Spain and the
United Kingdom have used extralegal or extreme, however, legal, measures in the fight
against terrorism.256 Scholars of the theory of moral panics offer various suggestions
concerning the security forces that are useful to help account for the use of extralegal or
extreme, however, legal counterterrorism measures. For example, Cohen writes, ―the
police, because of public support for the use of violence against criminals ... can use an
audience to legitimize illegal forms of violence‖.257 Goode and Ben-Yehuda additionally
write:
Efforts are made by officers to broaden the scope of law enforcement and
increase its intensity; punitive and overly zealous actions already taken are
justified on the basis of the enormity of the threat the society faces ... the
thinking among agents of social control is that ‗new situations need new
remedies‘; a natural problem called for a drastic solution and often this
entailed suspending rights and liberties previously enjoyed.258

Spain
The research on Spanish security forces and their role in counterterrorism reveals
a number of common themes. These include: support for the security forces, allegations
of misconduct or of operating outside of the rule of law, and how security forces were
often targeted by terrorists.
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Before discussing the data on Spanish security forces, it is advantageous to give a
brief overview of the organization and structure of the Spanish security forces. 259 It is
―only with regard to the competent police authorities [that] Spanish law makes a
difference between international and national/regional terrorism. The regional police
authorities are competent for terrorist activities on the regional level, while the struggle
against terrorism on the national and international level is the task of the national police
authorities (El Cuerpo Nacional de Policía) or the Guardia Civil‖.260 Furthermore,
―security on a national level in Spain is planned via the Ministry of the Interior and the
Ministry of Justice‖.261 The Municipal police are ―responsible for local maintenance of
public order [in] towns of over 20,000 population‖.262 It is worth mentioning that Organic
Law 2/1981, ―on Defense of Democracy‖, makes ―the crime of rebellion equivalent to a
crime of terrorism, given that both cases [have their] aim as the destruction of the
constitutional order‖.263 As a final note, the Guardia Civil can legally act as a military
force in ―determinated circumstances‖, and is ―administratively part of the Army but ...
placed in the Ministry of the Interior‘s chain of command‖.264
Before discussing how the Spanish security forces were publically supported it is
important to note that the security forces encountered numerous problems during the first
years of Spain‘s transition to democracy. Due to these problems, which largely consisted
of issues or problems of command and organization, in 1981, ―a single centralized
259
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command for the fight against terrorism, known as Mando Unico para la Lucha
Contraterrorrista [sic] was created‖.265 It merits mention that this command was
originally created in 1977 by former Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez due, in part, to the
assassination of Carrero Blanco, Franco‘s presumed successor.266
To look first at how Spanish security forces were supported in their
counterterrorism initiatives, the research demonstrates that they were supported in a
number of ways including: by discussing and publishing their successful operations,
especially when they are able to overcome obstacles to achieve these successes,
establishing a culture of support, and by justifying their actions, legal or otherwise,
through the demonization of the terrorist attacks and the terrorists themselves. To begin
the discussion as to how the security forces‘ successes were utilized to garner support, the
following examples are illustrative: ―The police in many occasions have dismantled
ETA‖;267 ―The disarticulation of the Araba command of ETA – which has been attributed
to 39 murders in the last years – the detention of practically all of its collaborators and the
seizure of an abundant arsenal of arms and other materials that serve to carry out and
camouflage their criminal acts constitutes a priceless and brave police success‖;268
―Nearly 200 terrorists or collaborators have fallen in clashes with security forces or have
died when the bombs they prepared for others exploded in their own hands or in attacks
of the terrorist group GAL, that acted in the second half of the 80s‖. 269 As the examples
demonstrate, the successes achieved by the Spanish security forces in combating
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terrorism were a key part in determining their support as they appeared to be making
strides in combating and eradicating the threat of terrorism. Moreover, highlighting their
successes in light of the difficulties they encountered also generated support for the
security forces. For example, ―the Armed Forces have advanced a lot in all these years.
Probably, keeping in mind the circumstances that the Executive had to face before and in
the first years of the democracy, few Spanish institutions have advanced so much in so
little time‖.270
Another way in which support for the Spanish security forces was acquired was
through the attempt to create a ―culture of defense‖,271 in which Spaniards would
―achieve the love, the affection, the fraternal attention of the Spanish public toward its
soldiers‖.272 Moreover, clear guidelines on how to achieve this ―culture of defense‖ were
given. For example, General Ascanio recommended that the military could ―achieve this
… [by having] an attitude above any policy, its identification as a guarantor of
constitutional order and the profession of honor in each and every one of its actions‖.273
Furthermore, high ranking members of the security forces recognized the fact ―that it is
very difficult for citizens to accept military costs if they do not know what [purpose] they
serve‖, and others cautioned that ―if we want to have Armed Forces equal to our
economic potential, demographic and the weight of Spain in the European Union, we will
have to dedicate more to the Defense budget‖.274
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An additional significant aspect of how Spanish security forces were supported
regards the support for their questionable, even extralegal, actions. For example, some
contended ―what is qualified as political repression [emphasis in original] is simply
persecution of the delinquents in the search for terrorists‖, which was supported by
stating that ―the police have reached a degree of efficiency in the persecution of terrorism
that had never been reached in previous years‖.275 An additional example is that ―the only
real trap is not understanding that against such an enemy [one who uses ―terrorism as an
instrument of revolutionary war‖] there is not more than one answer: defeat it as soon as
possible and by all means‖.276 Furthermore, it was even contended, ―the best tribute to
their [members of the Armed Forces who have lost their lives in the fight against
terrorism] memory and sacrifice is the compact, decided, and seamless union of all
Spaniards, without distinction of groups, associations, institutions or parties, to achieve
the isolation of terrorism and its total elimination‖.277
As previously mentioned, Spanish security forces were often the targets of
terrorist violence. Moreover, given that the security forces have the duty to protect
civilians, just the nature of the terrorist attacks against the security forces themselves was
a means to generate support. This is due to the fact that if the terrorists could attack the
security personnel that could translate into the belief, not uncommon in terrorist strategy,
that all were vulnerable to a potential terrorist attack. This appears especially true in the
case of Spain due to the large number of deaths of Spanish security forces attributable to
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ETA terrorist attacks. Or as phrased in one article, ―another large group of deaths [due to
ETA terrorist attacks] are the members of the Guardia Civil and police‖.278 It must be
mentioned that not only were Spanish security forces targeted by ETA, but Basque
security forces, the Ertzaintza, were as well. Moreover, it was originally believed that
―the killing of members of law enforcement [would] be more difficult when the Basque
autonomous police [took] over missions that … the National Police or the Guardia Civil
[were] assigned‖.279 Even though ―various senior police [officers] stationed in the Basque
Country ha[d] been victims of terrorism‖ before, this belief changed with the first murder
of a member of the Basque autonomous police force as it was quickly realized that the
threat of terrorism would not quickly disappear even with the creation of a Basque police
force.280
One of the reasons why Spanish security forces were the victims of terrorist
violence is due to the fact that they were, in some respects, an easy mark. For example,
members of the Spanish security forces were targeted in restaurants ―because they still
went there to eat in uniform‖ which made them very easy targets to spot.281 Moreover,
the previous quote illustrates how security forces were forced to alter their habits or
lifestyles in order to lower the possibility that they would become a victim of terrorist
violence. It should be mentioned, however, that even in light of the fact that ETA was
successful in carrying out some terrorist attacks against members of the security forces,
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the security forces did have a number of successes in foiling several terrorist attacks
planned against them. 282
In sum, there were a variety of ways in which Spanish security forces were
supported including: through the publication of their accomplishments, in the
establishment and support of a ―culture of support‖ for the security forces, and due to the
fact that the security forces themselves were targets of terrorist violence.
Turning now to how Spanish security forces were not supported in their
counterterrorism initiatives, a number of significant aspects are present in the research.
These include: allegations that the Spanish security forces operated outside of the rule of
law, which included engaging in a dirty war, and holding them accountable for their
actions. To address the allegations that the Spanish security forces operated outside of the
rule of law in at least some of their counterterrorism operations, the following two
subjects are discussed: violations of civil liberties or constitutionally protected rights and
questionable deaths perpetrated by the security forces.
Spanish security forces engaged in actions that violated a number of different
rights protected in the Spanish Constitution or by other Spanish laws. The most extreme
cases of these violations include: infringing upon the right of the inviolability of the home
and interfering with protected communications. Looking first at the cases in which
Spanish security forces violated the right of the inviolability of the home, protected by
Article 18(2) of the Spanish Constitution, there were multiple cases in which this right
was infringed upon due to searches carried out under the Antiterrorism Law which
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―effectively suspends the inviolability of the home‖,283 as its Article 16 ―permits security
bodies and forces to detain alleged terrorists without previous judicial authorization‖.284
The other example of violations of rights is that of interfering with protected
communications, specifically those between a prisoner and their lawyer. The
confidentiality of these communications was debated a number of times in the Spanish
Constitutional Court which ruled, ―article 51.2 of the General Penitentiary Organic Law
authorizes only the judicial authority to suspend or intervene, in a reasonable and
proportionate way, the communications of the intern with their lawyer without any
authorization in any case to the penitentiary Administration to interfere with these
communications‖.285 Furthermore, the same court ruled that not even the communications
of terrorists, a significant source of contention, could be interfered with ―without
expressed mandate from the judge ever again‖.286
Turning now to other serious allegations of misconduct committed by the Spanish
security forces, the questionable deaths the security forces were involved in and their
dirty war tactics, including the actions of the Antiterrorist Groups of Liberation (GAL)
are addressed. 287 A number of allegations were made against members of the Spanish
security forces for the use of excessive force, including the wrongful deaths of a number
of people. Just one example of such is how in 1988, ―a plain-clothed member of the Civil
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Guard, in a trivial discussion, killed a youth, Miguel Ángel Aguilar, and seriously injured
another, Felipe Martín‖.288 Highlighting the fact that these wrongful deaths were not
isolated cases is the fact that there is even an association comprised of ―members [who
all] have in common the death of some family member or friend by the disproportionate
reaction of some member of the police, Civil Guard or security guard‖.289
The actions of the GAL include some of the better-known cases of misconduct,
which are even tantamount to actions of state-sponsored terrorism or dirty war actions,
carried out by some members of the Spanish security forces on Spanish and French
territory in the 1980s.290 The actions of the GAL were reprehensible not only because
they constituted a dirty war, or because it took nearly a decade for the Spanish
Government to admit its actions, but also because the actions taken by the GAL only
supported ETA and its ambitions. To illustrate, an El País editorial claimed, ―the matter
of the GAL ha[d] not been unearthed because it was never buried. And it was not because
no one, of power, ever recognized [at least not until 1994] that the GAL were a
tremendous political error, moreover a criminal botched job‖.291 Which, furthermore, led
to the fact that ―ETA was never closer to triumph than in those years of the GAL … [and]
the only thing one can claim from the Government is justly that the GAL disappeared,
while ETA has continued killing‖.292
The members of the GAL, however, were not able to escape impunity. While it
did take a substantial amount of time, those accused of collaborating with, or taking part
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in, the GAL were held accountable for their actions, at least for the most part, albeit there
were some who claimed that they did not receive sufficient punishment. It must be noted
that not many were safe from prosecution if they had been involved in the GAL
controversy. Police officers, the former Director General of State Security, Julián
Sancristóbal, and the Minister of Justice and of the Interior, Juan Alberto Belloch, all
were ordered detained and had to appear in court and some were even convicted for their
affiliation to, or involvement with, the GAL.293 As aforementioned, there was some
contention regarding the convictions of those connected to the GAL. For example, Sabin
Intxaurraga, Minister of Justice of the Basque Government, ―reminded that those
‗implicated in the GAL have been indicted and condemned for direct participation in
crimes of the State and should carry out their sentences‘ [and furthermore] … added that
the treatment that those accused of actions of the GAL ‗should be the same that persons
implicated in the terrorism of ETA receive‘‖.294 On the other hand, however, there were
those who believed the members of the security forces should receive harsher
punishments than convicted terrorists.295 Importantly, there were also accusations that
convicted members of the security forces had not served their time in jail. For example, a
―member of the Civil Guard that fired [his gun and killed a youth] was condemned to five
years [in jail]‖, but was known to be continuing his military service in Guadalajara
instead of serving his prison sentence.296
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The GAL were by no means the only groups to use dirty war tactics against ETA.
An additional example of a group that utilized dirty war tactics used against ETA is that
of the Basque-Spanish Battalion (Batallón Vasco – Español or BVE) that operated from
1975-1981. The BVE ―targeted ETA members and many ordinary Basque citizens as
well. Its death squads were largely made up of mercenaries, directed by members of the
security forces‖.297 Furthermore, some argue, ―in every sense, the BVE was the prototype
for the GAL‖.298 Additional examples of groups that engaged in dirty war tactics include:
―special operations groups and antiterrorist units from both the National Police (Grupos
Especiales de Operaciones), [the Special Operations Groups] and the Guardia Civil (the
Unidades Antiterroristas Rurales) [the Rural Antiterrorist Units], [that] were deployed in
the Basque Country‖ in 1980.299
To conclude this section, it is important to recall that it is in fact the case that
Spanish security forces have, on numerous occasions, operated outside of the rule of law
or used questionable, albeit legal, measures to combat the terrorist threat. It is, moreover,
equally important to highlight the fact that these situations occurred either during the
transition to democracy or in the early years of Spanish democracy, and ―that during the
immediate post-Franco and the democratic transition periods, security agencies and
security agents were those of the previous authoritarian regime‖.300 With that being said,
it is possible to state that there is some evidence that the Spanish security forces have,
perhaps, learned from their past lessons and have made an effort to work within the
framework of a democratic society. For example, the Spanish Government itself was
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condemned to paying indemnifications to the victims of a terrorist attack because ―it was
said in this case the negligence of the State Security Forces‘ actions was the
responsibility of the Administration‖.301 Furthermore, regarding how certain actions were
kept secret (e.g. the GAL operations) an accord was signed ―that would guarantee that
possible criminal acts or excesses of injuring people would not go unpunished not even at
the margin of the acts of the judges‖, however, this ―accord [was] not retroactive and,
therefore, it [did] not affect the actions of the dirty war [emphasis in original] against
ETA, such as the GAL and others, … under judicial investigation‖.302 One last example
regards ―flights investigated by the Guardia Civil in Palma de Mallorca, allegedly used
by the CIA to transfer prisoners related to terrorism of Islamic origin‖ in which it was
stated, ―these activities are declared illegal in our legal system and therefore the Spanish
authorities do not accept that they are carried out in its territory‖. 303 Lastly, one editorial
claimed, ―the only way to prevent the occurrence of the deterioration of the morale of the
law enforcement, with its negative repercussions for the democratic institutions, is
precisely that light is shed over the darkness, that to many seem artificial, that surrounds
this unpunished criminality‖.304 In other words, while the Spanish had long reminded
security forces to remain within the democratic system, perhaps after confronting their
own demons, they were able to realize the importance of doing so.
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United Kingdom
Before discussing the actions and support for the U.K. security forces, a brief
overview of how counterterrorism in the U.K. works is given. ―In the United Kingdom,
the home secretary is responsible for all security and counterterrorism issues. ...
[Moreover,] even though Scotland and Northern Ireland have independent police forces
... they are subordinate to the home secretary on terrorism policy‖.305 Furthermore,
[W]ithin the Home Office, responsibility for terrorism police falls under
the Organized and International Crime Directorate. Within.... [which] is
the Terrorism Protection Unit (TPU), which is itself split into different
sections dealing with, inter alia, Irish terrorism, international terrorism,
contingency planning, and domestic terrorism.... In line with Britain‘s
consideration of terrorism as a criminal act, responsibility on the ground
for responding to a terrorist act within the United Kingdom falls to the
chief constable of the relevant fifty or so police authorities. The police
may then call in whatever additional resources they deem necessary, be it
fire department, ambulance, ... local and national government,
intelligence, ... or military. However, any decision to launch an assault
against terrorists requires ministerial approval. .... Within the United
Kingdom, it is the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office] and its
Counter Terrorism Policy Department that have the lead role on
international aspects of terrorism.306
Turning now to the data on U.K. security forces, similar to the case of Spain,
there is no doubt that security forces within the United Kingdom have used extralegal or
extreme, however, legal, measures in the fight against terrorism. The research on security
forces identifies a number of different themes which can be broken down into two main
categories: support for the security forces and their actions and the lack of support for the
security forces and their actions or inactions.
Before reviewing how security forces were or were not supported in their fight
against terrorism, a brief discussion of actions taken and the situation in which these
305
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actions were taken is necessary. These include: the legal, political, and security measures
taken by the security forces or put in place to aid the security forces in the fight against
terrorism, increasing troop numbers, the security forces‘ relationship with the public and
media, and lastly, structural or organizational problems with the security forces.
Throughout the course of the fight against terrorism in Britain a number of different legal
and political measures have been instated to aid the security forces against terrorist
threats. A more comprehensive examination of these measures is discussed in the chapter
on legislative data, but a brief review is discussed here, which includes the use of
internment and corresponding interrogation tactics, and increasing the number of security
forces, including the use of special forces.
The use of internment is perhaps the most well known extreme measure employed
by the British in the fight against terrorism and while the use of internment can be, and
often is, considered deplorable in retrospect, at the time of its implementation it was
viewed to be essential to combating terrorism. Even more appalling are some of the
measures used against suspected terrorists which included: employing extreme
interrogation methods such as sensory deprivation to extract confessions or information
from suspected terrorists which were later ―condemned as torture by the European
Commission of Human Rights.‖307 However, some claim that the ―principles governing
interrogation‖, which was the responsibility of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC),
were never ―more than guidelines. They have never had and do not have the force of
law‖, which would, therefore, make the use of them against the law.308 Lastly, these
measures and others were periodically reviewed to ensure that they continued to meet the
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needs of the security forces or, in other words, as phrased by The Times, ―present
procedures … [were] examined to see whether they [the powers of the security forces
provided under the law] could be amended or improved to assist the security forces‖.309
A discussion of troop numbers also provides insight into how security forces were
employed in the fight against terrorism. The number of troops often varied and was
increased numerous times to support counterterrorism initiatives. Security forces were
also called to help rebuild other forces‘ stations when they were attacked by terrorists and
troops were additionally used to guard ―essential services‖, or critical structures, such as
waterways or treatment plants, especially those in rural areas, from terrorist attacks.310
Given the previous discussion as to the importance of unemployment as a concern of the
British, it is noteworthy to mention that the rate of unemployment served as a significant
factor for bolstering the number of security forces as it made recruitment efforts easier.311
To better understand the situation security forces in Britain at times found
themselves in, a brief review of their relationship with the media is addressed. Though
security forces throughout the democratic world would perhaps prefer to have their
actions hidden from public scrutiny, if only for purposes of gathering and maintaining
classified intelligence, with the possible exception of ―matters of national security‖ in
Western democracies, with their freedoms of press and speech, this is extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to do. Complicating security forces‘ legitimate operations further is the
fact that the media and the military often do not have each other‘s best interests at heart
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which can, and often does, lead to deception or manipulation by one or both parties. This
can be especially detrimental to the security forces when they are trying to win ―the
hearts and minds‖ of the public and the media turns public support against them.
Examples of how the media assailed the security forces vary from engaging in
―psychological warfare‖ in which ―the Army regard[ed] the work of the British press in
Northern Ireland as actively destructive of the military campaign‖, 312 to allegations that
some media outlets paid ―youngsters to throw stones at the security forces and then
televis[ed] them‖, which would make it appear as if the security forces were disliked or
even hated.313 It should be noted that while the police were targeted by youth, especially
in the early 1970s when, ―the army was clashing regularly with Catholic youths‖, the
point here is to highlight the fact that the media fabricated some stories to the detriment
of the security forces.314 It must also be mentioned that the media were also criticized for
their failure to report attacks against security forces, especially when more ―newsworthy‖
stories were available. For example, a bombing, in which six persons were killed and 90
were injured, at the London department store, Harrods, received international publicity
while news of a murdered solider and policeman in the Irish Republic, not unlike most
other murders there, did not.315 Lastly, security forces were often present at marches and
protests in which they used a number of different methods of policing, including flying
military helicopters over the marches, and while the security forces themselves were
responsible for their actions, the media did not hesitate to exploit them.
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In addition to the apparent lack of support often depicted by the media toward the
security forces, they also encountered a number of organizational or structural problems.
These problems largely include, inter alia, how troops were mobilized and the number of
troops available. To illustrate, the ―apparent lack of control by police during … riots was
caused largely by their being outnumbered‖, and while it would be near impossible to
have a larger number of security forces than civilians except in an extreme police state,
the fact that only about one-seventh of the ―force … [could] be mobilized at any one time
in a trouble spot‖ only exacerbated this problem.316 Another problem is the fact that
security forces were often stretched too thin, or as described by The Times, they had
―other things to do‖. As noted above, the security forces were at times employed in noncounterterrorism missions which meant they often did have ―other things to do‖, and as
such their overall ability to combat terrorism was hindered.317 Lastly, in addition to the
aforementioned problems, security forces also experienced problems such as jailbreaks,
in which suspected or known terrorists were able to escape from jail due to ―deficiencies
in the physical security of the prison‖, which meant that their efforts had essentially been
wasted, not to mention the fact that this meant their resources would have to be divided
up in order to not only capture terrorists who had not been jailed but also to re-capture
those who escaped.318
As should now be apparent, security forces, regardless of their actions, did face a
number of problems that were, or would have been, quite difficult, if not nearly
impossible, to overcome. This, however, is not meant to condone their actions but rather
to highlight some of the problems they were faced with in order to help put the following
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examination of their support, or lack thereof, into perspective. The lack of support for
security forces is largely due to their misconduct, or allegations of such, the fact that
many members of the security forces were not charged for their extralegal actions, and
other general examples of lack of support for the security forces.
One of the major reasons why security forces were not supported in the fight
against terrorism was because they were deemed to be transgressing the confines of their
normal duties and, moreover, there was wide-spread perception, correct or not, that the
security forces were not being held accountable or liable for their actions. The allegations
of misconduct were extensive, and it is worth noting that according to some opinion
polls, over a quarter of those polled ―declared the British Army to be ‗generally cruel and
brutal‘‖.319

Furthermore, it was widely perceived that the British Government

ignored these allegations of misconduct due to the lack of serious inquiry into the security
forces' actions. Some of the allegations were, however, investigated by Amnesty
International which claimed, ―most allegations [of abuse] were against detectives. A few
allegations were against the Army but hardly any were against uniformed members of the
RUC‖, and, moreover, they did find some evidence to substantiate the claims.320
In addition to the claims of misconduct, security forces were also condemned for
what appeared to be apparent, or blatant, amnesty for their actions. Even in the cases in
which inquests into security forces' actions were held, their legitimacy, and
proportionality, remained questionable. For example, an inquest into the death of "a
loyalists shot by the Royal Ulster Constabulary in 1981", held a decade after the incident,
"did not remove suspicion that the RUC had without reasonable cause killed a young
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man", and furthermore, "'the cloud of suspicion, as in the cases of other loyalists killed by
security forces, will never be cleared unless there are full and frank inquiries into the
whole ‗shoot-to-kill‘ operations‘‖.321 One example of how these inquests were often
questionable is exemplified through the use of "public interest immunity certificates",
which permitted "coroners to allow members of the security forces to give written
statements rather than attend inquests".322 While the ―shoot-to-kill‖ operations are
controversial, it is argued that, ―‗snatch squads‘ were developed to arrest instigators, and
the army warned that it might have to shoot to kill in order to defend itself from attacks
[launched by Catholic youths] with firebombs and bricks‖.323
While there are many examples of police brutality or misconduct, the most well
known example is perhaps that of Bloody Sunday in which 13 civilians lost their lives
due to an overreaction by the military at a march in 1972. Further exacerbating the
perception of the security forces is the fact that ―the soldiers who fired or might have
fired the shots were exculpated‖.324 It merits mention that the events of Bloody Sunday
did not constitute the only time in which security forces were viewed to engage in
misconduct or appear overbearing in their actions or presence at marches and, in fact, on
numerous occasions security forces were present at marches to ―deter any active troublemaker from trying to exploit the situation‖.
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Furthermore, military helicopters were

often used to keep an eye on the marches and to ―take pictures of the event which …
[were] later … scrutinized by intelligence officers‖, which was done in part due to the
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fact that in 1984, ―a man died as they [the police and Army] charged through the crowd
in a vain effort to arrest Mr Martin Galvin of Noraid‖.326 It is worth mentioning that
military helicopters ―were present‖ at the march that it now known as Bloody Sunday. 327
The second most well known example of misconduct is perhaps the shooting in Gibraltar
which ―led to the deaths of three unarmed IRA members, shot by the SAS [Special Air
Services, a component of the U.K. Special Forces] under MI5 control‖.328 The Gibraltar
killings were considered controversial and the British Government was even accused ―of
violating the right to life when [the] three unarmed members of the IRA were shot dead
by the SAS in Gibraltar‖.329
An additional example of how the police engaged in misconduct regards how the
police fabricated terrorist threats. One example of such is that of the Old Trafford threat.
In this case, ―400 officers from over four police forces ... raided half a dozen houses,
flats, and businesses in and around Manchester‖, and due to various Manchester United
paraphernalia, including past tickets to games, the police unofficially leaked to the press
that there was a plan to ―launch an audacious bomb attack on Old Trafford stadium on
match day‖.330 While this story was leaked to the media by unofficial police sources, ―the
Manchester police ... encouraged the story to run by issuing public statements that ...
could be read as corroborating the story‖.331
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The last aspect to be discussed here is the perception that perhaps the security
forces were not committed to achieving an end to the threat of terrorism due to the fact
that in situations in which the IRA had declared ceasefires, they [the IRA] ―required a
cessation of aggressive military activity by Crown forces‖. 332 Additionally, while during
peace negotiations a United Nation‘s panel concluded that ―significant improvements
ha[d] been made in police treatment of suspects detained in Northern Ireland‘s
paramilitary holding centres‖, ―the Committee for the Administration of Justice
submission observe[d] that ‗even in the wake of the ceasefire … [omission in original]
complaints have included personal abuse, threats to (suspects) and their families, tactics
such as deprivation of sleep and slaps and blows to the body‘‖.333
In sum, there are many examples of how the security forces used questionable
methods and for the most part it appears as if their actions went unpunished. It is,
however, also true that their actions were condemned, just not by the U.K., but rather also
by

various

international

organizations,

governmental

and

non-governmental

organizations, or NGOs, such as Amnesty International, the European Commission on
Human Rights, and the United Nations.
Turning now to how the security forces were supported in their actions, it must be
noted that there were a variety of ways in which they and their ―extralegal‖ or
questionable actions were supported. Examples of this support include: boosting the
security forces‘ morale or justifying their actions in the fight against terrorism through
the use of fear, especially in referencing the fight against terrorism as being equivalent to
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a battle in war, and the fact that security forces often were specifically targeted by
terrorists.
As mentioned above, one of the most common ways in which support for security
forces and their actions was expressed was through the use of fear, especially by equating
the fight against terrorism as a battle in war. Before examining this in further detail, it is
important to note that not all of the support for the security forces and their actions
arose from the use of scare tactics, warning of the horrors that would await Britain if the
security forces were not successful in their counterterrorism efforts. For example, quotes
such as there was ―wilfil [sic] ignorance in Northern Ireland by some people of what was
being achieved on security‖, and that ―the successes of the RUC and the Army, aided by
the significantly growing number of people who voluntarily give information to the
police, provide hope for the future‖,334 or ―the Irish security forces have scored some
significant successes against the Real IRA this year, arresting scores of their members in
the Republic and foiling several high-profile attacks‖335 exemplify the fact that the
security forces were able to achieve success which correlated well to their support levels,
without having to resort to fear tactics, albeit they were often used.
As the following demonstrates, fear tactics were, however, one of the primary
methods used to rally support for the security forces and their actions. Quotes such as
―unless the security forces can get on top of the situation, the wider authority of the
Government in Northern Ireland will suffer serious damage‖,336 and ―British authority
and troops in the north-east of the province of Ulster stand guard against the renewal of
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civil war in Ireland‖,337 are just two examples supportive of the security forces‘ efforts
and reflective of the belief that the presence of security forces in Northern Ireland was
imperative to achieving and maintaining peace. Additionally, quotes such as
―imprisonment without trial has been urged by senior security advisors desperate to halt
Northern Ireland‘s spiralling sectarian violence‖,338 and ―the police had confirmed that
the Act [The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1976] was as
important to them as it had ever been‖,339 both demonstrate that support was also
expressed through the justification of the security forces‘ extralegal and legal actions.
Lastly, excerpts such as ―an intensification of the military effort is now the only way of
achieving the necessary success against the urban guerrilla campaign‖, 340 and ―if civil
disruption continues on a significant scale it could mean that soldiers will have to take
over running essential services in some areas‖,341 both illustrate how some aspects of fear
were utilized to augment support for the security forces. Moreover, and especially in the
cases in which security forces did have to ―take over running essential services in some
areas‖, this technique was successful.
Unlike the Spanish case, support for the British security forces and their
actions was also generated by equating the fight against terrorism to a battle in times of
war. Incidentally, this would be the exact justification the U.K. would use in order to
derogate from Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights in order to
prolong the detention of suspected terrorists. For example, Mr. Faulkner, former Prime
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Minister of Northern Ireland stated, ―we are, quite simply, at war with the terrorists, and
in a state of war many sacrifices have to be made, and made in a cooperative and
understanding spirit.‖342 It was, moreover, even contended that ―the morality of killing
terrorists cannot properly be distinguished from the morality of killing enemy soldiers in
war‖, which added further justification to the security forces‘ use of the more extreme or
questionable counterterrorism measures.343 It is worth mentioning that this comparison of
the fight against terrorism to a battle in times of war has been rarely, if at all, used after
the terrorist attacks of July 2005. This is due to the realization that the ―war on terror‖
cannot be won ―by military means alone, and because ... [the ―war on terror‖] isn‘t
against one organized enemy with a clear identity and a coherent set of objectives‖, and,
furthermore, because this type of language was ―deemed ‗counterproductive‘ by British
diplomats, [and hence,] was abandoned in order to avoid any suggestion of a ‗clash or
war of civilizations‘‖.344
As in the case of Spain, an additional method of how British security forces and
their actions were supported is that of the fact that they were often the targets of terrorist
violence. As put by The Times, ―the ease and impunity with which the IRA has been able
to pick off, especially in the border counties, off-duty policemen, reservists and members
of the Ulster Defence Regiment have engendered understandable anger and [a] sense of
insecurity".345 Given that, and the fact that ―the IRA has concentrated its fire on security
personnel, particularly off-duty policemen and members of the part-time Ulster Defence
Regiment, and particularly in the rural border areas of counties Fermanagh and Armagh
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where it is hard to provide protection‖,346 and that overall, "members of the security
forces bulk large among the IRA‘s victims‖,347 it is not difficult to see how the attacks
against the security forces accounted for at least some of the support for the more drastic
security measures implemented to combat the terrorist threat.
The last aspect to be discussed regards how security forces were supported due to
the fact that the attacks against the security forces were often attacks on civilians as well,
considering the fact that often many, if not more, civilians were injured or killed in the
terrorist attacks against security forces. In other words, ―placing the bombs in the area of
army barracks allow[ed] the IRA to pretend that it [was] attacking military targets, even
when it [was] predictable that many civilians [would] will also be casualties‖,348 which,
as the following illustrates, often was the case: "as with so many previous atrocities in
Northern Ireland it was civilians who bore the brunt of the explosion".349 It is worth
highlighting the fact that this is the converse of the Spanish case. In other words, ETA
rarely targeted civilians, and in the rare that it did target civilians, it was perhaps due to
the fact that ―the elimination of experienced activists [due to them being arrested or
killed] may have driven ETA to become more reckless in the use of explosives, and to
target civilians rather than the security forces‖.350 Lastly, it should be mentioned that
there is evidence that the specific targeting of security forces did lead to increasing troop
numbers numerous different times as exemplified by the following excerpt: "the
Government acted ... to counter the wave of Provisional IRA attacks on police stations in
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Northern Ireland by announcing that an extra battalion of more than 550 men is being
sent to the province ... to be stationed mainly in the border areas‖.351
To conclude, a review of the data on security forces in the U.K. demonstrates that
the security forces did operate both within and outside of the rule of law to combat the
threat of terrorism and that they were vulnerable to both media and public scrutiny, but
also that they were able to rally support, at least initially, for themselves and their actions
when needed, especially when the security forces had been victims of terrorist attacks
themselves.
In analyzing and comparing the experience of the Spanish and British security
forces it becomes apparent that both states‘ security forces operated both within and
outside the rule of law. To put this in the context of the moral panic theory, it is possible
to say that both countries‘ security forces did exhibit volatility, a heightened level of
concern, an increased level of hostility, and substantial or widespread agreement or
consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group and their
behavior, and disproportionality in their counterterrorism efforts. While it is true that the
five indicators of a moral panic are present in both cases, the fact that the British
experience arguably worsened over time while the Spanish experience improved as it
successfully transitioned into a consolidated democracy, must be recalled and highlighted
and, therefore, the case for moral panics is stronger for the British case.
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Chapter 6: Legislation Data

The purpose of this section is to review the legislation available to both Britain
and Spain in their respective counterterrorism initiatives. Both countries are members of
the European Union and also signatories to many international agreements and treaties
regarding terrorism, which are discussed in addition to their own respective domestic
legislations.

Spain
This section discusses Spain‘s legislative framework in regard to its attempt to
combat the threat of domestic, primarily from ETA, and international terrorism. Before
discussing the actual legislation applicable to combating terrorism, it must first be noted
that in January 1977, the Spanish National Court, the Audencia Nacional, ―was created in
Madrid to deal with serious organised crime and terrorist offences … [which] implied a
fundamental jurisdictional change, since terrorist crimes would be dealt with, from that
moment on, by ordinary judges instead of military courts as was previously the case‖.352
Furthermore, Article 117(5) of the Spanish Constitution explicitly states, ―the law will
regulate the exercise of military jurisdiction strictly within the scope of the military‖. 353
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The first piece of legislation addressing terrorism in the new democratic period
was Organic Law (O.L.) 56/1978 ―Special Measures toward Crimes of Terrorism
Committed by Armed Groups‖. This law ―was approved as emergency legislation …
[and] was expanded by special Decree-Law 3/1979 [―On the Protection of Citizen
Security‖]‖.354 After this legislation went into effect, ―the different antiterrorist laws were
basically referred to as ‗criminal acts committed by armed groups,‘ without making
almost any expressed reference to the term terrorism except in sporadic cases‖. 355 The
first piece of non-emergency counterterrorism legislation was Organic Law 2/1981, of 4
May, for the Defense of the Constitution. Under this law,
The powers of the Guardia Civil to detain and arrest anyone suspected of
involvement with terrorism, even if peripherally, [were expanded] …
[which] was made possible by the adoption of the very expansive and
highly ambiguous definition of terrorism [which was defined] … not only
as ‗embracing any attack on the integrity of the Spanish nation‘ but also as
‗any effort to secure independence of any part of its territory, even if non
violent‘.356
It is imperative to note that the passage of this piece of legislation came after the
failed coup d‘ètat of 23 February 1981, the first true test of the stability of the new
Spanish democracy. Due in part to the attempted coup d‘état, ―in March 1981, a single
centralized command for the fight against terrorism, known as Mando Unico para la
Lucha Contraterrorrista (sic) [Single Command for the Counterterrorism Fight], was
created for the first time since the democratic transition began‖.357 358 Due to controversy
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that surrounded the attempted coup, and the status of members of the Government in the
ensuing hours after the coup, in which many had believed that the military had overtaken
the Government, Organic Law 4/1981, ―over states of alarm, exception and sites, defined
the extraordinary powers that the state could assume in emergency situations‖, was
passed.359 Additionally, Organic Law 1/1984, of 5 January, on the Reform of Organic
Law 6/1980, of 1 July, for Regulation of the Basic Criteria of National Defense and
Military Organization was passed to, inter alia, further define the role of the military and
its duties. The role of the military and its duties was further expanded with Organic Law
2/1986 on State Security Forces and Bodies. Organic Law 1/1992, of 21 February, on the
Protection of Public Safety further,
Authorises the police agents to use specific preventative measures …
[and] permits the introduction of controls on the streets and in public
places or establishments for the purpose of discovering and apprehending
the participants in a crime and of securing the instruments, property or
evidence connected therewith. … [However,] the police agents are not
authorised, either in urgent or other exceptional circumstances, to dispense
with a court-ordered warrant to enter homes in order to combat crimes.360
Spain has elected to deal with the threat of terrorism by strengthening or
toughening its existing criminal law and relating it to specific terrorist offences or
offences associated with terrorism. Much of the counterterrorism legislation in Spain is
established in the Spanish Penal Code approved in November 1995 under Title XII
―Crimes Against Public Order‖, Chapter V on Possession, Trafficking, and Deposit of
Arms, Ammunition, or Explosives and Terrorist Crimes, Section 2, Articles 571-580 all
of which explicitly deal with terrorist offences. The offences found in Articles 571-580
include: offenses for belonging to or working in the service of, or collaboration with
359
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armed bands, organizations or groups (Article 571),361 possession of arms or explosive
substances (Article 573), collaborating with armed bands or terrorist groups or
organizations (Article 574), the financing of terrorism (Article 575),362 the
criminalization of glorifying or justifying terrorism (Article 578), provisions for lower
criminal penalties for abandoning terrorist activities and collaborating with police to
prevent a terrorist attack or capture other terrorists (Article 579), and the provision to use
previous foreign convictions of terrorism to further criminalize recidivist attacks (Article
580).363 Articles 571-580, moreover, state the applicable criminal punishment (i.e. prison
sentence) for the crimes described in the Articles. The punishments for these crimes can
be summarized as the following:
When a criminal act causes the death of a person, the sanctions defined in
the Penal Code for crimes of terrorism can reach a maximum of 30 years
in prison. For terrorist activities consisting of arson and destruction, the
sanctions range from 15 to 20 years in prison. When a person is seriously
injured, the sanction is also 15 to 20 years. When an injury is minor, the
actor who belongs to the armed group threatens, coerces or illegally
detains another person, the sanction ranges from 10 to 15 years in prison.
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These prison sentences can be even longer when if terrorist actions are
directed against government officials.364
Two additional reforms of the Penal Code merit mentioning. The first is Organic
Law 7/2000 on Regulating Penal Responsibility of Minors: Special Consideration of
Educational-Sanction Measures, ―which, in general, provide[s] for special measures in
cases involving persons younger than 18 years of age who commit terrorist offences. The
law increases the length of detention for minors convicted of terrorist offences and
creates a special Juvenile Court within the Audencia Nacional‖.365 The second refers to
the Penal Code modifications of 2001 that were implemented in response to a ―new
strategy instigated by ETA terrorist offences‖, to ―include criminal actions intended to
intimidate part of a given population as well as entire social or political collectivities, and
violent activities aimed at subverting the constitutional order and at seriously altering
public peace‖.366
As previous sections discuss the controversy surrounding negotiating or hosting
dialogues with terrorists and the criminalization of Herri Batasuna, the legislation
regarding these policies merit exploration. Looking firstly at the policy of negotiation,
although:
[I]n the Pact of Madrid of 5 November 1987, it was decided not to make
the policy of counter-terrorism an issue of the political debate in the
national Parliament [and] on the regional level, parallel agreements were
concluded with the so-called Pact of Ajuria Enea of 12 January 1988 and
the Pact of Navarre of 7 October 1988, … [which] clearly state that no
political objective, however legitimate it may be, justifies the use of
violence and categorically rule out the possibility of political negotiation
with terrorists … they still [however] leave a door open for a negotiated
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end to the violence, on the condition that ETA shows unequivocally that it
is willing to cease its terrorist activities.367
Additionally, the Popular Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party
(PSOE), the two primary political parties in Spain, came together to reach the Accord in
Favor of Liberties and Against Terrorism, Acuerdo por las libertades y contra el
terrorismo, of 8 December 2000, which called upon the other political parties ―to express
their will to collaborate in the goal of eradicating the scourge of terrorism‖.
Turning now to the legislation regarding the criminalization of political parties,
the most important is Organic Law 6/2002, of 27 June, on Political Parties. In which:
[A]ccording to Article 9, a political party will be declared illegal if it fails
to respect democratic principles and constitutional values, i.e. if it
systematically harms fundamental rights and freedoms by promoting,
justifying or exonerating attacks against the right to life and the integrity
of the individual, if it foments, facilitates or legitimises violence, or
complements and supports the actions of ―terrorist organisations‖.368
After this law was passed Judge Baltasar Garzón:
[F]iled an accusation that Batasuna was part of ‗the terrorist complex led
by ETA‘, financed terrorism and was involved in the group‘s terrorist
activities. Moreover, on the basis, [of] Article[s] 520 and 129 of the Penal
Code, he ordered the suspension for three years, extendable to five years,
of the political and economical activities of Batasuna, on the grounds that
it formed an important and intrinsic part of the structure of ETA. … [and]
further ordered that Batasuna‘s finances and possessions are to be claimed
by the Spanish state …. [and] included a prohibition of any gathering or
demonstration held either by groups or by individuals on Batasuna on its
suspension. …. [Furthermore,] on 2 September 2002, Judge Garzón issued
a Court Order that appeared to widen the scope for the prohibition of ‗any
gathering or demonstration‘, which was contained in the Order of 26
August 2002. The judge stated explicitly that the order suspending
Batasuna‘s activities included those that were either directly or indirectly
driven or inspired by Batasuna or its members or leaders. Any symbols,
logos, posters, placards, announcements, etc., referring to Batasuna, were
also prohibited. 369
367
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After the passage of Organic Law 6/2002 and Judge Garzón‘s accusation and Court
Order, the Basque Government attempted to take the Spanish Government to the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for violating Articles 6, 7, and 11370 of the
European Covenant of Human Rights (ECHR), but in ―February 2004, the European
Court of Human Rights unanimously agreed to reject the Basque Government‘s claim in
relation to the banning of ETA‘s political wing‖.371
Spain has additionally enacted a number of different legislative initiatives
regarding compensation to victims of terrorist violence. The primary laws include: Law
370

Article 6 ECHR: 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
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12/1996, of 19 December, on Help to the Victims of Terrorism, Law 13/1996, of 30
December, on Fiscal, Administrative Measures and of the Social Order, and Law
32/1999, of 8 October, on Solidarity with the Victims of Terrorism. Compensation
regulated by these laws is paid by the Spanish state. Law 13/1996 refers to ―both ...
injuries and to material damage‖, Law 32/1999 ―establishes a scale of minimum
compensation that could possibly be increased by judicial decision‖, and Law 12/1996
―set[s] compensation for death in the case of terrorist attacks‖.372
The last aspect of Spain‘s counterterrorism legislation to be addressed here is the
international or multinational dimension of the legislation. It is worth mentioning the fact
that, ―Spain, irrespective of the party in charge of the executive, has consistently
supported multilateral agreements in the fight against transnational or international
terrorism, both among liberal democratic regimes in the context of Western Europe, as
well as in the framework of the United Nations‖.373 Spain ratified many of the existing
international agreements against or related to terrorism in the years after its democratic
transition (e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ratified in
1979, the European Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism 1977 which Spain
ratified in 1980, the European Convention on Extradition of 1957 ratified in Spain in
1982, etc.). After its transition, Spain not only implemented bilateral counterterrorism
agreements (e.g. the Castellana Accords of 1984, an accord between France and Spain to
combat ETA), but also multinational or international agreements such as the ratification
of all of the U.N. conventions on terrorism (e.g. the U.N. Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 and the U.N.
372
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Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism of 1999), and the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1987, and the Europol
Convention of 1995 in which the ―inclusion of terrorism … was added … at the
insistence of the Spanish executive‖.374
Spain, moreover, enacted or ratified a number of counterterrorism policies as a
direct response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington D.C. These
include: the Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism 2002 and the Council
of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005. Moreover, Spain justified its
involvement in the United States‘ ―War on Terror‖ due to its obligations under Article 5,
an attack on one, is an attack against all, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) treaty.375 It is important to stress the fact that these policies or legislative
initiatives were adopted in the context of the European Union, the United Nations, or
some other multinational organization, and were not initiatives that the Spanish
Government undertook on a purely domestic level in reaction to the 9/11 attacks.

United Kingdom
Legislation used to combat terrorism is quite extensive in the U.K. As discussed
below, the majority of this legislation is derived from measures deemed necessary to end
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the terrorist violence in Northern Ireland. In more recent years, however, the legislation
has started to reflect a growing concern for international terrorism.
For purposes of this thesis, the main counterterrorism legislation dates back to the
Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Acts of 1939-1973. These Acts were
initially temporarily enacted, but were successively renewed until 1973 and, moreover,
served as model for their replacement, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act passed in 1974. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
of 1974 was passed ―largely in response to the Birmingham bombings‖, 376 in which the
IRA bombed two pubs in Birmingham, killing 21 and injuring another 162, and the
continued IRA ―irredentist campaigns of violence against the British mainland‖.377 These
Acts, which were successively renewed until 1989, ―applied to Northern Ireland terrorism
as it affected the United Kingdom as a whole‖, and furthermore, they ―allowed, inter alia,
[for the] proscription of organisations, powers of exclusion from one part of the UK to
Northern Ireland and vice versa, and extended powers of post-arrest, pre-judicial
detention‖.378 Additionally, in 1973, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act
was passed to replace the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) of
1922 that ―had conferred upon the authorities unusually wide powers for maintaining the
peace‖,379 establishing ―special procedures for criminal procedure in Northern Ireland,
both for the investigation and trial of so-called ‗Scheduled Offences‘, i.e. terrorist
offences‖.380 This act was also ―intended as a temporary piece of legislation which had to
be extended by Parliament at the end of a two years period, [but] the Act remained in
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force for twenty-seven years [until 1996]‖.381 Furthermore, it must be noted that the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973 ―inter alia, also provided for
internment without trial‖.382 The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts 19731996 were replaced with the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 which
came with a ―sunset‖ clause date of August 2000. The British Government, however,
―arrived at the conclusion that the time [was] not yet right to remove all of those
provisions in light of the evolving security situation‖ and, therefore, ―Part VII of the
Terrorism Act 2000 … provides additional temporary measures for Northern Ireland‖.383
Before returning to the Terrorism Act 2000, the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and
Conspiracy) Act of 1998 needs to be addressed. This was the first piece of U.K.
legislation that dealt specifically with international and not just Irish Republican
terrorism. The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act of 1998 was introduced
in the aftermath of the Omagh bombing, one of the most deadly attacks in Northern
Ireland, and it ―not only further[ed] counterterrorism laws for Northern Ireland but …
extend[ed] the extraterritorial criminal liability of persons acting in the UK against the
interests of foreign Governments‖.384 A review of existing counterterrorism legislation
was conducted by Lord Lloyd in the late 1990s in which it was ―concluded that there was
a continuing need for legislation, in some measure to be available against threats not
hitherto falling within the counterterrorism legislation‖, and consequently, the Terrorism
Act 2000 was passed ―with a vastly extended definition of terrorism,385 it being decided
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that there remained the need for special powers with respect to Northern Ireland and for
the extension of existing powers to cover domestic and international terrorism‖.386 Some
additional powers found in the Terrorism Act 2000 include:
The power for the Secretary of State to proscribe terrorist organisations387
… [provisions] for criminal sanctions with regard to a number of other
activities related to terrorism like fund-raising for terrorist purposes, the
training in the use of firearms for terrorist purposes, … [and, inter alia, it]
gives the police special powers in order to facilitate the prevention of
terrorist acts and the investigation of terrorist crime … [such as] powers to
stop and search vehicles, their occupants, and pedestrians for the
prevention of terrorism as well as special arrest powers which are
applicable in cases where there is not enough evidence to charge an
individual with a particular offense even though there is reasonable
suspicion of his involvement in terrorism388.389
Moreover, the Terrorism Act 2000 ―allowed the withdrawal of the final Art. 15
derogation [of the European Convention on Human Rights]390 made by the Government
to inﬂuence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use
or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (2)
Action falls within this subsection if it— (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b)
involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person‘s life, other than that of the person
committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of
the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic
system. (3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of
ﬁrearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisﬁed. (4) In this
section— (a) ―action‖ includes action outside the United Kingdom, (b) a reference to any person
or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated, (c) a reference to the
public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and (d) ―the
government‖ means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or
of a country other than the United Kingdom. (5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the
purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the beneﬁt of a proscribed
organisation.
386
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in response to Northern Ireland terrorism‖.391 Furthermore, the Terrorism Act 2000 set a
new precedent because, inter alia, it also covers offenses ―related to terrorism which have
no equivalents in ordinary criminal law… [which includes] some core activities in
relation to terrorism like the directing of a terrorist organization or the weapons training
for terrorist purposes, including recruitment for such training‖. 392 It is important to note
that while the Terrorism Act 2000 did create new offences such as inciting terrorism
abroad, most of the offences in the Act were ―carried over from previous legislation‖.393
A mere two months after the 9/11 attacks, a new counterterrorism bill, the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001, was introduced in Parliament as ―a
legislative response to the events following 11 September and [UN]SC Resolution 1373‖,
and after receiving royal assent it entered into force on 14 December 2001.394 The
ATCSA 2001:
Includes measures to cut off terrorists from their funds by ensuring better
information sharing between intelligence and security agencies;
preventing terrorists from abusing immigration and asylum laws;
tightening security in relation to aviation, at nuclear sites, and at
laboratories holding stocks of dangerous substances; and enabling prompt
action to implement measures agreed on by all European Union member
countries to tackle terrorism and directly related crimes.395

measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. No derogation
from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3,
4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision. Any High Contracting Party availing
itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully
informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the
provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.
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The ATCSA 2001 also includes provisions found in Part 11, Retention of
Communications Data, that ―relate the duty of communications data providers like
telephone and internet companies to retain certain communications data and to disclose
these data to secret intelligence and law enforcement agencies‖.396 It must be noted that
similar provisions were present in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIPA) Bill
2000, but that they were enhanced and extended in the ATCSA 2001.
The most well known measure included in the ATCSA 2001 is perhaps the
provision for indefinite detention without trial. This provision is found in Part 4,
Immigration and Asylum, of the ATCSA 2001 which ―empowered the indefinite
detention under immigration law powers which would otherwise be time-limited, of
foreign nationals reasonably suspected of involvement in or supporting international
terrorism whom the Home Secretary reasonably believed to be a threat to national
security‖.397 This provision ―required an art. 15 derogation from art. 5 ECHR398 because

396

Grote, 617
Bonner, 55
398
Article 5 ECHR: ―Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful
arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to
secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority of
reasonable suspicion of having committed and offence or when it is reasonably considered
necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention
of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for
the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of
persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind,
alcoholics or drug addicts, or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his
effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken
with a view to deportation or extradition. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in
a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and the charge against him.
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this article
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by
397

138

detention pending deportation cannot be valid once it becomes clear that deportation is
precluded for art. 3 ECHR399 reasons‖.400 It is important to note that since these powers
of detention ―result from an extension of existing detention powers under the
Immigration Act 1971, they do not apply to persons which are not subject to immigration
control under the Act, i.e. British citizens‖.401 Furthermore, Britain also derogated from
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)402 for two
reasons. Firstly, ―to forestall a possible breach of the UK‘s obligations under the
Covenant‖, and secondly, ―to protect the derogation under the ECHR from challenge …
[since] Article 15 ECHR derogation measures are only admissible, among other things, if
they are not inconsistent with the other obligations of the Member State under
international law‖.403 Additionally, there was some precedent for extended detention from

arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention
shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this
article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.‖
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400
Supra note 397
401
Grote, 619
402
Article 9 of the ICCPR states: 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
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Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and
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the so-called ‗Soering’ Principle,404 a decision reached by the European Court of Human
Rights in 1989 that held that a non-national could not be extradited if they would face
torture or death. The legality of detention without trial was challenged in the A (and
others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department case, also referred to as the
―Belmarsh case‖. ―In its decision, the House of Lords, in exercise of its powers conferred
by the Human Rights Act 1998,405 quashed the Human Rights (Designated Derogation)
Order 2001, and made a declaration that s 23 of the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security
Act 2001 was incompatible with Arts 5 and 14406 of the [European] Convention [of
Human Rights]‖.407 This is an important ruling given the fact that this was the first time
the Court was given the ―power to declare Acts of Parliament incompatible with the
European Convention [of Human Rights]‖.408 It merits mention that those certified as
terrorists and held in detention have recourse to the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission (SAIC) ―in lieu of the right to apply for habeas corpus‖.409 The SAIC ―was
established in response to the judgment against the United Kingdom in Chalal by the
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (SIACA) in order to provide a
judicial process where the Government raised national security considerations about the
presentation of evidence in immigration cases‖.410 Furthermore:
The ‗Soering’ Principle was upheld further in the Chahal v. UK 1996 case in which the
majority of the ECHR ruled that regardless of citizenship a person could not be extradited if there
was reasonable belief they would face torture or death, a violation of Article 3 ECHR.
405
The Human Rights Act 1998 which entered into force on 2 October 2000, ―provides that in
coming to decisions, courts must take account of ECHR jurisprudence‖ (Bonner, 54).
406
Article 14 ECHR: ―The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status.‖
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[F]or as long as a suspected international terrorist remains in detention
there will be an automatic review of the certificate by the SAIC. The first
review will happen six months after the appeal (if there is one) or after the
date on which the certificate was issued (if there is no appeal). Subsequent
reviews will happen every three months beginning with the date on which
the previous review is finally determined. As with the appeal, the SAIC is
able to cancel the certificate on review if it is of the opinion that there are
no longer any reasonable grounds to believe that the detained person is a
risk to national security or a terrorist.411
The last piece of legislation to discuss here is the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(PTA) 2005. The PTA 2005 provides for two controversial and different types of control
orders, ―non-derogating‖ and ―derogating‖ from the rights of the ECHR. The reasoning
and:
[F]unction of a control order is to impose obligations on individuals
suspected of being involved in terrorism related activities. The obligations
are designed to restrict or prevent further involvement by individuals in
such activities. The intention is that each order is tailored to the particular
risk posed by the individual concerned. Obligations that may be imposed
include prohibitions on the possession or use of certain items, restrictions
on movement to or within certain areas, restrictions on communications or
associations and requirements of place of abode.412
As with the case of the terrorist certifications, these control orders can also be
appealed.413
While several pieces of international legislation or decisions have been discussed
above it is important to highlight several more that have not yet been discussed. As
should be evident, the international dimension of U.K. counterterrorism legislation comes
in many forms, including: European-wide counterterrorism initiatives, judicial decisions
and legislation, security alliances, and also United Nations resolutions condemning
terrorism. It is important to note that the U.K. is ―one of only a few states in the European
411
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Union and the world ... [that] has ratified all of the international conventions dealing with
the prevention and repression of terrorism [and furthermore,] it did not enter into any
reservation concerning the substance of the obligations established by these treaties‖. 414
Some of the additional measures that are important for purposes of this thesis include: the
European Convention on Extradition of 1957, the European Convention of the
Suppression of Terrorism of 1977, the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984, the European Committee for
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment of 1987,
the U.N. Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism of 1999, the Council Framework Decision on Combating
Terrorism of 2002, and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism
of 2005.
To conclude, as should be evident, both Spain and the U.K. have a wide range of
counterterrorism legislation. Not only are both countries signatories to a number of the
same conventions regarding terrorism, especially those within the European Union, but
both have also enacted emergency legislation, both have enacted legislation in the
aftermath of terrorist attacks, and both have vast definitions of terrorism, written as such
to be as all-encompassing as possible. Due to these facts, it is possible to claim that both
the British and Spanish counterterrorism policies appear to be reflective of the five
indicators of a moral panic. There are, however, noticeable differences between the two
countries‘ counterterrorism legislation. The first is that while both countries enacted
emergency legislation, Spain used the emergency legislation only during times of
emergency and not for an extended amount of time, which is the converse of the British
414
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case. A second noticeable difference concerns the extent of disproportionate measures.
While both Spain and the U.K. have used disproportionate measures, the use of these in
Spain is limited to the first years of the time frame of this case study (i.e. during the years
of Spain‘s transition to democracy and the early years of its consolidation), and the
disproportionate measures implemented in the U.K. span most of the research period. A
third difference is that U.K. counterterrorism legislation provides for very expansive
counterterrorism measures, including provisions for indefinite detention, which has
required Britain to derogate from a number of Articles in several different international
covenants on human rights which Spain has not found necessary. The last noticeable
difference to be discussed regards how the two countries‘ counterterrorism policies,
although similar, are carried out differently. For example, both Spain and the U.K. have
legislation regarding retaining communications data but whereas Spanish police forces
need to seek judicial approval before they can access the data,415 British authorities do
not, and a similar situation is found between the two countries‘ policies of entering a
home. It is, therefore, possible to state that the British counterterrorism legislation is more
indicative of a moral panic than is the Spanish counterterrorism legislation.
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Law No. 34/2002 on Services of the Information Society and Electronic Commerce, of 27 June
2002, ―forces Internet service providers to retain and to conserve the data of connections and
traffic for at least one year, although the police will not have access to the data without judicial
permission‖ (Soria, 544).
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Conclusion

The previous sections have reviewed the different ―agents of social control‖ that
can contribute to the creation of a moral panic. This section reviews the conclusions of
the previous sections and offers an analysis as to what these conclusions signify for
democratic states‘ counterterrorism policies and the role of the public in the creation of
these policies.
To look first at the Spanish case, the data make it evident that the public was quite
concerned with the threat of terrorism throughout the time frame of the case study given
that it was typically one of the top concerns for Spanish society, but there was some
noticeable, albeit limited, volatility regarding the extent of this concern. While this is
true, it is reasonable to state that there was substantial or widespread agreement or
consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing of certain group
members and their behavior. It is also true that the Spanish public did exhibit some
evidence of disproportionality and hostility regarding measures such as the possible reintroduction of the death penalty. The data from Spanish action groups reinforce the
public opinion data given the fact that not only did these organizations influence public
opinion through, inter alia, the organization of demonstrations or collection of petition
signatures, but also because, on occasion, the action groups themselves used or supported
questionably legal, and hostile, perhaps, disproportionate measures such as attempting to
criminalize all political parties to the extreme right along with their attempt to criminalize
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Herri Batasuna. Regardless of the fact that there are a variety of different action groups,
representing many different views, it is possible to state that there existed some volatility,
and furthermore, that among the different action groups examined in this thesis, that there
was a heightened level of concern and widespread agreement or consensus that the threat
posed by terrorism was real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing members of society.
A review of the Spanish editorial data demonstrates opinion overwhelmingly in
favor of doing what was necessary to combat the threat of terrorism insofar as the chosen
methods were compatible with the framework of a liberal democratic system. This
included supporting controversial counterterrorism measures such as the reinsertion
program of repentant etarras and condemning the potential reinstatement of the death
penalty. In other words, while the Spanish editorial data do reflect a heightened level of
concern for terrorism and substantial or widespread agreement or consensus that the
threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group members and their behavior,
it does not reflect an increased level of hostility, disproportionality, or volatility, and,
therefore, the editorial data only reflect two of the five indicators of a moral panic.
The data on Spanish heads of government and opposition offer some evidence of
a moral panic. While it is true that there were occasions in which Spanish politicians
attempted to use the threat of terrorism as a method to incite fear or panic, especially with
regard to the effect terrorism could have on Spanish democracy, it is also true that
Spanish politicians were very mindful of how their words would be conceived or
interpreted by the Spanish public, and they, therefore, attempted to avoid creating such a
panic. Moreover, while some politicians indeed were quick to offer dramatic responses to
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the threat of terrorism, by and large, Spanish politicians emphasized the importance of
staying within the democratic system to combat terrorism. Furthermore, Spanish
politicians largely tried to convince the public as to how measures publically deemed
inappropriate (e.g. the reinsertion of repentant terrorists), or appropriate in other cases
(e.g. the re-introduction of the death penalty), would actually be counterproductive in
their quest to eradicate the threat of terrorism. It is also worthwhile to recall that when
Spanish politicians pursued arguably disproportionate measures (e.g. the closure of the
Egin newspaper), they would attempt to reassure the public that these measures were
indeed necessary and legal. In other words, contrary to statements claiming that the
politicians did not heed to public opinion, the data demonstrate that the converse was
actually the case. In short, it can be said that while Spanish heads of government and
opposition at times did exhibit the indicators of a moral panic, specifically increased
levels of hostility and the use of disproportionate measures, they were quite cognizant of
the impact their statements would have in the general public and, hence, largely refrained
from using this type of language and instead referred to the strength of the Spanish
democracy to combat terrorism with methods true to a democracy. It is also important to
recall that the politicians who advocated for harsher punishments for terrorists, the more
extreme or disproportionate measures, or exhibited more hostility and volatility often had
been personally affected by terrorist violence.
The data on Spanish counterterrorism legislation demonstrated that it is indicative
of several moral panic indicators, specifically a heightened level of concern, substantial
or widespread agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the
wrongdoing group members and their behavior, and, to some extent, hostility. It is
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necessary to recall that although Spain has signed and ratified most of the international
agreements condemning terrorism, Spain did not enact any new domestic legislation in
the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. or the 11/M
terrorist attacks, with the exception of Organic Law 6/2002 which outlawed political
parties that do not ―respect democratic principles and constitutional values‖. Moreover, it
was argued that new legislation was not necessary to combat the new threat of Islamic
terrorism given the fact that the Islamic terrorists were not attempting to work within the
democratic system, and furthermore, that the existing legislation was already sufficient to
combat this new terrorist threat. This is due to the fact that Spain has taken a criminal
justice approach to counterterrorism, and, therefore, convicts terrorists for their crimes by
finding their equivalent in existing legislation, albeit, the terrorism related crimes are
subject to harsher punishments (e.g. longer prison sentences). Lastly, while Spain did
enact emergency legislation, which could be viewed as a disproportionate measure, it was
only used during times of emergency, and not for an extended amount of time. In sum,
the Spanish legislative data do reflect a heightened level of concern, substantial or
widespread agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the
wrongdoing group members and their behavior, hostility, and, to a limited extent,
disproportionality.
The last agent of social control to review for the Spanish case is the security
forces. While it is in fact the case that Spanish security forces have, on numerous
occasions, operated outside of the rule of law or used questionable, albeit legal, measures
to combat the terrorist threat, given that these measures were used, or actions taken,
during the early years of Spain‘s transition to democracy, there is some evidence that
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they have learned from their past lessons and have made an effort to correct their
mistakes and work within the framework of a democratic society. For example, the
Spanish Government itself was ordered to pay indemnifications to the victims of a
terrorist attack given the fact that ―it was said in this case the negligence of the State
Security Forces‘ actions was the responsibility of the Administration‖.416 Additionally,
regarding how certain actions were kept secret (e.g. the GAL operations) an accord was
signed ―that would guarantee that possible criminal acts or excesses of injuring people
would not go unpunished not even at the margin of the acts of the judges‖.417 In the
context of the moral panics indicators, the security forces did exhibit a heightened level
of concern, an increased level of hostility, and substantial or widespread agreement or
consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group and their
behavior, disproportionality, and volatility or, in other words, all five of the indicators of
a moral panic. It is also true, however, that the experience of the Spanish security forces
changed for the better (i.e. became less reflective of the moral panic indicators) as the
country successfully transitioned into a democracy.
Turning now to the British public opinion data, while it appears that the British
citizenry exhibited a lesser amount of concern for terrorism than their Spanish
counterparts, which may be due to the fact that most of the acts of terrorism during the
time frame of this research occurred in Ireland, and not on the mainland; terrorism is still,
however, a notable concern for the British public, at times even becoming volatile,
revealing the presence of an increased level of hostility toward terrorists and regarding
policies such as extended detention or imprisonment and the death penalty. While the
―El Estado, condenado a indemnizar a 12 víctimas de Hipercor con 112 millones‖, El País, 7
July 1995
417
Editorial, ―Secreto y antiterrorismo‖, El País, 23 March 1996
416
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IRA enjoyed a higher level of public support than ETA, a significantly larger percentage
of the British populace disapproved of the IRA and its actions, and therefore, the criterion
of substantial or widespread agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and
caused by the wrongdoing group members and their behavior is also met. Lastly, there is
some evidence of disproportionality present in the British public opinion data on
terrorism, which is especially true regarding certain aspects of Britain‘s counterterrorism
legislation and the public support for these counterterrorism initiatives such as extended
detention. In summary, the U.K. public opinion data demonstrate evidence of all five of
the moral panic indicators.
To review the data on British action groups, it is important to recall that the action
groups have been successful in achieving an improvement in the lives of victims of
terrorism through economic and other forms of aid, in assisting and maintaining the
integrity of the democratic system by protesting against legislative or security measures
that could curtail civil liberties, and by ensuring that those who used these questionable
or illegal methods of counterterrorism, or those who were responsible for others using
them, faced the consequences of their actions or inactions. Furthermore, it can be stated
with certainty that the British action groups were able to influence not only public
opinion, by, for example, organizing or calling for the cancellation of demonstrations or
marches, but also policy making, especially with regard to collecting indemnifications for
the victims of terrorism. To put the data on British action groups into the context of the
criteria of moral panics, it must be stated that while British actions groups did not exhibit
much volatility, it is evident that a number of action groups did express a heightened
level of concern, an increased level of hostility, and, although there was some contention
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among the different action groups, substantial or widespread agreement or consensus that
the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group members and their
behavior, and disproportionality. In other words, the data on British action groups
demonstrate evidence of four of the five indicators of a moral panic.
The data on British heads of government and opposition make it apparent that
British politicians have used some fairly extreme language to refer to their
counterterrorism initiatives and the threat that terrorism poses to the democratic state.
This language, however, was often balanced out with statements referring to the strength
and integrity of British democracy. One important contrast found in the British case is the
prevalence of exceptional measures in the aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist attacks in
London. While exceptional measures were used before the July 2005 terrorist attacks,
after these attacks, it became more apparent that the British government would do
anything it deemed necessary to eradicate the terrorist threat, and to prevent more
terrorist attacks from occurring, regardless of the effect this would have on civil liberties
or human rights. The example of the ―hierarchy of liberties‖ discussed in the examination
of British statements of heads of government and opposition offers a compelling
illustration of the exceptional measures. In the context of moral panics indicators, the
data reveal that British heads of governments and opposition expressed a heightened level
of concern, an increased level of hostility, substantial or widespread agreement or
consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group members
and their behavior, disproportionality, and volatility, which is especially true in the
aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist attacks.
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A review of the editorial data confirms Britain‘s tough, seemingly legitimate, but
questionable, counterterrorism measures. Although the editorials suggest that a hard-line
approach to terrorism is necessary, they do, however, largely support these measures
because they have been determined to be lawful. Moreover, the editorials also express the
need for caution or prudence in the application of counterterrorism measures so that they
do not cause more detriment than benefit. In other words, the editorial data demonstrate
that the editorials are fairly balanced when discussing counterterrorism measures and the
threat terrorism poses, at least when the measures fall under, or are covered by, existing
laws or when new legislation can be drafted and implemented to make them lawful. A
review of how the data on editorials fit into the moral panics model needs to be
examined. While it is true that some of the U.K. editorial data reflect the need for
prudence in the counterterrorism battle, the data also express a high level of support for
controversial measures, including those that could potentially violate civil liberties, if
they are included in British legislation regarding counterterrorism. This reflects an
increased level of hostility, a heightened level of concern, substantial or widespread
agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing
group members and their behavior, disproportionality, and volatility, or, in other words,
all of the indicators of a moral panic.
A review of the data on security forces in the U.K. demonstrates that the security
forces did operate both within and outside of the rule of law to combat the threat of
terrorism and, moreover, that they were vulnerable to media and public scrutiny, and that
they were also able to rally support, at least initially, for themselves and their actions
when they needed to, especially when the security forces had been victims of terrorist
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attacks themselves. To put this in the context of the moral panic theory, it is reasonable to
say that the U.K. security forces did exhibit a heightened level of concern, an increased
level of hostility, substantial or widespread agreement or consensus that the threat is real,
serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group and their behavior, disproportionality, and
volatility in their counterterrorism efforts.
The last aspect of the U.K. case is that of its counterterrorism legislation. The
U.K. has a wide range of counterterrorism legislation given that it is a signatory to all the
international conventions regarding the prevention and repression of terrorism, has
enacted emergency legislation, both in response to the Northern Ireland ―Troubles‖ and
as a result of a terrorist incident, and, furthermore, uses a broad definition of terrorism,
written to be as all-encompassing of terrorist activity as possible. The U.K.
counterterrorism legislation provides for very expansive counterterrorism measures,
including provisions for indefinite detention, which has required Britain to derogate from
a number of Articles in several different international covenants on human rights. Due to
these facts, it is reasonable to state that the British counterterrorism policies exhibit a
heightened level of concern, an increased level of hostility, substantial or widespread
agreement or consensus that the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing
group and their behavior, disproportionality, and volatility, or, in other words, all five
indicators of a moral panic.
Given the evidence demonstrated by the data assembled and reviewed in this
thesis, it is possible to state that moral panics were indeed apparent in both the cases of
Spain and the United Kingdom. However, while the Spanish case reveals a number of
contributors to a moral panic, as Spain successfully transitioned into a democracy it
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adopted and had less public support for extreme, disproportionate, and questionably legal
and democratic counterterrorism responses. Furthermore, the U.K. case is more reflective
of a moral panic and the dangers that can accompany one, and this is especially true in
the aftermath of the July 2005 terrorist attacks.
This thesis puts forth the argument that the role of the public in influencing
democratic states‘ counterterrorism policies can be explained, at least partially, with the
theory of moral panics. According to Rothe and Muzzatti:
[S]ome would argue ultimately the most important actor in a moral panic
is the public. The success of the media, politicians, rule enforcers and
moral entrepreneurs in generating and sustaining a moral panic is
ultimately contingent upon how successfully they enrage the public and
marshal their support against the folk devils. The vox populi is enlisted as
a front-line agent in the crusade against the designated evil. Members of
the public are relied upon to express contempt for the folk devils and
support for the rule enforcers, to consume the media coverage, and wait
for the latest pronouncements from politicians and/or action groups on
how the problem is to be solved.418
On the other hand, however, the public is not a unitary actor and, therefore, ―public
opinion cannot be divorced from the political discourse and media frames that surround
it. The apparent impact of the public on government policy often arises from a circular
process in which government officials respond to the polling options, anticipated or
perceived majorities, and priorities that many of them helped create‖.419 The fact that the
public is not a unitary actor, and instead is part of a circular process, is evidenced by the
data presented in this comparative case study.
While Cohen‘s theory of Moral Panics offered a useful framework to organize
and examine the role of the public in democratic states‘ counterterrorism policies,
unfortunately, it does fully explain the divergence found between British and Spanish
418
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counterterrorism policies. However, the theory of Moral Panics was beneficial in a
number of ways due to the fact that it led to some very insightful and surprising
conclusions. The conclusions gathered from the data presented in this comparative case
study offer a number of precautions and suggestions for democratic states to take into
consideration when developing and implementing their counterterrorism policies. These
include: the dangers of institutionalizing a moral panic, the dangers of overstepping the
boundaries of a democratic system, the dangers of playing politics with terrorism, and the
benefits of adopting a law enforcement or criminal justice approach to counterterrorism.
Although this thesis demonstrates that moral panics were present in the cases,
there is some room for optimism due to the fact that, ―a panic, by definition, is selflimiting, temporary and spasmodic, a splutter of rage which burns itself out‖.420 However,
one of the greatest threats of a moral panic is the potential legacy that can accompany it.
In other words, while a moral panic cannot by definition last indefinitely, the extreme, or
disproportionate, measures implemented to counter the threat of terrorism can leave a
lasting impression. According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda:
[I]n principle, moral panics can have two potential outcomes: they can end
leaving little or no long-term institutional legacy, disappearing, as with
fads, without a trace – they may generate or stimulate no new laws, no
lasting social movements, no government agencies. On the other hand, the
intensity of the concern that was expressed at the height of moral panics
can, in principle, become captured, routinized, or institutionalized into
ongoing, long-lasting organizational structures. In other words, one
possibility is that moral panics can, in principle, generate social change;
they can either leave a substantial institutional legacy, or none. And ...
these institutional structures can be a diverse lot: laws but no social
movements; social movements but no government agencies; and so on.421

420
421

Cohen 2002, xxx
Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 225
154

Therefore, the possibility that a moral panic episode could lead to institutional or
organizational changes like, for example, in the case of the U.K., is particularly
worrisome. Additionally, even if a case of moral panics does not leave an ―organizational
or institutional legacy, the collective excitement that citizens experience when it lasts
prepares them for future panic-like experiences. They may reshape the normative,
attitudinal, and value landscape of a society‖.422 Therefore, any evidence of a moral panic
should not be taken lightly, and should be taken into consideration when creating or
implementing future counterterrorism measures.
Another lesson apparent from the British and Spanish cases is how dangerous it is
to operate outside the democratic framework to counter the terrorist threat given the fact
that extreme, disproportionate, and unlawful acts actually aid the terrorists whose aim is
to destroy the democratic state or to, at a minimum, make it appear weak. This is
especially true during times of crisis or emergency, when it is of the utmost importance
for the state to remain democratically strong. As Gross writes:
Fundamental democratic principles – the rule of law, the separation of
powers, the independence of the judicial authority, and recognition of
principles of social morality and justice at the core of which lie human
rights – are not luxuries of peacetime which make the democracy in which
we live a better one; rather without them the democracy does not exist. A
democracy that permits itself to deviate from respect for these values –
even for a limited period of time – is not a bad democracy, but from a
substantive point of view it is not a democracy at all. Accordingly, the
manner in which democratic states deal with emergency situations in
general, and security emergencies in particular, must fall within the
boundaries of the existing constitutional framework.423
While it is true that democratic states have a responsibility to protect their citizens
and the right to use some extreme measures, the cases of Britain and Spain demonstrate
422
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that it would be tremendously erroneous to use extreme measures because they have
proven futile in countering terrorism, and even worse, because they have proven to aid
terrorists and their causes. For example, the experiences of the GAL in Spain and
internment in the U.K. only led to greater sympathy for the Basque and Irish causes. With
that being said, democratic states would find it immeasurably beneficial to learn from
history, taking heed of these examples, to prevent a similar, or perhaps an even worse,
reaction from other terrorist organizations or sympathizers. Even more importantly, when
the democratic state steps out of the bounds of democracy to counter the threat of
terrorism, it is only contributing to its own demise and, therefore, if it wishes to preserve
democracy, then there is no choice but to act prudently in counterterrorism initiatives.
This is especially true given the fact that:
Even the most cursory knowledge of terrorism reveals that terrorists have
never truly threatened a state, or democracy, or freedom, or the way of life
of an entire people; nor have they ever threatened the peace of the world
or the existence of any civilisation. ... On the other hand, there are
numerous examples where the reaction of the authorities to terrorist
attacks has endangered democracy and freedom by seriously undermining
civil and political rights, and where the state‘s eagerness to suppress
dissidents has led to gross miscarriages of justice and human rights abuses
by the security forces. Such acts have undermined public respect for
political institutions, damaged the functioning of democracy, and
demoralised society. In reality, it is not terrorism that threatens the essence
of our societies – terrorists are tiny groups of isolated individuals able to
do little more than commit symbolic acts of violence – but rather state-led
counter-terrorism and the dangers of over-reaction by the authorities.424
A further, and related, lesson is that democracies have to learn that they cannot
play politics with terrorism. In other words, it is ultimately not beneficial, although it may
seem to be in the short term, to prey on the public, attempting to invoke public support
for extreme or disproportionate counterterrorism measures by exaggerating, or
424
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overreacting to, the terrorist threat. As Kassimeris writes, ―governments and career
politicians have always been tempted to exploit disasters and use them to realise their
political objectives. ... ―When it comes to terrorism, a phenomenon that almost always
stirs fear and insecurity disproportionate to the actual danger, the temptation for
governments to bend the rules and the truth becomes irresistible‖.425 While some argue
that the leaders of democratic states have a vested interest in exaggerating the threat of
terrorism due to the fact that:
[P]oliticians and terrorism bureaucrats also have, as Jeffery Rosen points
out, an ‗incentive to pass along vague and unconfirmed threats of future
violence, in order to protect themselves from criticism‘ in the event of
another attack. ‗Far better‘, notes Peter Beinart, ‗to warn of an attack that
never comes than to remain silent and appear to be taken by surprise‘.426
However true it may be that it is better for individual or groups of politicians to work in
concert to exaggerate the terrorist threat for their own benefit, the disadvantages to doing
this are immensely worse for the democratic state. Similar to using extreme measures,
which may in themselves be a byproduct of overreaction, ―overreaction undermines the
moral fabric of a society that is victimized by terrorists and plays into the hands of the
terrorists and the assumptions central to their calculus of violence‖.427
An additional lesson that can be learned from this comparative case study is that a
law enforcement approach to counterterrorism is not only more democratically
legitimate, but also more effective. In one study on how terrorist groups ended, among
which the different ways in which they ended consisted of a transition to nonviolence,
effective policing, and, inter alia, military force, Jones and Libicki find, ―where terrorist
groups cannot or will not make a transition to nonviolence, policing is usually most
425
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effective in defeating terrorist groups‖.428 This is especially true given the fact that
military operations are one of the least effective methods of counterterrorism. According
to Jones and Libicki, ―military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of
terrorist groups (7 percent)‖.429 The only exception is ―when they [terrorist groups]
became strong enough to conduct insurgencies … [then they] ended because of military
force 25 percent of the time‖.430 Furthermore, Jones and Libicki address religious terrorist
organizations, which they rightfully recognize as ―different from those otherwise
classified‖, and highlight, ―the most salient fact about religious terrorist groups is how
hard they are to eliminate ... only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups have ended. ...
of those that ended under pressure from authorities, most (13) fell to policing, while only
three succumbed to military force‖.431 This is significant not only for the Spanish and
U.K. cases discussed in this thesis, but also for the United States and its ―Global War on
Terror‖, as all three are experiencing an increase in religiously motivated terrorist attacks.
One of the primary reasons the law enforcement or criminal justice approach to
counterterrorism is more effective than a military approach is because the police can get
intelligence better than ―outsiders‖. In other words, ―police have a permanent presence in
cities, towns, and villages; a better understanding of local communities than other
security forces and better intelligence. This enables them to be best suited to understand
and penetrate terrorist networks‖.432 An additional reason why a law enforcement
approach is more effective in countering terrorism is that it is possible to criminalize
―activities that are necessary for terrorist groups to function, such as raising money or
428
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openly recruiting‖.433 Moreover, ―in many cases, it may be easier and more effective to
arrest and punish terrorists for other offenses, such as drug trafficking, that have little
direct connection to their terrorist activity‖.434 Furthermore, in the cases in which the
criminal activities can be linked to terrorism, an approach similar to the Spanish case, in
which criminal activities are given longer prison sentences when related to terrorism, can
be adopted. Adopting a law enforcement approach to counterterrorism would not be
difficult, and would have the added benefit of taking power away from terrorists. To
elaborate, ―in most cases ... acts of international terrorism are primarily crimes under
common law; they are sporadic and marginal acts that achieve a disproportionate effect
through the amount of publicity they receive. In this sense, counterterrorism efforts only
inflate terrorism‘s impact, reinforcing its power to intimidate and unsettle‖.435 Jones and
Libicki refer to countering this publicity and write, ―winning the media war to label
terrorists as criminals is especially important and virtually impossible to do in the face of
a strategy based on military force‖.436 Lastly, ―every time we pretend we are fighting for
our survival we not only confer greater power and importance to terrorists than they
deserve but we also at the same time act as their main recruiting agent by suggesting that
they have the slightest potential for success‖.437
The fact that ―in most cases … acts of international terrorism are primarily crimes
under common law‖ deserves to be highlighted further. One major difference found in
this comparative case study was between the British and Spanish methods of
counterterrorism with regard to counterterrorism legislation. While Britain continuously
433
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enacted or re-enacted emergency and non-emergency legislation to combat terrorism,
Spain largely has combated the terrorist threat with its Penal Code. While it is true that
the Spanish Penal Code provides for longer or tougher sentences for crimes related to
terrorism, the Spanish method is arguably more effective and true to the democratic
system of governance given the facts that alleged terrorists can be tried more quickly for
their crimes and that it is easier to prosecute someone for a given crime than it is to
prosecute someone for suspected, or known, terrorist affiliation.
One last policy implication regards the fact that analysts and scholars have largely
avoided linking the concept of moral panics to terrorism. As this thesis demonstrates with
the evidence from the British and Spanish cases, this should be re-visited, because not
only is there a demonstrated connection between moral panics and terrorism, but also
because it may be that in preventing a moral panic from occurring, or recognizing one in
its formation, that it would be possible for democratic states remain democratic in their
counterterrorism initiatives. The following excerpt is quoted at length because it offers an
excellent depiction of how scholars of moral panics reacted to the terrorist attacks of 9/11
and the potential problems that could arise from their reactions:
In the aftermath of 9/11 it was noticeable that commentators carefully
avoided describing the reaction as a moral panic – even when the conduct
of the press, the control apparatus, and the public seemed to invite
precisely this kind of analysis. Indeed, there was an article published six
months after the events (Walker, 2002), interviewing a number of ‗moral
panic‘ sociologists – Joel Best, Phillip Jenkins, Eric Goode – all of whom
took great care to refuse the attribution of this term to the reaction, even
though, as they noted, it appeared to fit the model in most aspects. Why
was this? In part, no doubt, it was due to uncertainty about the nature of
the threat involved. ... no one was sure about the scale of the danger or
the likelihood of subsequent attacks. But the primary reason for this
reluctance to invoke the idea of ‗moral panic‘ was, I think, an ethical one.
These sociologists were unwilling to challenge the moral sentiments that
drove the social reaction. They were unwilling to play the debunking
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skeptics in the face of such intense grief and fear and so many murdered
victims. It seems likely, at least to me, that they saw the attribution of
‗moral panic‘ as analytically appropriate but ethically taboo.438
One positive aspect regarding the media coverage linking terrorism to moral panics,
however, is, as Altheide points out, that while the more mainstream news media will not
connect the link between terrorism and moral panics, that some alternative news media
are willing to make this link, and Altheide, furthermore, argues that this is especially true
in the United States.439 Given the evidence of moral panics demonstrated in this
comparative case study and the discrepancies between Spain and the United Kingdom in
their counterterrorism initiatives, especially in the post 9/11 world, this is a link that
should not be overlooked.
In conclusion, while the data demonstrate the existence of a moral panic in both
Spain and the United Kingdom and that the public has an active, though not unitary, role
in creating and sustaining a moral panic, a surprising conclusion evident from the data is
the role of the age of a democracy in being conducive to the formation of a moral panic.
As aforementioned, the Spanish case reflects a moral panic but this reflection is most
apparent in the years of Spain‘s transition to democracy. The data from the Spanish case
reflect concern for staying within the confines of the democratic system to combat
terrorism, which was especially true once they confronted their own misguided
counterterrorism measures, such as the use of the GAL. In other words, the fact that
Spain did not take their democracy for granted, as they were transitioning to democracy
and later a consolidating, fledgling democracy, especially compared to the U.K., led them
to pursue more democratically legitimate counterterrorism measures for fear of
438
439
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destroying their democracy. Therefore, in sum, democratic states would find it
immensely beneficial to not take their democracies for granted, because while freedom is
not free, freely choosing counterterrorism policies that undermine democracy will only
lead to the destruction of democracy and associated freedoms. In other words, although it
is difficult to find the right balance between liberty and security, the costs of choosing
security over liberty too often are far greater than choosing liberty over security, because
once the foundation of democracy is torn apart, it may not be easy to repair. Recognizing
the formation or re-emergence of a moral panic regarding terrorism is one method that
would prove beneficial to democratic states and their citizenries, as it would caution them
to exercise prudence in their counterterrorism initiatives so as to prevent the destruction
of their democracy from ever becoming a reality. Moreover, as this case study has
demonstrated, the public is able to exert influence over their governments, especially
when organized, and therefore, they should continue to hold their governments
accountable, and not permit them to try to convince the public to be swept away in a
moral panic and this is especially true the older a democracy is. The good news is that by
exercising prudence in counterterrorism measures, holding governments accountable,
recognizing moral panics as they form, and not taking democracy for granted, regardless
of how long it has been the system of governance in a given country, democratic states
can help prevent themselves from falling into the trap of achieving what some terrorists
want: the destruction of the democratic system.

162

Table 1: Moral Panic Indicators in Spanish Data Sources
Public
Opinion

Action
Groups

Heightened Level
of Concern

X

X

Increased Level of
Hostility

X

X

Substantial or
Widespread
Agreement or
Consensus that
the Threat is Real,
Serious, and
Caused by the
Wrongdoing
Group Members
and Their
Behavior

X

X

X

Disproportionality

X

LIMITED

X

Volatility

X

LIMITED

Security
Forces

Legislation

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

LIMITED

Editorials Statements

X

X = presence of Moral Panic indicator
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X

X

Table 2: Moral Panic Indicators in U.K. Data Sources
Public
Opinion

Action
Groups

Security
Forces

Legislation

Heightened Level
of Concern

X

X

X

X

X

X

Increased Level of
Hostility

X

X

X

X

X

X

Substantial or
Widespread
Agreement or
Consensus that
the Threat is Real,
Serious, and
Caused by the
Wrongdoing
Group Members
and Their
Behavior

X

X

X

X

X

X

Disproportionality

X

X

X

X

X

X

Volatility

X

LIMITED

X

X

X

X

Editorials Statements

X = presence of Moral Panic indicator

164

Appendix I: List of Action Groups:
Spanish Action Groups
The following list of Action Groups in Spain is listed first by their original name (if in
Basque the Spanish translation follows first) followed by their English translation:
1.
La Asociación de Vecinos de Sant Andreu, The Association of Neighbors of Saint
Andrew: A neighborhood association that organized demonstrations against the terrorist
attack of the commercial center in Barcelona.
2.
La Asociación Víctimas del Terrorismo, The Victims of Terrorism Association:
An association created in 1981 whose aim is to aid families of victims of terrorism in
advice and moral and material support.
3.
La Asociación de Víctimas del 11-M, The 11-M Victims Association: Founded
three months after the 11 March 2004 attacks in Madrid, this association‘s main
objective is to ensure all those affected in the 11-M attacks receive the medical,
psychological, social and legal support they need. 440
4.
La Asociación por la Paz de Euskal herria (País Vasco), The Association for the
Peace of the Basque Country: An association created in 1986 that served as the ―principle
daily witness to the rejection of political violence in Euskadi‖.441
5.
La Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (del País Vasco), The Pro Human Rights
Association (of the Basque Country): An association that fights for the protection of
human rights in the Basque Country.
6.
El Colectivo de Víctimas del Terrorismo del País Vasco (COVITE), The
Collective of Victims of Terrorism of the Basque Country: Created in November 1998
―with the intention to become a basic and inescapable reference in any peace process that
could be undertaken in Basque Autonomous Community‖. 442
7.
La Confederación Empresarial Vasca (Confebask), The Basque Business
Confederation: Formed in 1983 to ―represent and defend the interests of Basque
businessmen‖ including to stand firm against terrorism and speak out against violence
440
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País Vasco‖, El País, 12 May 1987
442
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and to represent the more than 13,000 private enterprises that are integrated into
Confebask. 443
8.
La Comisión Obrera de Andalucía (COAN), The Workers‘ Commission of
Andalucía: ―[A]n independent, democratic, and class union, that defends the professional,
economic and social interests of working men and women in all areas, especially in all
workplaces‖.444
9.
La Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE), The
Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations: The CEOE was founded in 1977 and
―is the major representative institution of the Spanish business community‖.445
10.
Denon Artean – Paz y Reconciliación, Peace and Reconciliation: An association
dedicated to peace and reconciliation in the Basque Country.
11.
Diálogo, Dialogue: An association founded in 1983 whose objective is ―to
promote and encourage activities that promote a better understanding and dialogue
between Spain and France‖.446
12.
Elkarri: Founded in 1992, ―Elkarri is the social movement for dialogue and
agreement in the Basque Country‖.447
13.
La Federación Provincial de Asociaciones de Vecinos, The Provincial Federation
of Neighborhood Associations: Foundations in each of Spain‘s provinces that work on
behalf of and with those living in their communities for their social wellbeing, citizen
participation, and youth and social movements among many other things.448
14.
La Fundación de Víctimas del Terrorismo, The Foundation for Victims of
Terrorism: A foundation that ―intends to promote and spread democratic values, the
defense of
human rights, and the plurality and freedom of citizens, and at the same
time, to be a useful vehicle for consultation for a better understanding of the situation of
victims of terrorism as a whole in Spain‖.449
15.
Gesto por la Paz (de Euskal Herria), Gesture for the Peace (of the Basque
Country): ―[A] pacifist, civic, unitary, pluralist and independent platform that constitutes
an organized response of civil society against the constant scourge of violence that the

443

http://www.confebask.es/Castellano/acercade.htm,
http://www.confebask.es/Castellano/historia.htm
444
http://www.andalucia.ccoo.es/webandalucia/menu.do?Conoce_CCOO:_Quienes_somos?
445
http://www.ceoe.es/ceoe/contenidos.type.action?type=0864321&menuId=0864321
446
http://www.dialogo.es/es/quienes-somos/origen-y-objetivos.html
447
http://www.elkarri.org/en/textos/quienes.php
448
http://aavvmadrid.org/index.php/aavv/quienes_somos/Historia
449
http://www.fundacionvt.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=30
166

Basque and Navarrese people suffer from under some alleged political goals for this
society‖.450

U.K. Action Groups
1.
The British Irish Rights Watch: ―An independent non-governmental organisation
that has been monitoring the human rights dimension of the conflict, and latterly the
peace process, in Northern Ireland since 1990‖; provides services ―free of charge to
anyone whose human rights have been violated because of the conflict, regardless of
religious, political or community affiliations‖.451
2.
Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ): ―[A]n independent human
rights organisation working since 1981 to ensure the protection and promotion of human
rights of all those in Northern Ireland by reference to internationally agreed human rights
standards‖.452
3.
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board: ―[A] government organisation that can
pay money (compensation) to people who have been physically or mentally injured
because they were the blameless victim of a violent crime‖.453
4.
Derry Citizens‘ Action Committee: ―A group established on 9 October 1968
which was made up of representatives from a number of groups which at that time
operated in Derry.‖454
5.
Families Acting for Innocent Relatives (FAIR): ―[F]ormed as an non-sectarian,
non-political organisation to work in the interests of the innocent victims of terrorism in
South Armagh‖.455
6.
Irish Commission for Prisoners Overseas (ICPO): ―[A] voluntary agency that
provides assistance to Irish prisoners overseas and to their families in Ireland‖.456
7.
Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL): Founded in 1976, the ICCL ―is Ireland‘s
leading independent human rights watchdog, which monitors, educates and campaigns in
order to secure full enjoyment of human rights for everyone‖.457
8.
National Association of Victims Support Schemes: An ―independent charity for
victims and witnesses of crime‖ that has ―grown to become the oldest and largest victims‘
450
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organisation in the world‖ contacting ―over 1.5 million people [every year] after a crime
to offer … help‖. 458
9.
The National Council for Civil Liberties (currently known as Liberty): ―Founded
in 1934, … Liberty seeks to protect civil liberties and promote human rights for everyone
[and] campaigns to protect basic rights and freedoms through the courts, in Parliament
and in the wider community … through a combination of public campaigning, test case
litigation, parliamentary lobbying, policy analysis and the provision of free advice and
information‖. 459
10.
The National Victims Association: ―The UK‘s largest and longest established
specialist homicide support charity [that] provide[s] a comprehensive advocacy, advice,
counselling and support service to families bereaved through murder or manslaughter,
and are widely regarded by many Government Ministers, statutory agencies, Police
forces and Churches as the leading Charity specialising in this field of work‖.460
11.
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA): ―The main organisation
involved in the Civil Rights movement from the late 1960s to the 1970s. The NICRA
grew out of the work of the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) and was modelled on the
National Council for Civil Liberties based in London. The first committee of the NICRA
was made up of representatives of trade unions and some of the political parties. The
NICRA had a number of main aims: universal adult suffrage in local government
elections; the end to 'gerrymandered' electoral boundaries; the allocation of public
housing to be on the basis of need; repeal of the Special Powers Act; the disbanding of
the 'B-Specials'; the end to discrimination in employment; and a system to deal with
complaints of discrimination.‖461
12.
Relatives of Bloody Sunday Victims: A group comprised of members who lost
family members and friends in the events of Bloody Sunday who campaigned for
independent inquiry into the fateful events of that day.
13.
Relatives for Justice: ―Founded in April 1991 [by] … a number of bereaved
families affected by the conflict came together to support one another. … [A] Belfast
based NGO support group working with and providing support to relatives of people
bereaved, and injured, by the conflict across the North of Ireland including border regions
in the 26 counties‖.462
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Appendix II: Counterterrorism Legislation
Select Legislation Used in Spanish Counterterrorism Initiatives463












Decree-Law 10/1975, of 16 August, Sobre Prevención del Terrorismo, (on the
Prevention of Terrorism)
Decree-Law 1/1977, of 4 January, for the Creation of the National Court
(Audencia Nacional)
Constitución Española (Spanish Constitution) approved by referendum 6
December 1978
Decree-Law 21/1978, of 30 June, sobre Medidas en Relación con los Delitos
Cometidos por Grupos o Bandas Armadas, (on Measures in Relation to the
Crimes Committed by Armed Bands or Groups)
Organic Law 56/1978, of 4 December, de Medidas especiales en Relación con los
Delitos de Terrorismo Cometidos por Grupos Armados (Special Measures toward
Crimes of Terrorism Committed by Armed Groups)
Organic Law 1/1979, of 16 septiembre, de General Penitenciaria (on General
Penitentiary)
Decree-Law 3/1979, of 26 January, sobre Protección de la seguridad ciudadana
(on the Protection of Citizen Security)
Organic Law 3/1979, of 18 December, Estatuto de Autonomía del País Vasco,
(Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country)
Organic Law 40/1979, of 10 December, sobre Régimen jurídico de Control de
Cambios (on the Legal Status of Exchange Control)

There are ―four basic types of Spanish legislation, in order of importance, are: (1) organic
laws; (2) ordinary laws; (3) decree laws; and (4) legislative decrees. Organic laws are reserved for
special subject matters. In particular, organic laws deal with the regulation of fundamental rights
and liberties, the passage of the autonomous communities‘ Statutes of Autonomy, and the
regulation of the electoral regime. C.E. [Constitución Española, Spanish Constitution] art. 81(1).
Moreover, organic laws can be passed only by the affirmative vote of an absolute majority of the
Parliament. Id. Art 81(2). Ordinary laws are those passed by a simple majority of the legislature,
and which regulate matters not subject to organic laws. Id. art. 90(2). Decree laws are temporary
laws passed by the executive subject to approval by the legislature within thirty days. Id. art. 86
(1)-(2). Like ordinary laws, decree laws may not affect subjects regulated by organic laws. Id. art.
86(1). Finally, legislative decrees are laws promulgated by the government pursuant to a
legislative grant of authority. Id. art 82 (3).‖ (MacKinnon, 615, footnote 52)
463
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Real Decree Law 190/1980, of 1 February, sobre Delegados Especiales del
Gobierno para la Seguridad, (on Special Government Delegates for Security)
Organic Law 4/1980, of 21 May, de Reforma del Código Penal en materia de
delitos relativos a las libertades de expresión, reunión y asociación, (On the
Reform of the Penal Code on Crimes Related to the Freedoms of Expression,
Meeting, and Association)
Organic Law 6/1980, of 1 July, por la que se regulan los criterios básicos de la
Defensa Nacional y la Organización Militar, (for the Regulation for the Basic
Criteria of National Defense and Military Organization)
Organic Law 11/1980, of 1 December, sobre los supuestos previstos en el artículo
55.2 de la Constitución (on the Cases Referred to in Article 55.2 of the
Constitution)
Organic Law 2/1981, of 4 May, que modifica y adiciona determinados artículos
del Código Penal y del de Justicia Militar, (to Modify and Add Determined
Articles of the Penal Code and of the Military Justice)
Organic Law 4/1981, of 1 June, de los Estados de Alarma, Excepción y Sitio (on
States of Alarm, Exception and Sites)
Organic Law 1/1984, of 5 January, de reforma de la Ley Orgánica 6/1980, de 1
de julio, por la que se regulan los criterios básicos de la defensa nacional y la
organización militar (on the Reform of Organic Law 6/1980, of 1 July, for
Regulation of the Basic Criteria of National Defense and Military Organization)
Law 5/1984, of 26 March, Reguladora del derecho de asilo y de la condición de
refugiado, (Regulating the Right of Asylum and Refugee Status)
Organic Law 6/1984, of 24 May, Reguladora del Procedimiento Habeas Corpus,
(Regulating Habeas Corpus Procedure)
Organic Law 9/1984, of 26 December, contra la actuación de Bandas armadas y
elementos terroristas y de desarrollo del artículo 55.2 de la Constitución (Against
the Actions of Armed Groups and Terrorist Elements and the Development of
Article 55.2 of the Constitution)
Castellana Accords 1984
Organic Law 6/1985 of 1 July, del Poder Judicial (on Judiciary Powers)
Organic Law 13/1985, of 9 December, de Código Penal Militar (on the Military
Penal Code)
Organic Law 2/1986, of 13 March, de Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad (on State
Security Forces and Bodies)
Organic Law 4/1987, of 15 July, de la Competencia y Organización de la
Jurisdicción Militar (of the Competence and Organization of Military
Jurisdiction)
Pact of Madrid 5 November 1987
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Organic Law 3/1988, of 25 May, de Reforma del Codigo penal (for Reform of the
Penal Code)
Organic Law 4/1988, of 25 May, de reforma de la ley de Enjuicimiento Criminal
(for Reform of the Criminal Prosecution Act)
Pact of Ajuria Enea 12 January 1988
Pact of Navarra 7 October 1988
Organic Law 2/1989, of 13 April, Procesal Militar (on Military Procedure)
Organic Law 1/1992, of 21 February, sobre Protección de la Seguridad
Ciudadana (on the Protection of Public Safety)
Organic Law 10/1995, of 23 November, del Código Penal (on the Penal Code)
o Title XII ―Crimes Against Public Order‖, Chapter V on Possession,
Trafficking, and Deposit of Arms, Ammunition, or Explosives and Terrorist
Crimes, Section 2, Articles 571-580 deal specifically with terrorism related
offenses
Law 12/1996, of 19 December, on Help to the Victims of Terrorism
Law 13/1996, of 30 December, on Fiscal, Administrative Measures and of the
Social Order
Law 44/1998, of 15 December, of Plan and Territorial Organization of Military
Jurisdiction
Law No. 41/1999 of 12 November, sobre Sistemas de Pagos y de Liquidación de
Valores, (on Payment Systems and Liquidation of Assets)
Law 32/1999, of 8 October, de Solidaridad con las víctimas del terrorismo (on
Solidarity with the Victims of Terrorism)
Law 1/2000, of 7 January, de Enjuiciamiento Civil (of Civil Procedure)
Acuerdo por las libertades y contra el terrorismo, of 8 December 2000 (Accord in
Favor of Liberties and Against Terrorism)
Organic Law 7/2000 de modificación de la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de
noviembre, del Código Penal, y de la Ley Orgánica 5/2000, de 12 de enero,
reguladora de la Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores, en relación con los
delitos de terrorismo (on the modification of Organic Law 10/1995, of 23
November, of the Penal Code, and of Organic Law 5/2000, of 12 January,
regulating Penal Responsibility of Minors, in Relation with Crimes of Terrorism)
Penal Code modifications 2001
Organic Law 6/2002, of 27 June, de Partidos Políticos (on Political Parties)
Law No. 34/2002, of 11 July, de servicios de la sociedad de la información y de
comercio electrónico (on Services of the Information Society and of Electronic
Commerce)
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Organic Law 7/2003, of 30 June, de medidas de reforma para el cumplimiento
íntegro y efectivo de las penas, (On Measures of Reform for Full and Effective
Penalties)
Organic Law 13/2003, of 24 October, de Reforma de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal en material de prisión provisional (on Reform of the Criminal
Prosecution Law regarding Provisional Detention)
Organic Law 20/2003, of 23 December, de modificación de la Ley Orgánica del
Poder Judicial y del Código Penal, (On the Modification of the Organic Law on
Judicial Power and of the Penal Code)

International
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, codified in Article 10(2) of the
Spanish Constitution
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1949, ratified in 1982
 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
1950
 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1953
 The European Convention on Extradition 1957, ratified in 1982
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1976, ratified
in 1979
 The European Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism 1977, ratified 9 May
1980
 The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984
 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment of Punishment 1987
 The Europol Convention 1995
 The United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999
 The Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism 2002
 The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005
Other
 March 1981, creation of the single centralized command for the fight against
terrorism, known as Mando Unico para la Lucha Contraterrorista (Single
Command for the Counterterrorism Fight)
 Pact of Madrid 5 November 1987
 Pact of Ajuria Enea 12 January 1988
 Pact of Navarre 7 October 1988
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Select Legislation Used in U.K. Counterterrorism Initiatives





































The Offenses Against the Person Act 1861
The Explosive Substances Act 1883
The Aliens Registration Act 1914
The Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919
The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) of 1922
The Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1939-73
The Immigration Act 1971
The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 – 1996
The Biological Weapons Act 1974
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974-1989
The Biological Weapons Act 1976
The Race Discrimination Act 1976
The Criminal Law Act 1977
The Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978
The Criminal Attempts Act 1981
The Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984
The Public Order Act 1986
The Biological Weapons Act 1989
The Official Secrets Act 1989
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996
The Chemical Weapons Act 1996
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998
The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act of 1998
The Good Friday Accords 1998
The Human Rights Act 1998
The Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998
The Terrorism Act 2000
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIPA) Bill 2000
The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001
The Human Rights (Designated Derogation) Order 2001
The Crime (International Cooperation) Act 2003
The Criminal Justice Act 2003
The Constitutional Reform Act 2005
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The Civil Contingencies Act 2004
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
The Immigration, Nationality, and Asylum Act 2006
The Terrorism Act 2006

International464
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ratified in 1948
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ratified in 1949
 The United Nations Refugee Convention 1951
 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1953
 The European Convention on Extradition 1957
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1976
 The European Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism 1977
 The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984
 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment of Punishment 1987
 The Chemical Weapons Convention 1992
 The United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999
 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 2001
 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1378 2001
 The Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism 2002
 The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005
Decisions
 The Farrakan Decision 1986
 The ‗Soering’ Principle 1989
 The Brannigan and McBride Decision 1993
 Chahal v. UK (1996)
 The Roma rights case
 The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) decisions
 A (and others) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004)
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. M (2004)
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, KK, GG, HH, NN, and LL
(2006)
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The U.K. has ratified, without reservations, all of the international conventions concerning the
prevention and repression of terrorism.
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Appendix III: Editorial Translations

―First Blood‖ (Primera Sangre) 11 March 1978
Before the attacks yesterday that took the lives of an armed police officer in
Madrid and of a retired Guardia Civil officer in San Sebastian, there is little more than
ritualizing the mourning and condemnation. The man killed two of his own species and
that is how it will continue to happen unless there is a genetic mutation. We will have
terrorism with democracy like we had with the dictatorship. There will always be
marginal groups that include in their analysis the factor of ―the worse, the better‖. From
the extreme left with the objective of inciting the more fundamentalist sectors to think in
a dictatorship that – according to such schemes – drive in the medium term [toward] a
social revolution, and from the extreme right with the same dictatorial objective but with
intent to be permanent. In the short term some give as much as the others; as if they are
not delinquents of the same path.
But today it is necessary to stress that in less that one week two services of the
Armed Police Forces have received their baptism in blood: the EDAX (bomb disposal)
and that of the surveillance patrols, very recently created. Two days ago in Santa Cruz de
Tenerife the first EDAX artificer [explosives expert] died, killed in service trying to
remove an explosive. With very precarious technical means, on occasion with the mere
protection of a shield and helmet with a visor, the agents of this grouping of the Armed

175

Police remove and disassemble practically daily every type of artifact from buildings and
public ways.
On their part, the agents of the surveillance patrols have started to make
themselves normal and known in the streets regardless of whether or not they prevent
public disturbances. Following the Anglo-Saxon model that has given good results they
watch for the security of the neighbors, offer their services to whoever asks for it and
quickly recover stolen cars that before took weeks to appear.
The murderers have chosen their victims well. Because a serious intellectual
distortion is missing to associate these two servicemen of the Armed Police with
activities of social or political repression. Today honor these men that patrol the street or
that remove bombs from the roads for us and that have already had their first blood in
active service.

Democracy Against Terrorism (Democracia frente a terrorismo) 1 April 1978
Fifteen days since one of the most spectacular terrorist attacks in contemporary
history, the Italian Politian Aldo Moro is still in the hands of his kidnappers, serving at
the same time the shocking publicity and dramatic blackmail of not only the so-called
―established system‖, but also the political regime of the same Italians that
democratically elected him. It is an act that goes beyond the simple definition of a
criminal act. An attack against a person, against a regime, against a community, and
against a conception of the world. From there the attempts that have taken place in the
western democratic community, harassed and tense by the increase of violence and
terrorism, to equip itself with an adequate legal methodology to fight against this tragic
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avalanche. The Council of Europe has arbitrated an instrument, admittedly it is still
controversial, that is the European Convention for the Repression of Terrorism, already
signed by sixteen countries; those that have not yet are Ireland, Malta, and Spain, which
is the most recent member of the organization and hardly has had the time to do so. The
countries of the Common Market, for their part, currently are negotiating a similar text,
more restrictive than the previous, that will be applicable in the nine countries of the EEC
[European Economic Community]. In the U.N., however, things do not seem to be going
in the same direction, since last February a commission of experts of the organization,
brought together to study the problem, adjourned without any result.
The European antiterrorism convention, despite its critics that have arisen even
within Europe, will enter into force sooner or later. The reservations that have been made
are centered in the argument that the text – directly inspired by Federal Germany, the
country that has gotten the farthest in this area – considerably limits democratic liberties,
above all in what is referred to as the concept of political crime and the right to asylum.
Bonn, who has suffered very directly from this rise in terrorism, has preferred to take the
middle ground and respond to violence with violence. An extremely dangerous method
that without a doubt is more than a danger for democracy. But it does not also stop to be a
logical temptation.
Ten or fifteen years ago, for example, in the Western world the idea to abolish the
death penalty broke through. Not only did many countries erase it from their penal
legislations, but also public opinion in almost all of Europe was inclined toward this
measure of human justice. Today, on the contrary, surveys demonstrate that the increase
in violence in the industrial society has provoked the break of all humanism, and today
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the Western towns are favorable to the death penalty for the pure and terrible reflection of
what is called legitimate defense. In France the number in favor of capital punishment is
increasing and Giscard himself, who declared his opposition to it before being elected
president, not only has not proposed its abolition, but also has permitted it to be applied.
Finally, regarding the rise augment of terrorism, Paris has joined Bonn to sponsor the
controversial antiterrorism convention.
Violence creates violence, and the collective reflection before the wave of the
terrorist threat passing instinctively above all ideological or moral consideration to
demand concrete results. This is the terrain in which it is most evident that the terrorists
are achieving their goals. They are making the European public opinion doubt the values
of democracy and of civil liberties.
In the United Nations, some representatives of non-European countries, such as
Algeria, Libya or Syria, have refused to work on developing a universal treaty against
terrorism. They have manifested their opposition to an accord that prevent hijackings,
considering that ―it would restrict the already precarious means that the liberation
movements have‖. Naturally, the Near East and the OLP [Organization for the Liberation
of Palestine] are behind the taking of this position. The problems that terrorist acts raise
should, therefore, also be resolved politically; colonial violence or war, the historical
grievances of the peoples of the Third World have widened a good part of the terrorist
violence, that at the same time threatens to destroy the democratic system. This analysis
of the facts is useless when it comes to trying to morally justify the same. Terrorism is the
worst of the ills that plague civilized society, and it has to be fought. But it would be wise
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to know that the world is headed toward zones in which terrorism will receive different
treatment and where politics will play a role in the terror business.
However, it may be, the people who defend democratic values, among them Italy,
among them today happily Spain itself, cannot and should not fight against violence,
renouncing these convictions. The narrow path that remains is to refine the legal means to
make them more efficient and robust: to perfect the police and legal machinery, giving
them the best and most modern means of investigation. But do not fall into the trap of
blowing up the same world of liberties that it is supposed to defend.

―The Government, Again against the Constitution‖ (El Gobierno, de nuevo contra la
Constitución) 5 December 1979
It is not easily comprehensible, and even less excusable, the persistent
perseverance with which the Government borders the terrain of unconstitutionality, or
they openly step on it, on what is referred to as the individual rights and guarantees
recognized in Title I of the Constitution. When the sanctioning of the fundamental text
was not even a month ago, the decree-law of Public Safety, enacted quickly and running,
with clear electoral objectives, poorly able to withstand the criticisms that denounced its
unconstitutional character. Now, in dates close to the first anniversary of the
constitutional referendum, the Boletín Oficial del Estado [Official State Bulletin]
publishes a new decree-law that not only extents for a year the Antiterrorism Law of 4
December 1978, but also, moreover, widens in a manner quite exotic, the ambit of
competences of the Audencia Nacional [National Court]. If the decree-law of 28 January
1979 could only save face for its constitutionality in Congress by means of the discipline
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of the UCD vote, some grams of cynicism and various kilos of fallacious arguments, the
Government‘s recidivism to continue in this path is already a useless scandal. Moreover,
and incidentally, because, predictably, the Antiterrorism Law has not been of any use in
fighting political violence in this country. Article 86 of the Constitution conditions the
use of decree-laws in cases of ―extraordinary and urgent necessity‖ and explicitly and
exhaustively prohibits their enactment when they affect ―the rights, duties and freedoms
of citizens, regulated in Title I‖. The new decree-law extends the validity of a law that
establishes substantial cuts to habeas corpus, the inviolability of the home and the
secrecy of the postal, telephonic and telegraphic communications guaranteed by Articles
17 and 18 in Title I of the Constitution. This norm, so gallantly flattered with a fixed one
year extension, in the first of its final depositions, that its validity would be a year from
its enactment, without making the smallest reference to the possibility of extension.
Is it possible to conceive of a more arbitrary decision than the Government‘s
violation of the norm established in Article 86 of the Constitution for the enactment of
decree-laws and a very contemptuous attitude toward the work of the previous
legislature, equally controlled by the UCD, than the violation of the expressed will of
limiting a law to only be in force for one year? Now we believe so. Because this same
decree-law includes, apropos, a generous expansion of the competences of the National
Court in issues barely related to terrorism such as the falsification of money, organized
prostitution, the public scandal produced by pornographic movies and drug trafficking. If
this modification of jurisdictional boundaries corresponds to the organic law on Judicial
Power, whose project has already been sent to the Courts, the Government has seen fit to

180

consider it of ―extraordinary and urgent necessity‖ to strip the natural judges and the
provincial courts from this, it seems, explosive package of competences.
Without a doubt, the reason for this extension through an inappropriate decreelaw is that the Government forgot when signaling the priorities of its legislative calendar
and did not notice that the Law of Public Safety would come into effect after it ceased to
be called the Antiterrorism Law. It is not surprising that a party such as UCD, which
boasts having the best experts in law, has broken in this instance all of the brands of legal
bundling. But the most lamentable is that the UCD, that presents itself around the entire
planet as a champion in the defense of human rights, can cut citizens‘ guarantees and
liberties without respecting the procedures and without taking the precautions
exhaustively established in Article 86 of the Constitution. And we say it is lamentable,
but it is barely a surprising result, because the seriousness of the democratic convictions
of many centrist deputies are being, and not without reason, questioned. Here, the patents
of democracy are not extended by anyone. But anyone can show their own badge of
authoritarianism and disregard for freedoms. We refer ourselves to the tests.

Terrorism and Independence (Terrorismo e independentismo) 17 May 1980
The CRIMES of ETA militar will never lose, despite the cumulative and
appalling character of their frequency, the ability to produce that invincible feeling of
horror and contempt that still engenders the cruel cowardice of the murderers, and leads,
again and again, to ask how the human species can permit in their codes of conduct the
possibility that someone takes the life of a fellow [human being]. The political
justifications and the ideological motivations that terrorists use to turn their sinister
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ambushes in epic stamps only adds to the vileness of the crime the contempt for the
ability of men to reason, discuss and decide on their own the destiny of their public life.
For these fanatics, clinging to the simplifications of their catechisms and the butts of their
guns, they do not use conviction, but intimidation, to impose, by blood and fire, their
programs and ideas. Those who think that the flags are used to wash the blood of Cain,
which stains the murderers, or that the patriotic hymns need the rattle of arms as an
accompaniment are wrong. Although the verbal and gestural revolution of the traveling
companions of ETA militar are offensive, increasingly, in their mechanisms of
motivation and murderous conduct, the Basque terrorists and right-wing fascists are
indistinguishable. Certainly the symbolic emblems, the warrior sounds, the political
rationalizations and ideological contents are distinct between both species of patriots.
However, such contempt for fellow man, the denial of the fundamental human right that
is the right to life and the fanatical and stupid arrogance of considering themselves
owners of the truth and bearers of mysterious essences is related in the brotherhood of
crime in these two tribes of violence cultivators.
The new wave of killings in Euskadi, has coincided with the proposition of law
that the PNV will submit to the Basque Parliament, which follows the brave previous
statements of the Basque Government and the Minister of the Interior against violence
and the "revolutionary tax‖. This is not a coincidence. As in the past, each measure of the
Government and of the Courts in favor of autonomy and of peace in Euskadi had as a
response a barbaric act of terrorism, the clear route of the Basque government toward
peace and the strengthening of democracy now receives an identical criminal response.
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The PNV calls on all Euskadi political forces to renounce "violence of any kind and the
use of arms" and to accept "the political pathways as the only channel, within the
democratic system, for the legitimate and necessary confrontation of all ideologies and
options‖. It also underlines the necessity of ensuring the "strict adherence to any and all
rights of the person, especially that [to the right] of life‖.
The document also addresses other issues and problems that are related to the
consolidation of structures of coexistence among Basques, which could permit the
eradication of the phenomenon of violence in the medium term. Thus, the legalization of
all political parties and the freedom of expression, vindicated in the text, point, no doubt,
toward the convenience of not depriving the voice of the independent options or their
ability to organize within the law. On more than one occasion we have argued, from these
columns, the right of all citizens to freely express opinions and to organize to propagate
them. The only limitations on that right of association is to not peacefully defend the
independence movement, but that which is established in Article 22 of the Constitution,
which prohibits "secret societies and those of a paramilitary nature" and that [which]
establishes that "associations which pursue ends or use methods, characterized as
criminal are illegal‖.
Regarding the delicate topic of grace measures [i.e. pardons], it is clear that the
purpose of the PNV is to promote and encourage the definitive abandonment of arms by
those who are inclined to take that step, through the promise of making their reintegration
into civil life possible. You can agree or disagree with this peacemaking strategy. But it
would be wise, in any case, to remember that a public man so little suspect of extremism
or indiscretions such as Mr. Areilza, a representative of the parliamentary group led by
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Mr. Fraga, has defended the necessity of negotiating with ETAm, which would logically
include the adoption measures of grace. Dialogue is a path that no civilized Government
can renounce, especially if from the dialogue the eradication of violence could be
derived.
The no proposition of the law insists on "the development and deepening of the
Statute of Autonomy" to achieve authentic institutions of self-governance. Indeed, the
only way for the social and electoral bases of the terrorists to begin to weaken and break
down is for the Euskadi Government to show its people that the path to autonomy is not a
dead end, but rather a political and historical reality. And the murder of members of the
Forces of Public Order will be more difficult when the Basque regional police force is put
in charge of missions that today are assigned to the National Police or Civil Guard.
In any case, the reasonable doubts that could honestly be harbored on the sincerity
of the PNV and of its Government in its search for a peaceful, constitutional and
democratic end to the Basque conflict cannot be maintained in good faith after the
virulent statement released yesterday by ETAm. The text viciously attacks the Basque
Government – qualifying it as a "puppet government‖ – for its convictions of violence
and its advice for citizens (following Mr. Alcorta‘s example of civic bravery) to resist the
extortion and gangster blackmail, pompously madeup as "revolutionary taxes‖. For this
the recent wave of killings could be the point of political desperation more than anything
else. If it turns out to be this way, it would also be that we have started, perhaps without
realizing it, the long and slow road to peace in Euskadi.
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Reflections on Terrorism (Reflexiones sobre terrorismo) 15 April 1981
In the event that the Law for the Defense of the Constitution permits intellectual
approximations to terrorist tactics and strategy, we will have to agree that the mafia gang
that is ETA militar is proceeding to give their criminal response to the work of the socalled single anti-terrorism command in the Basque Country. It is already beginning to be
difficult to extrapolate statistics of the long history of murders of ETAm, but one does not
remember the vile etarra terror the commission of three murders of these features in a
single day – and in the space of just a few hours – and two of them in the same province.
Despite the added cowardice which is the fact that criminals choose as victims of their
savagery retired bosses or ex-officials and industrials without protection, or any special
significance, it is not unreasonable to see in this escalation of ETA – started a few days
ago with other barbaric attacks against national police [officers] – a sinister here we
continue directed at emphasizing the defense minister's tour, visiting the troops pledged
by the Government to waterproofing the Basque-Navarre Pyrenees. The identification of
the latest victims of ETAm should also be emphasized: military retirees voluntarily
settled in Euskadi and murdered in a particularly cruel and repugnant form, it is as if
there is a ranking of cruelty in the premeditated death of a man. The least warned could
caution [against] the latest ETAm actions, a frontal assault on the psychological
resistance of members of the Armed Forces. A new proof that ETA terrorism has decided
to launch without mercy by the slope of the proponents of the coup d‘état, against the
liberties of the Spanish.
The possibility that etarra terrorism is creating ambient temperature for Aberri
Eguna (next Sunday) stained with violence and clashes [should] also not be neglected.
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But, and still recognizing the objective difficulty of the fight against political banditry,
these facts seem to indicate, on the one hand, that it is not desirable to participate in the
triumphalism with which its administration has initiated this conglomeration of
unconnected competences called single antiterrorism command.
Yesterday, the happy release of the industrial Luis Suñer from Alcira (on whose
circumstances the responsible law enforcement officers have laid a blanket of silence, but
it seems they go through a high rescue) was so tarnished by these three immune crimes,
that now it is obvious to condemn when words, in a repeated manner, lose the brightness
and strength of their original coinage.
Almost daily it rains on the mammoth [sized] official relations officers of
detained [terrorists] or of captured terrorist material; the public has been offered
statistical tables which purport to demonstrate that in this or that period of time – always
with special legislation and indiscriminate threats on the use of freedom – they have
proceeded to carry out somewhat more successfully antiterrorist services than at the this
same time last year. It has entered a worthy lexicography worthy of the dictatorship, in
which seditious liberal newspapers call for the hunting of man as the tiger, thus equating
their brilliant intellectual and journalistic trajectory to the same trajectory of inhumane
violence, and have taken the step – just barely discussed – that the Governments of
Franco never decided to take, not even when the Prime Minister was assassinated: to
approximate the Armed Forces to the direct fight against terrorism.
Of course, no anti-terrorist operation of any kind could be able to prevent terror in
a few weeks. But few are fully aware that behind the resounding front of a single
command there are many loose twigs, poor technology, adequate diplomatic work,
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previous reorganization of debilitated services, such as that of the Defense Intelligence,
and above all, a single [antiterrorism] command. Recent statements from Commissioner
Ballesteros recognizing that coordination between military, civil guards and police was
made at the level of friends, move to such embarrassment that we are advised to be quiet
in this moment. One has already been advised, from these and from many other pages,
that Ballesteros was the reissue of his teacher, Commissioner Conesa, condemned as the
first, as this one with the GRAPO, to the new Sisyphean torture to announce the
dismantling, over and again, of ETA.
Therefore, if apart from the horror that the crimes arise we can draw some brief
lessons of such infamy, these at least are crystal clear. The first and most important is
that, as we already said, at the time of the murder of the engineer Ryan, that ETA: was
pure villain, today one can now add that this villain is now not only in its fascist pseudointellectual origins, but has in their immediate objectives a coup d‘état. The second is that
the Government of Calvo Sotelo, abundant in gestures – and in gestures, we say without
reluctance, interesting and courageous, but gestures in the end – has to start producing
policies.

Forgiveness for Terrorists (Perdón para terroristas) 8 August 1982
The publication of the conversations of those responsible in the Ministry of the
Interior with leaders of Euskadiko Ezquerra to implement measures of grace to a group of
old ETA Political-Military militants in the VII Assembly has led to curled
pronouncements from bodies of information and to some demonstrations from political
leaders who do not waste not even the smallest occasion to cultivate emotions in citizens
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before the next electoral confrontation. A football player, in a survey carried out by the
newspaper Ya, condemned the issue as seeming to him as the Government dropping their
pants. Without coming to this brunt opinion, other more qualified figures in Spanish
political life hid in their opinions more visceral and unfocused reasoning like that of the
Real Madrid player Juanito. The problems of social coexistence in the Basque Country
are much older than the actual political regime of freedoms and their roots are largely
sunk in the blink politics of the dictatorship, which, with its simplicity and lack of
historical vision, was the most valuable ally in the blossoming of armed gangs. It is
enough to remember, in this sense, that all of the action displayed in those years to seal
the indestructible unity of the men and the lands of Spain resulted in blowing through the
air the Prime Minister and the inheritance, to the parliamentary monarchy, from a
terrorist group with solid social support.
In the parliamentary spectrum, the politicians who think that the terrorist problem
in the Basque Country is a simple case of public order are few. Those who are defending
on the front line and from within the security forces the fight against the activity of armed
gangs have said so on numerous occasions. However, some ineffective politicians, that
played important roles in the first moments of the transition and harvested resounding
failures, are returning now, masquerading as the white hope of the Spanish right, to
preach, with unrepentant stubbornness, that it is all a simple question of hard labor and,
therefore, there is nothing better than a state of emergency at the time. God save us from
these messiahs.
It is a bit repetitive to repeat that the fight against terrorism is not only an issue of
police efficiency. The activity of armed gangs is unthinkable without the social support
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that makes their movements possible. For that, all of the political and judicial measures
that serve to isolate terrorist groups signify a qualified advance to enable a peaceful
coexistence in the Basque Country.
In this sense, and with an analysis moved by dispassion, and not by hot emotions,
in which we must place the Minister of the Interior‘s political initiative, from which it
would be convenient to give some details. It is an evil, or at least, an interesting poison to
state that the law is violated or that the State loses respectability when applying measures
of this type. The action that will be followed will be applied by competent jurisdictional
bodies and under the provisions of specific sections of the penal legislation. Therefore,
there is not the smallest creepy shadow or hidden and shameful negotiation, like the
lackeys of the criminal coup attempt to portray to the public opinion.
The measures that are going to be applied to members of ETA Political-Military
who abandoned their activities for more than a year and a half, because they understood,
after the failed coup d‘état, that their actions were aimed at consolidating the dawn of
times in Spain.
The first group of persons included in these measures are those that, not having
any responsibility, are found in exile for reasonable fear of reprisals. The other two
groups are composed of those still serving their long sentences, they could be, at the
court‘s discretion, applied to the provisions of existing legislation on remission of the
sentence or parole, and, in the last place, of those preventative prisoners to which they
can apply more mild sentences until they have their respective trials. In any case, in all
circumstances, those guilty of murder, illegal detentions, or of other [crimes] of
significance and seriousness are excluded. Therefore, the assumptions made about those
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to whom these so-called measures of grace will be applied do not seem as significant as
to cause so much turmoil.
However, above or below the scrupulous respect that one has in the action of this
law and the distribution of powers true to a system of rule of law, the Minister of the
Interior‘s initiative constitutes a laudable and brave policy initiative. Terrorism has left
our country with a sequel of frustrations and painful memories that will not be easily
forgotten. But whatever attitude that put a definite end to the violence and facilitates
coexistence under the rule of law can only be well received by those who love peace and
progress. To nourish the confrontations inexorably leads to catalyze the tensions and
reproduce violence.
There is, lastly, one equally important issue. The groups related to the coup d‘état,
that are unwavering in their efforts to drive our country to fratricidal confrontation, have
started what will become an overwhelming campaign to apply similar measures of grace
as well to the rebel participants in the 23 February attempt[ed] [coup d‘état]. In principle,
here fit some clarifications. In first place, the participants of those facts have never
recognized their criminal authorship, and some have confirmed that they will attempt it
again. Politically, therefore, it would be inconsistent to consolidate peace and coexistence
of all citizens to kindly apply the penal law, if it has not already been applied with
complete generosity, to those who are ready to impose by force – relying on their special
status as members of the Armed Forces – their political viewpoints. It is, therefore, a
quite different issue. And to establish a parallel does not appear encouraged by the sound
criminal principle of social reinsertion and the policy of [criminal] offenders, but, rather,
a ploy to confuse citizens and to hinder the governorship of the State. In any case, it
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would not be convenient to forget that the decision of the Supreme Council of Military
Justice recommended to the Government the commutation of sentences to Milans and
Tejero‘s immediate inferior. The rebellion leaders renounced this benefit in an arrogant
gesture.

The Crime of Rentería and ETA‘s Electoral Campaign (El crimen de Rentería y la
campaña electoral de ETA) 15 September 1982
The general elections of this 28 October will allow the Basque people to decide,
for the fifth time in four years, with the ballot box. After the general and municipal
elections of 1979, the referendum that approved the Statute of Guernica and the election
of the autonomous Parliament in March 1980, the designation of deputies and senators to
the General Courts will be a new occasion for the citizens of the Basque Country to
express, through universal suffrage, free and secret ballot, their preferences and opinions,
the only way to ascertain the real social support of the [political] parties and their
programs. Despite the undisputed importance of the vote obtained by Herri Batasuna in
the general election of 1979, the fact is that only 149,685 citizens of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa
and Alava were delivered, on a census of eligible voters of 1,625,280 (9.20%) and
1,020,793 actual voters (14.66%), against peace, democracy and harmony. The enemies,
of representative government have always theorized their aristocratic contempt toward
the popular will through aberrant ideological constructs that reserve the monopoly of an
alleged patriotic truth to a determined minority capable of imposing through arms its
dictatorship. Despite this doctrinal arrogance, each adverse electoral consult puts these
self-appointed messiahs in the awkward position of having to seek extravagant arguments
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with the public opinion to justify their bloody loneliness. Determined to close the ballot
boxes forever once they have conquered [their way] to power, they have to conform, in
the meantime, to interfere, directly or indirectly, the celebration of elections and
introduce factors of alteration in their normal development. While vanguards despise
from their infatuated stupidity the votes as a source of political legitimacy, the
restlessness that produces in their bases the sense of isolation moves them to boycott or
distort the democratic elections to the extent that their efforts are permitted.
The sad comment regarding the ambush perpetrated Monday near Rentería, which
claimed the lives of four national police, should be exhausted, from a purely human point
of view, in the expression of horror at this new manifestation of barbarism. The
persecution waged by terrorists to top off one of the injured policemen, that was being
driven to a hospital, constitutes one of the horrifying feats of cruelty and sadism
committed by these criminal gangs throughout their shady history. However, the
murderers, to reap human lives, tactical objectives are also proposed, despite the
repugnancy aroused by the instrumentalization of death in the service of other goals, it is
necessary to analyze. ETA undertakes, so, their own electoral campaign, designed to
induce – as a maximum program – the definite closure of the polls or to dramatize – as
the resigned alternative, – a situation that would be even more adverse without the
exasperation and fear terrorism breeds with its crimes. The overheating of the preelectoral atmosphere by commissioning the action-repression spiral [of violence] in the
Basque Country is but a desperate attempt to distort, to the advantage of radical
nationalism and of the conservative opinions, the verdict of the ballot boxes.
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The other clip of the pliers to crush the liberties of Basques and the rest of
Spaniards has been the revival, at the beginning of the election campaign, of
demonstrations in favor of the amnesty, aimed at coldly instrumentalizing the emotions
of the prisoners‘ families and friends. Freedom of the accused or convicted is not the goal
of these demonstrations, but rather the dirty expectation of getting – as in San Sebastian
this past Sunday – new names for the martyrdom with the help of some exasperated and
frightened Forces of Public Order who respond disproportionately or wrongfully to the
provocations. The maneuver is even more nauseating since those same manipulators have
slandered the leaders of the rogue Euskadiko Ezkerra, that advocate for the Ministers of
Justice and of the Interior to revise the records and add an elevated number of former
ETA Political-Military members committed to abandoning arms.
Never has it been more evident than now that the inmates are simple exchange
rates for their seditious benefactors of the pro-amnesty advocates, human merchandise
that has to always be behind bars with the end of serving an altruistic flag for
mobilizations that strategically looks for other purposes. In the exclusively human terrain,
the pain of the prisoners‘ family members is worth all respect, although, different than
that of the families of those killed by ETA, who have the consolation of knowing that
they are still alive and harbor the hope that someday they will hug them in freedom.
However, only contempt are creditors those who politically trade with the feelings of
solidarity and condemn to a second time the inmates to the horror of prison, by defending
a strategy of violence that makes it unthinkable to negotiate any measures of grace and to
consider as a betrayal the efforts in favor of those exiled and prosecuted within the
framework of legality. Because nobody in their right mind could honestly ask for pardons
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for those who, the day after leaving prison, were willing to commit murder as atrocious
as those committed yesterday in Rentería. And only the disappearance of violence in the
Basque Country would make a change to the situation of the prisoners imaginable. But
this is well known by those who obscenely manipulate demonstrations in favor of the
amnesty as one more piece of a strategy of provocation and death.

The Government and Constitutional Guarantees (El Gobierno y las garantías
constitucionales) 9 April 1983
THE MINISTER of the Interior called a press conference yesterday to report the
results obtained by the spectacular police operations carried out in Madrid in recent days.
While these actions have not yet managed to locate the whereabouts of Diego Prado and
his kidnappers, Jose Barrionuevo justified the usefulness of the raids started in the
neighborhood of Pilar through data related to the partial disarticulation of an ETA unit
that was preparing criminal attacks and that is organically linked with the terrorists who
criminally hold the financier. In a measured tone, which is welcomed as showing a new
political sensibility, the Minister of the Interior apologized to the public for any
inconvenience caused by the deployment of the Security Forces, while the propaganda
services of his department placed advertisements in the Press to thank the residents of
Madrid for their collaboration in home registrations. Simultaneously, whole
neighborhoods of the capital continued to be subjected yesterday to the rigorous combing,
continuing the largest scale of police operations put into action since the establishment of
the democratic system. In a previous editorial commentary (see EL PAIS of 7 March) we
noted that although the eventual achievements of the spectacular raid could make up for
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many (under the moral of success) of the irregularities ordered by the Ministry of the
Interior, no victory could justify – ethically, politically and legally – the violation of a
constitutional guarantee as important as the inviolability of the home. The Minister of the
Interior, convinced that his glance at the Constitution is the correct one, has invited those
who have criticized him to carefully read Article 18.2 of the Constitution, which states
that "the home is inviolable" and that "no entry or registration may be made without the
consent of the owner or a court order, except in cases of flagrant crime‖. Although the
willingness of Jose Barrionuevo as a hermeneutic should not be doubted, it is compulsory
to return the advice to him and ask him to analyze that paragraph in greater detail and
with better legal consultancy.
The official media emphasize the voluntary nature of the authorizations given by
citizens for the public order patrols to register their dwellings. It is surprising, in this
respect, the efficiency with which the mechanisms of forgetting operate as a function of
the changes of position produced by upward mobility and the occupation of political
power. Because those socialists who lived in secrecy until a few years ago, should at least
consider as a problem the investigation of the real reasons that might prompt a citizen to
grant such permission. Given that any human act is always motivated in multiple ways, it
seems to be an excessive simplification to highlight the excitement and to reject fear in
all of the cases in which "consent of the owner" of an address was produced for the entry
and registry by police, without a warrant. The Minister of the Interior, instead of rejoicing
exclusively for the ease received for the address registrations, perhaps should also worry
about the automatic behavior of those who, with the fresh memory of the days in which
they were simply subjected [to the registrations], have not gotten used to fully assuming
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their condition as citizens, which involves the exercise of each and every one of the
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of 1978.
Playing to those of the past and those of the future, one could imagine the reaction
of the socialists, turned into the opposition, in the case that an operation such as that
carried out this week in Madrid were to be endorsed by a Government of UCD (in the
past) or Manuel Fraga (in the future). Probably senior socialists and a good part of its
voters would argue that the ownership of power, today occupied by the left, completely
changes the nature of state actions and magically changes their meaning. It would result,
therefore, that the only important thing is to know who governs, so that the assessment of
the decisions of power should not be carried out in function of its concrete content but of
its ideological origins. Unfortunately, not only history has been responsible for denying
such arrogant presumptions (it is enough to cite the liquidation of the SFIO, that is, the
French Socialists, as a result of their behavior during the Algerian war), but the
absolution of the errors by the alleged sacramental efficiency of some centuries is a thesis
that would be difficultly maintained by those who have formally settled to the
foundations of their political conduct and have rejected the specious independence of the
means with respect to the ends.
Regardless of the eventual lack of consent produced by intimidation and the
memory of other times, the exceptions – few or many, one would be enough – to the
voluntary acceptance of the address registry are sufficient – to raise in its integrity respect
for the constitutional guarantee of the inviolability of the home. The issues of principle,
as badly as they weigh on the defenders of State reasoning, do not allow [for] quantitative
discounts. Moreover, the Ministrer of the Interior showed, with their initial hesitations
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when it came time to justify the home raids, a legal uncertainty which could be
interpreted as a symptom of a deeper bad conscience. At first, the authorities spoke
indistinctly of injunctions to house searches, consistent with Article 18.2 of the
Constitution, and of the application of the Antiterrorism Law of 1 December 1980, that
authorizes the raids of dwellings without previous judicial resolution in exceptional
circumstances. Yesterday, however, once the news that the duty judge of Madrid had not
been requested by the police to issue search warrants [was] made public, the Minister of
the Interior has gone out of his anxieties and has justified the raids exclusively through
the application of the Antiterrorism Law.
This legal retreat is, however, a worrying manifestation that the heights of power
can dizzy those who occupy the positions until the point that they temporarily forget their
own past and jeopardize their credibility. The Antiterrorism Law, enacted in the ambit of
Article 55 of the Constitution but situated – in the opinion of leading experts – outside the
framework of our legality, suspends, effectively, the right to inviolability of the home and
does not support any registration without supplied judicial consent or resolution. In this
way, the members of the State Security Forces and Bodies may proceed under this rule
without prior judicial authorization, to raid and search homes. But it occurs that an
exceptional law cannot be interpreted in the rule of law and a democratic system; in an
abusive form with analogous criteria. The suspension of the constitutional guarantees
strictly affects the persons "suspected of being integrated or relating well with terrorist
elements, along with armed gangs‖. The application of the antiterrorism legislation to
defeat the resistances of a simple citizen to police bursting in into their home without a
warrant is a legal and political aberration. And the suspension of constitutional rights of
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the thousands of residents of the Madrid neighborhoods combed through by the police is
an indignant abuse of power from a government that massively and cleanly won the
elections, under the defense of freedoms. Let us point out, finally, that the Minister of the
Interior is obliged by the antiterrorist law to report in these cases to the Central Court of
the Audiencia Nacional the records made, the reasons that motivated them and the results
obtained. Let us hope that this communication is done quickly.
Only bad faith or recklessness could lead to confuse the necessary collaboration
of society in the fight against terrorism, defended always in the pages of El País, with the
use of dubious constitutional mechanisms and unpleasant authoritarians to extract
through psychological intimidation or the violation of fundamental rights an appearance
of civic voluntarism in this task. It is always difficult to balance the dialectic between
public security and civil liberties. However, apart from the short-term euphoria produced
by short-term efficacy of the measures of force, it is evident that a democratic system
must rest, whatever the ideology expressed in its parliamentary majority, on the
principles of freedom and has to exclude any possibility that the Executive Power –
hypnotized by the rhetoric slogan of a Government that governs – makes their daily
practice indistinguishable from that of any authoritarian regime.

Terrorism, Before Congress (El Terrorismo, ante el Congreso) 3 November 1983
TODAY Congress will know the government‘s plans to improve the effectiveness
of actions taken against terrorist groups. The tense moments and the emotions unleashed
by the monstrous murder of Captain Alberto Martín are the beginning of the call for this
plenary. However, ETA has not wavered in their harassment since the inauguration of
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Felipe González. The long and painful list of attacks and murders during this period is
testimony to this fact. It is possible that the socialist Government believed at the
beginning of their mandate that the gates of terrorist hell could not prevail against the
new majority. Perhaps that initial trust made them lower their guard or underestimate the
dangers in the first moments. It can be speculated, thus, about omissions in the field of
diplomatic pressure and errors in the reorganization of the intelligence services and
police. The weak hopes for a truce from the different terrorist branches showed their
illusory character to failure, partly due to PSOE‘s own fault, the Garaikoetxea initiative
of convening a peace talk.
The information available gives reason to suspect that the Government has given
up adopting some antiterrorist measures that would in the short-term only have
propaganda effects, and that in the medium and long term would be counterproductive.
Heated suggestions to declare a state of emergency, to claim military intervention or to
extend for no less than up to 20 days the period of preventative detention before having to
go before a judge for those suspected of being members of armed gangs have been on the
Government‘s table. Also the expressed criminalization of Herri Batasuna and of the
parties that form the coalition, currently located in a limbo of lawlessness, criminalization
that would only lead to greater tension in the social body of the Basque Country. Finally,
the dirty war – some of whose methods the Government seems to be using – is an action
forbidden to anyone who believes in the political and ethical superiority of democratic
systems and who is committed to the defense of their values. But, moreover, the
experience also indicates that institutional terrorism – sufficient with the example of
Argentina – would not only discount those who practice the same miserable moral
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condition of the armed gangs, but would also condemn them to [what is] surely political
bankruptcy.
In any case, the news that arrives – and that we hope will be confirmed today –
that the Government has wisely decided to give up the revenue of a spectacular but
useless dramatization in the antiterrorism fight does not mean that the pressures to require
confirming visible gestures – effective or not – in their obvious intention to obstruct the
armed gangs can completely resisted. It appears that the devised measures that
Parliament will debate today will be judicial, penal, procedural and criminal. In the
judicial sphere the exceptions to the general principle of territoriality of the penal law
would be extended, with the aim to prosecute the extortions and actions of terrorists
abroad, and would deal with trying to change extradition practices with other countries.
In the penitentiary terrain, the precautions adopted to guarantee the safety of officials
could indirectly punish the families of prisoners and call into question the principles of
penitentiary reform. In the litigation field, the measures to apply the maximum period of
preventative prison do not need, in our view, any modification of the laws. In the penal
sphere, equipping the military with authority in case of attack would permit the use of a
type of aggravated penalty that is used when the victims are members of the Forces of
Public Order. The insults to the flag committed by public officials would be more
severely sanctioned. The reality is that, ultimately, the government finds itself with the
fact that there exist laws that are more than powerful – and some that are even doubtfully
constitutional for the fight against terrorism, and it is not about modifying them if it is not
to quell the hydra coup or popular tribulation from the increase of terrorism. But it would
be a dangerous error if the Government were to follow the slope of panic on this issue.
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This incline is insinuated in the decision to more rigorously pursue, and under the
expectation of more severe punishment, the so-called crime of advocating terrorism.
Once again it is necessary to point out that the indetermination and vagueness of such
offense violated, in our view, the constitutional principles of legality and legal security.
The Penal Code had always considered the condoning of crime – as it is defined in
Article 566 – as a simple failure. Elevating it to a substantive offense of "public
condoning" of the conducts or activities of people "integrated into organized and armed
groups or bands and their associates‖ vainly tries to contain within the limits of penal law
legal-political phenomena that are difficult to define, and for whose denunciation the
prosecution has no fixed or firm criteria. Moreover, the experience of the so-called Law
for the Defense of Democracy teaches that it is not these types of threats that will manage
to defeat terrorism, but those that agitate its waters. The Government is not obligated to
offer miracles in its fight against ETA, but it is, instead, obliged to not make mistakes in
their repressive response. We expect and hope that this is the spirit that will appear today
before the Courts.

Again Terrorism (Otra vez el terrorismo) 21 November 1984
The terrorist murder of Santiago Brouard, leader of Herri Batasuna, in Bilbao is a
new and disgusting attack against democratic coexistence in this country. The specific
circumstances surrounding [the murder] – the doctor was viciously attacked while giving
a consult – help highlight the moral misery of the murderers. There has been a new
victim of this bloody intolerance that threatens to destroy the roots of coexistence in
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Euskadi. President of the Revolutionary Socialist People's Party (HASI), elected member
to the Basque Parliament, and deputy mayor of the Bilbao City Council during the
previous term, Santiago Brouard, Santi, was a pediatrician and a highly esteemed person
for his personal kindness and his professional work. He met the criteria for a leader, and
since many times these columns have disagreed even bitterly with his approaches and
beliefs, it is necessary today to highlight the despicable act which ended his life, the
human and political aberration that was committed once again by the sowers of violence.
It is too early to analyze the explanation of the murder. The fact that the crime was
committed on 20 November carries ominous and disturbing connotations the coincidence
between that date and the death of the dictator Franco. The possibility that the
responsibility [for the attack] corresponds to the Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups (GAL),
so far settled on French soil for the operation of their bloody business, will more
dramatically plant serious questions in public opinion – not yet convincingly clarified by
the Government – about the origin, financing, supplying, and address of that criminal
gang. The possibility that, as in the fable of the sorcerer's apprentice, the hired murderers
of the GAL were able to escape control by their employers and act as a loose wheel in
this awful drama should not be ruled out.
In any case we should ask who benefits from this attack. Indeed, not democracy
and peace. It will be necessary to exude prudence, imagination, and political know-how
so that this murder does not lead to the paroxysm of a spiral of violence in Euskadi. Even
with all the differences that exist between conflict zones, the specter of Ulster,
understood as a violent confrontation in the heart of a civil society divided by ideological
hatred and sectarian misunderstanding, it should disturb and frighten all who sense that
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the future of democracy and freedom in Spain is inseparable from the future of the
Basque Country. At the present time, the institutions of the autonomous region are almost
paralyzed by the internal divisions of the Basque Nationalist Party and by the attempts of
other political forces to utilize these conflicts to their advantage. Yesterday's attack
impacts, moreover, the negotiating process started last summer by the Madrid
Government aimed at pacifying the Basque Country, to achieve social reintegration of
not a few ex-militants of ETA and give a political exit and not only police [exit] to the
conflict. Now no one doubts that everything will be more difficult. But perhaps those
who defend, [from] deep within and even in their statements, the existence of a terrorism
of response, a type of good, anti-etarra terrorism, against the other bad, etarra terrorism
will learn a lesson. The facts demonstrate that outside the action of the law and strict
respect for democratic norms there is no free solution to the Basque problem. The
murderers of Brouard are not better than those of the socialist senator Enrique Casas, or
the latter than the former. But the extension of political criminality can ruin in a few days
the hopes of peace opened recently. The Basque and Madrid Governments need to give a
response to this urgent call from the citizens: security in democracy. And arrest and
punishment of all terrorists.

Terrorism and Security (El terrorismo y la seguridad) 28 April 1985
Two weeks after the tragedy that occurred in El Descanso, that cost the lives of 18
clients of the popular Madrid restaurant, the scrupulous silence or complete ignorance of
the Minister of the Interior has stolen from the public opinion this basic information
about the brutal attack to which the citizens of a democratic system have the right and
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that justify the rational confidence of society in the competence and efficacy of their
police services. Although definitive and reliable evidence demonstrates that the
vindication made in Beirut by an Islamic terrorist organization was authentic, [it] would
still [be necessary to] reconstruct the path taken by this criminal enterprise from Lebanon
to the heart of Spanish territory. That criminal orders were originally given beyond our
borders constitutes a marginal fact in investigating the infrastructure, the composition and
contacts in our land of a foreign band able to select [as] a target a restaurant frequented
by North American nationals, install an explosive charge in the building, erase their
tracks and find safe refuge in a strange urban environment. The coldness and distance
shown by the official media toward the victims of this attack – buried without the
presence of some usual personalities of this type of funeral – perhaps rests on the unjust
judgment that it is not the same an indiscriminate killing of modest persons perpetrated
by a foreign band as the targeted killing of uniformed men, political leaders or social
leaders executed by a Spanish organization. If this were the explanation, one would have
to doubt not only the sensibility of the Government and of its strange conception of
public safety, but also of their capacity to understand the scale and implications of
international terrorism. Because the incorporation of Spanish territory into the field of
operations where the secret services of the great powers and of their allies, free their
destabilizing wars is news as much or more serious than the persistence of terrorist
groups with known identity. That kind of unacknowledged official relief that underlies
the hypothesis of foreign authorship in the El Descanso attack is particularly puzzling if
one recalls President Reagan‘s impending trip to Madrid.
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Along with the disturbing emergence of the terrorist outbreak materialized in the
El Descanso tragedy, the statement made public on Friday by ETA militar (see EL PAIS
of 26 April) adds another concern to public safety. ETA militar threatens Spanish and
foreign tourists with a "campaign of sabotage" in the Mediterranean zone, to the style of
that developed by ETA Político-militar in the summers of 1979 and 1980. Still without
excessive confidence in the efficacy of the quotes, we will remind that five years ago
Herri Batasuna considered the polimilis’ [members of ETA Político-militar] anti-tourism
campaign "counterrevolutionary" "crazy" and "harmful" accused of "confusing the
struggle of the Basque people and undermining the necessary solidarity between the
workers of the distinct peoples of Spain".
If the new direction taken by ETA Militar is confirmed it might be inferred that
the strengthening of the measures adopted by French authorities in the former sanctuary
of the armed groups has obliged the terrorist organization to cross the border and extend
their area of operation – so far basically limited to the Basque Country and Madrid – to
the rest of Spain. French cooperation was a condition so that Spanish democracy could
deal with the terrorist challenge. Also compromise of the Basque Government and the
Basque Nationalist Party with the antiterrorism fight constitutes an indispensible
requirement for its success. The legislative pact between Basque nationalists and
socialists and the energetic pronouncements from the lendakari Ardanza have satisfied
this requirement. Finally, the police authorities have always claimed, with more than
debatable arguments, Udder hands to arrest suspects, register homes, intervene
communications and question for 10 days those detained. The present Government's
Antiterrorism Law strengthens and extends the exceptional legislation, with the end to
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give the police the requested facilities. The pretexts have ended: the Minister of the
Interior already has all the cards in his hand and the success of the fight against ETA
depends on his efficacy and capacity.

The Ertzantza, on the Front Line (La Ertzantza, en primera línea) 3 November 1986
Genaro García de Andoáin, head of the Basque autonomous police was shot dead
yesterday by an ETA unit in the operation which rescued the industrial Lucio
Aguinagalde, is the first representative of the Ertzantza to fall in a battle against the
terrorist organization. In the operation that freed Aguinagalde from the kidnapping other
State antiterrorist entities were not involved, and apparently were not informed of the
arrangements put in place for the Basque police. This is not the first time the Ertzantza
collaborated in some way in the fight against terrorism and this is not the first ertzaina
killed by ETA. The Basque terrorist organization took responsibility for the murder, on 7
March 1985, of the superintendent of the regional police force, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos
Díaz Arcocha. The assassination coincided with the beginning of the Ertzantza antiterrorist activity, to which ETA responded with the brutality that has traditionally been
common.
In all, the special meaning of yesterday‘s action escapes no one. García de
Andoáin was a man of confidence of the adviser to the Interior of the Basque
Government, Luis María Retolaza, a personality of great importance in the Basque
Nationalist Party. Lucio Aguinagalde, industrial, 69, is the oldest militant of the PNV in
Vitoria and had accepted, a week before the kidnapping, a position of responsibility in the
municipal court of the party. Thus, both the kidnapping and its resolution have been an
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open challenge from ETA to PNV. The president of the party, Xabier Arzalluz, said in
the Bilbao Press: "The kidnapping of Lucio Aguinagalde is a direct confrontation from
ETA against the PNV. We are doing things to even find him, which are difficult and
dangerous". Reality has confirmed Arzalluz‘s suspicion. The response of PNV to the
challenge of ETA highlights the will of the ruling party in Euskadi to confront terrorism
as much in the political as in the police front. A significant fact, without a doubt, when
the discussion of who has the responsibility of the antiterrorism fight remains in the
Basque Country.
In that debate, in which there are no shortages of confusing profiles, it should not
be forgotten that ETA is the common enemy of the democratic forces that defend the
Statute of Guernica and peaceful coexistence in Euskadi. Terrorists extort or kidnap
without distinction. For the Basque terrorist organization, the enemy is defined as anyone
who disagrees with their violent approaches.
The responsibility to end the climate of violence in Euskadi belongs, by the same,
to everyone. ETA similarly kills citizens who cross the lights when they decide to end the
family of a militant as the civil guards or the children playing in the street.
The terrorist challenge requires practical cooperation of all democrats and all
public institutions. The PNV finds itself in these moments in an unsurpassable position to
ensure proper implementation of that solidarity. And the assumption by the Basque police
of the antiterrorism fight, in all its dimensions and with all its consequences, is first-rate
news that inspires all kinds of hopes.

207

The Fall Assessment (Pulso de otoño) 16 October 1987
SPANIARDS are not necessarily happier, but contemplate the evolution of the
political situation, and especially of the economic situation, with increasing optimism, per
a poll corresponding to this fall by the company Demoscopia for El País. The favorable
indicators of the economic situation released in the past months – decrease in inflation,
increased investment and production – have permeated into the consciousness of the
people, who envision the future with greater confidence. The percentage of those who
consider the general economic situation to be bad or very bad decreases from 44% in
June to 32% at the end of September, while increasing by 30% the number of citizens
who have a positive evaluation. This occurs despite [the fact that] the opinion of personal
household economic [situation] hardly changed, while noting some improvement in the
estimate. The survey shows a clear parallel between the evolution of the assessment of
the economic situation and that of the political. The number of pessimists descends by
seven points, while those who consider the current political situation to be very good
increases by five points with respect to the survey from the beginning of the summer.
That assessment barely has a reflection on the voting intentions of Spaniards. The slow
decrease of the PSOE continues parallel to the Alianza Popular [Popular Alliance], as has
been happening practically since 1982, so that, as a whole, the electoral map is barely
modified. With everything, the tendency toward greater pluralism highlighted in the local
elections of last 10 June is maintained.
Suarez's CDS continues to get results inferior to those of his leader in the
popularity ranking of politicians. Fraga continues surpassing, by a narrow margin,
Hernandez Mancha, and Felipe Gonzalez remains the most popular politician. As a
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particular case, in the Basque region a great permeability is observed between the voters
of the two forces that divided the PNV last year, expressed also in the appreciation of
each electoral group to the leader of the rival sector: not only is Garaikoetxea esteemed
more by those who vote Ardanza, something that was already known, but the voters of
the leader of Eusko Alkartasuna also show a clear respect for the current lehendakari.
The survey, held a week before the arrest in France of the ETA leader Santiago
Arrospide, does not permit assessing the effect that in the perception of the problem of
terrorism they could have produced developments as a consequence of this arrest. At the
end of September, a relative majority (42%) of those polled considered that the ETA
problem was worse than few years ago, and only 10% felt that that it was getting better.
The pessimism from young people with respect [to this] is significant: 23% of those
under age 21 do not see any solution to the problem of terrorism on the horizon. A few
days after the Prime Minister recognized that he had maintained contacts with ETA, 51%
of Spaniards positively valued that attitude, but it was very high, 32%, the number of
those who spoke against any type of contact with the terrorists.
Like every quarter, the survey includes a series of seven questions designed to
highlight the evolution of what the pollsters call the vital tone of the Spanish: level of
self-satisfaction with their own work, euphoria or depression, hope for the future, etc.
The results reveal a slow shift toward greater lethargy, fundamentally determined by the
relative absence of stimuli. Whether this is compatible with a more optimistic assessment
regarding the evolution of political and economic situations could perhaps be interpreted
as a sign of maturity of Spanish society. Today, the excessive euphoria and the
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disproportionate disappointments of the transition gone, people have learned to separate
the private sphere from the public plane.

The Law and the Bomb (La ley y la bomba) 24 May 1988
―IT WAS ALL legal‖, is the terse reply from the Minister of the Interior about the
armed assault that a family and a local Leganés (Madrid) politician suffered in the early
hours yesterday from the Special Operating Groups (GEO). With that which they
sanctioned the legality of police and political incompetence. All counterterrorism action
involves the risk of negative consequences for its innocent witnesses. But from there to
any mischief that Fraga calls "burdens of citizenship" is a very big stretch. The concept
that in the fight against terrorism anything goes and that it is unfortunate but inevitable
that some spectator ends up badly harmed is a fallacy imposed by what is considered
expedient in the fight against this modern plague.
The citizenry must not carry more burdens than those covered by law; the rest are
illegal, regardless of who implements them and regardless of their justification. And it is
necessary to know what specific legal norm protected the barbarity of the GEO, that is to
say, what has permitted them to violate the [right of the] inviolability of the home
provided in the Constitution. It is only possible, twisting the argument, to find remote
support in the sixteenth article of the aberrant antiterrorism law, which permits security
forces and bodies to detain alleged terrorists without previous judicial authorization –
which obviously is not case. One must ask, this article automatically converts Spaniards
into suspects in the eyes of the Government and extends a blank check to law
enforcement. In that case, the proven ineffectiveness of the antiterrorist law –
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unconstitutional for many reasons – to fight terrorism alone, will be comparable to its
utility patent to terrorize the population.
Regarding kidnapping, the Government of Felipe Gonzalez has tested everything,
from the paramilitary occupation of entire neighborhoods up to the GEO smashing
through the doors of the house of Leganés. The Nani disappeared for the sake of the fight
against terrorism, and the police officer Amedo is involved in serious criminal charges
for his alleged involvement in the GAL case (antiterrorism terrorism, as the socialist
Government likes to dictate). Many times we have had the opportunity to point out that
along with the destruction and damage directly caused by the criminal barbarity of ETA
the moral damages in the social body, the discredit of the democracy and its methods, the
perversion of authority or the leniency regarding the violation of the basic values of the
rule of law should be accounted for. The inadmissible and cruel torture to which the
Revilla industry is being subjected to by ETA gangsters cannot be a pretext or a reason
for the State apparatus to lose its nerves. The maxim that against terrorism anything goes
is indignant of any democratic sensibility, but is moreover, and as can be verified, stupid.
[Very] recently, Felipe Gonzalez acknowledged the wear of his Minister of
Education. When will it be recognized that it is inhumane to keep in the position of the
Interior a man so inept and politically mediocre such as that who occupies the office?
How many blunders, abuses, excesses, arrogances, should this team of foolish
administrators of the public order commit before we Spaniards finally receive the grace
of his dismissal?
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The Last of ETA (La horma de ETA) 19 September 1989
The dismantling of the Araba command of ETA – to which 39 murders in the last
years are attributed – the arrest of practically all of its collaborators and the seizure of an
abundant arsenal of arms and other materials that would serve to carry out and to
camouflage their criminal acts constitutes an inappreciable and valuable police success.
But, moreover, the dismantling of this dangerous firing squad and of their accomplices is
a very timely blow to the terrorist organization, in a period of resurgence of criminal
activity after the talks in Algiers broke down. Since ETA unilaterally considered that the
informal contacts that it maintained with emissaries of the Spanish government in the
Algerian capital did not meet their claims, their murderous arm has claimed at least a
dozen lives in just six months, the latest of which is that of National Court prosecutor
Carmen Tagle. Operations such as that culminated by the Guardia Civil with the
dismantling of the Araba command show that the democratic State has the capacity and
legal means to deal with the challenge of terrorists so that their criminal activity does not
go unpunished.
Although, in principle, the official version of events seems plausible, the Director
General of the Guardia Civil, Luis Roldán, does not do a good service to the required
transparency in a democratic society when he refuses to give "too many details" to "avoid
controversy" about its outcome: two terrorists killed and three civil guards wounded to
varying degrees. In any case, the details of the operation, publically denied at this time,
cannot be hidden from a judicial inquiry, which shall ultimately rule on the legality of the
police action. In the rule of law, no violent death – not even those produced by the
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security forces in the legitimate struggle against terrorism – falls outside the margin of
clarification by an independent and impartial body such as the judiciary.
The speed with which Herri Batasuna and pro-amnesty solicitors have condemned
the police action, which they have qualified as an "ambush", is all a sample of the crude
hypocrisy that often leads those who walk around the world asking the dead for their
identity and political affiliation to decide what use will be made of them. Always willing
to praise the dead terrorists and analysts punctilious on the circumstances of their death in
light of a democratic legality that they fight with fury as heroes, they do not blink when
the dead are others. Fortunately, the immense majority of the Basque society discovered
long ago the imposture of these executioners.

Death Instinct (Pulsión de muerte) 7 September 1990
The hypothesis that it was members of the First of October Antifascist Resistance
Groups (GRAPO) that placed the three bombs that exploded yesterday in two official
buildings of Madrid is perfectly plausible. Known only by the cruelty of their actions, but
not for other types of causes that could possibly evoke to justify them, this group of
desperate [persons] only moves, like their ETA counterparts, as the Bishop of Bilbao just
described as, citing Paul Ricoeur, an extreme "death instinct". Kill and destroy, that is
their concise program. To apply it you do not need any special qualities. It is neither
necessary to be smart nor is it indispensable to be brave. It is enough to be unscrupulous
and close your eyes to the effects caused. To place a bomb in a public place like the
Madrid Stock Exchange is to blindly bet on an indeterminate number of random victims.
To do it in the Constitutional Court's headquarters or the office of a ministry is to seek
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victims at random between anonymous officials. Therein lay the motive of those who
have been won over by this death instinct that dominates the soul of the terrorist. In
which, its action being arbitrary and indiscriminate, no one can feel safe. Their desire for
omnipotence is done when they know that we all fear.
The hypothesis of the responsibility of the GRAPO is also weight[ed] [given] the
artisanal– but no less deadly – character of the artifacts, such as, above all in the case of
the Constitutional Court, the barely sophisticated system used to place them. But that
itself highlights the resounding failure and fragility of the existing security systems in the
affected centers.
Spain is one of the European countries most punished by terrorism, and the
security measures must be proportionate to the risk. It is true that killing and destroying is
always too easy, and that, as experts have repeatedly reiterated, no security plan can
eliminate one hundred percent risk of terrorist action: if in a given place the security
measures were almost insurmountable, the terrorists would look for other less protected
targets. And then the editor in charge of communications would be responsible for
explaining that the new target symbolically represented that which was abandoned for
being inaccessible. All this is true, but from it no good conscience should be derived.
Precisely because in the fight against terrorism the symbolic battle is decisive, the
democratic State has to step up its effort to avoid any image of vulnerability. At least so
that it does not give the impression that the terrorists have not had to struggle too much to
cause the destruction to which they aspired.
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Judges and Terrorism (Jueces y terrorismo) 23 November 1991
Many things are felt, from indignation to bewilderment, about the recent decision
from the Criminal Division of the National Court to absolve three ETA collaborators,
nevertheless recognizing their criminal conduct. The exculpation of those who developed
and partially executed a plan to get the etarra Ignacio de Juana Chaos to escape from the
Herrera de la Mancha jail, sentenced for various attacks, among others that which caused
the death of five Civil Guard members in Juan Bravo de Madrid Street in 1985, has
prompted the prosecutorial board of said tribunal to show their indignation. For their part,
the State security forces have expressed their discouragement, and from the broadest
areas of society it is not difficult to feel perplexed about the judicial statement. This
varied range of sentiments is not only due to the absolution itself but rather that it is a
product of a mechanical application to the case of a series of legal principles and
guarantees that have led, definitely, to the impunity of behaviors that the court itself
describes in its conviction as materially criminal. The principle argument of the tribunal
is that such conducts do not constitute the crime of collaboration with armed bands, as
intended by the prosecutor, but rather the attempted escape of prisoners. The perpetrators
are consequently absolved of the first crime, but they cannot be sentenced for the second
for lack of indictment.
It is incomprehensible, however, that the tribunal waited for the sentencing to
present their criteria regarding the classification of the facts and did not warn the ministry
publically of its possible error in the oral hearing, when it was still possible to remedy it.
It is also incomprehensible that this same tribunal was able to keep for almost two years
in temporary detention those accused of a crime that was later considered unfounded.
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The justice is usually represented as a blindfolded woman. But that is not to say
that it must act blind in the process, in a bureaucratic manner. On the contrary, their
obligatory blindness to the outside world to the process is a condition for better
clairvoyance against what occurs in its interior. When this is not what happens situations
really Kafkaesque can occur, such as that in which collaborators of a terrorist
organization that seek the destruction of the rule of law unduly benefit from its
guarantees. Guarantees that, obviously, apply to all, including terrorists, but taking care
that its imprecise legal formation or the malpractice and the routine [manner of] its
application does not serve the purposes of those who do not believe in them and who
viciously fight the institutions that guarantee them.
It is true that the justice system has mechanisms to redress its own wrongdoings.
In the case that motivates this commentary, the Supreme Court, to which the prosecution
has appealed, can still prevent the law from being definitely circumvented. But it will be
difficult that, in that case, their decision has any other value than that strictly moral. It is
not probable that the justice [system will] get back in their hands those who achieved to
circumvent it, taking advantage of the methods in which, on occasion, are given.
Meanwhile it is not strange that the situation created garners indignation or
discouragement. It is worth specifying, however, that the State officials should not, in any
case, condition their acts on the success or failure of other officials. Discouragement,
which can be comprehensible in this case, cannot be a determinant factor for those who
have essential responsibilities in the rule of law.
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Fascism and Reason (Fascismo y razón) 24 March 1992
THOSE WHO CHOOSE democratic coexistence as the best known system of
political and social organization – that is, the immense majority of Spaniards – know that,
against the murder and extortion of the ETA Mafia, the most sensible thing is to trust in
the institutions of the rule of law: the justice and the police. In these days there have been
two consistent and commendable facts: the Supreme Court upheld the sentences of 108
years imprisonment for those who turn away from democratic legitimacy to combat
terrorism (the GAL case) and the Ministry of Interior scored a success by arresting in
Tarragona an alleged member of ETA, the discovery of two safe houses of the group and
a van. That is the right way for those of us who believe in democracy. The murder of a
young man of 26 years yesterday in Madrid is the way of those who only accept the
dialectic of guns: fascist totalitarianism.
Against those who choose death as a way of life, only constancy of political
reason and the legitimate defense mechanisms of the same are possible.

When the Medium is the Message (Cuando el medio es el mensaje) 3 December 1993
That Herri Batasuna and ETA are two bodies with the same head is not a
suspicion, but something so evident, at least, as that the Egin newspaper is the organ of
expression of those bodies and their corresponding soul. That, as a function of it, there is
someone who considers [it] convenient or even morally justified that said newspaper stop
publication does not make any lawful administrative measure aimed at closing it. But the
invocation of the freedom of expression also is not enough to make any act of that or any
other newspaper lawful. Between the arbitrariness of power and naked impunity there is a
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third possibility, the one appropriate with the rule of law: the judicial investigation of
facts from which evidence of criminal behavior can be derived. It is to say, the
application of the law. It is what Judge Bueren has done regarding the documentation
submitted by the French authorities and that was found in the possession of Carlos
Almorza, allegedly responsible for the ETA extortion network, detained in said country a
few months ago. That documentation reveals that reports about companies and
individuals that had been commissioned by Egin to a private company were in the hands
of the terrorists.
Given the long dedication of ETA to the task of extorting businessmen, it is not
unreasonable to assume that someone from Egin would have passed these reports to the
terrorists with the end to make it easier for them to obtain funds for these proceedings. In
any case, it was something that deserved to be investigated. The entrance of the
Ertzaintza, by court order, in the Egin newsrooms in Bilbao and Hernani to search for
any evidence that could confirm such evidence was, therefore, justified.
As the Basque Interior Minister, Juan Maria Atutxa, revealed yesterday regarding
the material seized in those newsrooms, it is already known that among the businessmen
that Egin sought information include, in addition to some from the Gohierri district that
were subjected to extortion, others related to the works of the Leizarán highway that were
once victims of ETA attacks. This extends the field of investigation: it should be
ascertained whether the information utilized by the terrorists to select their victims and to
prepare the attacks had its origin in the cited newspaper. The investigation should clarify
in that case which person or persons sent such reports to the terrorists. It is about, in any
case, the responsibility of individual persons.
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Linking this investigation with the "campaign of harassment", as the director of
Egin has done, is, therefore, misplaced. Different from the etarra world, in which the
rifle commands and in which the terrorists are attributed to the legislative power; judicial
and executive – in the double sense of the word – in a democratic society the judges are
independent of the other powers and apply preexisting norms and regulated proceedings.
The evidence obliges the judge to intervene.
The Penal Code does not provide for the possibility of closing a newspaper,
although it does [provide for] the seizure of the printing press, in certain cases related to
crimes of terrorism. In the analyzed case, such a possibility seems unrealistic, given that
the crimes under investigation have been committed, where applicable, by individuals
and not by the paper as such.
But beyond this particular case, and given that the issue has been raised, one
questions if whether the right to freedom of expression protected by the Constitution and
now invoked by Egin covers anything that appears on their pages. The answer is no.
Right from the start, the freedom of speech to criticize and that to incite murder are not
the same. It is one thing to express ideas, however abhorrent they could be for the
majority of the population, and another to utter credible threats.
When, after the arrest of ETA's network of extortionists dismantled by the
Ertzaintza at the beginning of 1992, a spokesman for Herri Batasuna accused the judge
that intervened in the case of "acting like a super cop‖, he warned that HB "took good
note of their actions‖ and he threatened him to ―act accordingly‖, he was doing
something that absolutely could be considered protected by the Constitution. If the
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transmission of such threats by the Egin newspaper constitutes a crime or not is
something that the judges will have to determine.

Reinsertion (Reinserción) 22 July 1994
IF THERE is a field in which all parties should avoid conflict it is that of the
counterterrorism fight. And if there has been in the democratic Spain a successful
operation in this field it has been precisely the collaboration – the solidarity – of the
parties in what became known as the Ajuria Enea table. The terrorists in our country are
increasingly less and less, increasingly isolated, and many of them, in prisons, are sorry
for having been, or at least determined not to return to be one. For that it would be an
unpardonable insanity if the Government and the opposition were to get involved now in
public disputes about the antiterrorism strategy. It would only benefit those who wish to
continue killing and those that applaud them. Terrorism has lost the battle in Euskadi and
in all of Spain, and what is now needed is for all of those who have been its activists or
supporters realize it. Conflicts between democrats in this terrain only grant balls of
oxygen to those who deny this reality.
The Popular Party has every right to criticize when it wishes specific aspects of
the Government‘s counterterrorism policy. That from within it there is a strong resistance
to the reinsertion policy is logical. It is also there in other [political] parties. The sense of
justice that all citizens rebel to some degree before what is undoubtedly a State pardon
toward a delinquent responsible for heinous crimes in some cases. But political wisdom
sometimes requires generosity, not so much for the good of the jailed delinquent, but for
that of society and all of the potential victims of terrorism. To close the pathways of
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incorporation into society of these former terrorists who have abdicated violence would
not only promote the collective irrationality of prisoners still committed to the crime. It
would also feed the numantinismo of terrorists still in freedom and of their political
environment.
The policy of reinsertion has been a success. Criticizing it can be popular. Even
electorally profitable for those who are seen already, again or continuously, immersed in
campaigning. Political profits [are] also accrued by promoting instincts of revenge. But
the State policy in the fight against the scourge of terrorism should define clear ideas and
cool heads. Emotions generate emotions, and precisely from these [emotions] terrorists
are nurtured for their work to recruit new members.
That the accelerated reinsertion of the last few months coincides with a process
whose end is the granting of the penitentiary third degree to the police officers Amedo
and Domínguez, convicted for belonging to the GAL, cannot be a coincidence. But, in
any case, it would be absurd to say that it is motivated by it. The policy of reinsertion and
the general lines of penitentiary treatment for terrorist prisoners are, [along] with the
police action, the cornerstone of the democratic State's fight against terrorism and [they]
were designed long before the two police officers were convicted.
If something has changed it is because the current Minister of Justice and the
Interior has the political will to carry them out without consequence and does not hide it.
As in the reinsertion cases of etarras, the sense of justice also rebels against Amedo and
Domínguez obtaining more or less limited freedom.
Moreover there exists the perception in much of society that this favor is granted
by the Government under pressure from some prisoners that without a doubt have
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information about the plot of the GAL and any implications that the State does not want
to come to light. But if gradual reintegration of Amedo and Domínguez serves to make
the enemies of this policy toward etarras understand that it is the best way to end nearly
three decades of deaths and pain caused by terrorism, it is worth it to support this malaise
that causes many Spaniards [to be] certain that they will not complete the sentence they
deserved.

The Government Cannot Keep Quiet (El Gobierno no puede seguir callado) 21
December 1994
A day and a half after a judge ordered the arrest of the former Director General of
State Security Julian Sancristóbal, accused of crimes that refer to an alleged plot of State
terrorism, the Government has not said a single word to dispel the concern and
discouragement that have taken hold of many citizens. It is true that, starting with
unemployment and job insecurity, the people's concerns are not reduced to what is
happening these days in the Audencia Nacional. Also, it is that the charges for which
Sancristóbal has been arrested refer to events that occurred more than a decade ago. But,
in an already very tense environment, it will be difficult to address those problems that
concern the citizens while the suspect of serious events continues depending on active
political leaders. It is alleged that someone could have had a personal or political interest
in reactivating the GAL issue now. It is possible that this is how it could have been, and
citizens should know, but that does not change things: the GAL issue has not been dug up
because it was never buried. And it was not because nobody in power, ever
acknowledged that the GAL was a tremendous political mistake and a criminally botched
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job. There were not even publicly known terminations or resignations that could have
been interpreted by the public as an implicit admission of guilt and commitment to nonrecurrence. The reverse: still yesterday, the former minister Barrionuevo claimed the
solidarity of "friends and supporters". Supporters of what or of whom? Perhaps of the
efficacy of the GAL to clean the border from terrorists, according to a police union
[official] affirmed yesterday?
It is true that the attitude of the French authorities changed after the attacks
claimed by the GAL. But that change would have occurred anyway, because belligerence
against terrorist groups ambushed in their territory formed an essential part of the
program of the center-right coalition that won the 1986 elections, and that later the other
parties assumed. But, in return, the existence of the GAL provided ETA the flag they
were looking for to prove their theory of two symmetrical violences, speech in which,
they have founded the continuation of the armed struggle by a new generation of activists
with their corresponding civilian supporters. ETA was never so close to success as in the
years of the GAL. The de-legitimization of the democratic State they were looking for by
provoking military [personnel] – in the hope of producing a regressive blow – they
almost got it in those months and years in which the GAL and ETA competed in the same
field. Including that of the so-called "mistakes". Up to nine French citizens outside the
terrorist organization figure among the victims of the gunmen in the GAL.
At the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties there were many
politicians of all ideologies – including the Basque nationalism and what was later called
the Popular Party – which insinuated, when they did not proclaim, openly, that the only
way to end ETA was "to do what De Gaulle did with those of the OAS". But the only
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[thing] that can be claimed from the Government is precisely that the GAL disappeared,
while ETA has continued killing. Exactly, 214 people since the beginning of 1987, the
year in which the last attack attributed to the GAL was committed. That is the only selfcriticism of which one has on record by the Government of Felipe Gonzalez in relation to
this matter.

‗Dirty‘ Histories (Historias ‘sucias’) 25 February 1995
THE STATEMENTS of Lieutenant-General Sáenz de Santa María regarding the
antiterrorism fight are of unquestionable informative interest. Not in vain was he an
essential piece in this difficult fight during the first 10 years of democracy, as, delegate of
the Government in the Basque Country and commander-in-chief of the National Police
and Civil Guard, where he relieved Luis Roldán. Some of his statements are truly
disturbing and, of course, objectionable. Above all, the thinly veiled recognition of the
need to utilize dirty war methods, even of murder if there is no other alternative, and the
general hypothesis that the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism demands on
occasion going beyond the edge of legality.
The greatest triumph of terrorism over the rule of law is that it arrives to copy
their methods of terror. With this not only are their institutions degraded. It is also a form,
if effective, to extend the life of terrorism, including if the historical or ideological alibis
that gave it [its] origin have disappeared. This is, perhaps, what has happened in Spain
with the GAL and with some of the stories that now Lieutenant-General Sáenz de Santa
María tells us.
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He has said that, at times, in the fight against terrorism there are things that should
not be done; that if they are done, they should not be talked about, and if they are said,
they should be denied. Although the harsh reality is like this sometimes, it does not
negate in any way the obligation of the rule of law to investigate such facts and punish
those who could have committed crimes. This is exactly what the legal proceedings
underway regarding the GAL is about. That unlawful procedures were employed in the
early years of democracy does not absolve from blame those who have done it during the
socialist phase. It is more: the responsibility of those is greater, because the democratic
system was more settled and had sufficient strength to purge the most antidemocratic
elements from its police.

Secret and Antiterrorism (Secreto y antiterrorismo) 23 March 1996
The Public Defender, Fernando Álvarez de Miranda, has asked the Government
for information about their confusing and controversial accord that permits it to declare
police and the Civil Guard proceedings on terrorism secret. The Director of the Data
Protection Agency (DPA), the official body that makes sure, among other things, that
certain information from police files is not kept prohibited from public knowledge had
previously done the same thing. This Government accord has all the traces of influencing
sensitive issues of the fundamental rights of the person whose defense has been assigned
both to the institution of the Ombudsman and the Data Protection Agency. Therefore, it is
essential that the Government explain its nature and scope. For now, the only public
explanation has been given by the Secretary of the Interior, Margarita Robles. But it does
not clear the unknown principals. Margarita Robles has been limited to ensuring that the
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declaration of reserved matters does not affect [neither] operations nor police actions
against terrorism, but only the information relating to them. That would ensure that
possible criminal acts or excesses that hurt people would not go unpunished or fall
outside the judges‘ actions. She has also said that the agreement is not retroactive and,
therefore, does not affect the dirty war actions against ETA, such as the GAL and others,
currently under judicial investigation. It may well be so, but that explanation does not
reassure everything about the potential impacts that a simple agreement could have on
rights guaranteed by the Constitution or by organic laws. In any case, the Government
should give this guarantee formally and in writing. A mere newspaper statement is not
sufficient to clarify this important issue. It is what the Ombudsman and the Director of
the Data Protection Agency ask.

Fear is the Message (El miedo es el mensaje) 9 February 1997
On 10 December 1995, ETA assassinated in Madrid six workers who were
traveling in a Navy van. A few hours earlier, 500 people had demonstrated in Ordizia,
Guipúzcoa, in solidarity with a young man of 23 years arrested after murdering two
ertzainas. This young man, a "prominent member of the nationalist left" as defined by
the Minister Atutxa, will be tried by jury soon for two alleged crimes of murder.
However, more than half of the 36 people – including members and alternates –
appointed by lottery to form part of that jury have tried, under various pretexts, to be
exempt from that role. None of them claimed to be afraid. In the Basque Country there is
so much fear that even to recognize that one has it takes courage. The production of fear
has turned out to be the principal activity of this so-called left-wing nationalism; it is to
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say, the political front: those who offer press conferences and threaten, sector by sector,
professors, journalists, judges, politicians. The youth mobs harass those threatened;
[putting] graffiti in fronts of their homes or in their classrooms. And every once in a
while ETA kills someone – a seller of bicycles that crossed the path of a terrorist, a
professor, a non-nationalist politician, a nationalist ertzaina – to make it clear that the
threat can be met. Fear has, therefore, objective reasons: there are motives to take their
threats seriously. But fear disturbs the trial; when someone is not able to overcome it, it is
probable that one ends up joining those who threaten them. For that there were enough
people willing to mobilize in solidarity with the murderer of the two ertzainas; for that
there is no shortage of feverish protesters that convert into murder the apparent suicide of
José María Aranzamendi in the Alcalá Meco prison – without any evidence and before
the judge concludes their inquiries – and for that there are not enough citizens willing to
form part of the jury that will judge Ordizia‘s alleged killer. This evidence justifies the
existence of the Audiencia Nacional, born precisely to reduce the effects of the social
climate of intimidation of judges in charge of judging crimes of terrorism. But it also
questions the drastic distinction between terrorist murder and common homicide in
certain cases. The murderer had a history as an active participant in street riots and other
violent acts in demonstrations promoted by ETA satellite organizations. Although he is
not a member of ETA, it is ETA that those who try to wriggle out are afraid of: fear will
be free, as they say, but it enslaves people.
On Friday, a San Sebastian newspaper published a letter from a neighbor in
Ordizia – precisely – in which the "hoax" that the husband of their daughter was an
ertzaina was rejected. Someone had spread it, and soon threats appeared painted on their
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house, for which the family talked with ―someone we considered appropriate‖. Despite
this, this past 1st, at dawn, they planted a bomb. The woman ends her letter by asking:
"To whom do I have to go for this to end? These kids have some responsible [for them],
right?". They do, but there are doubts about the opportunity to apply the law to them as
any other citizen.
Authoritative, sound, equidistant voices deduce from the invocation by the violent
[persons] political reasons or pretexts that it is an error to think that you have to apply
police or judicial solutions, that only serve to "give them publicity"; however, to not offer
an alternative other than that to become distracted, that the authorities do as if they do not
find out that HB broadcasts a terrorist propaganda video, specifically a video which
offers the message that ETA made public in April 1995 with the motive of the attempted
assassination of Aznar. It is possible that those of HB are thrilled at the prospect of
appearing on the news for 20 days when they are arrested, but they would be even more
so if justice were not done: they would give on conquered ground the dissemination of
such messages, and the next time would increase the dose. And the fear would continue
to be the gasoline that fuels the motor of our defeat.

Truce and Opinion (Tregua y opinión) 20 September 1998
It is not surprising that the ETA truce is viewed with more hope in Euskadi than
in the rest of Spain. The emergency survey published yesterday by this newspaper has
come to ratify this perception differently than a fact that has had an enormous impact in
all of the country. Given that the Basques have a more immediate threat of terrorism, it is
natural that above all other considerations they value whatever initiative that would
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alleviate this tension. An ETA truce is viewed well by those who have nothing to fear –
because they have adapted more or less – but above all for those who resisted violent
imposition and do not cover. The sum of both groups totals 73% of hopeful Basques. The
rest of the territory dominates in skepticism and not without good reason. The survey also
includes some more surprising reactions. For example, that the citizens who consider the
Statute of Guernica to be a still useful instrument, and not expired, are more numerous in
the Basque Country (51%) than in the rest of Spain (34%). This surely means that this
negative exterior perception is conditioned on the detachment shown by nationalist
politicians in their statements; but Basques themselves do not see it this way. One of the
debates that raises with this new situation is if in the political framework that the
nationalist parties advocate for with diverse intensity corresponds to a real demand in
Basque society or to the fact that ETA makes it depend on the definite abandonment of
violence.
The survey offers some indication. For example, there is a difference of 20 points
between those who consider self-determination as ―a priority issue‖ (39%) and those who
are willing to accept ―a change to the Spanish Constitution that recognizes the right of
self-determination‖ (59%) in exchange for ETA to permanently abandon weapons.
The responses taken as a whole show that what the politicians busy themselves
with does not necessarily coincide with what the citizens are concerned about and they
often invoke in vain the alleged public will to implement decisions that only they are
interested in. The newspaper survey that the Vitoria Government did a few years ago
regarding the priority concerns of Basques systematically indicate[d] that terrorism [was],
along with unemployment, one of the two essential concerns; while the ―development of
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the Statute [of Guernica]‖ and ―the achievement of self-governance aspirations‖ always
figure in the three less pressing problems in a list of 16 issues.
It is surprising – although the data had already been revealed by other, previous
studies – that there are more Basques ready to accept a change to the Constitution and the
Statute [of Guernica] than to grant amnesty to ETA prisoners. Surpising, because without
a doubt it would be more feasible to release the prisoners than to undertake legal reforms
that are of doubtful democratic legitimacy – to the extent that a minority imposes its
points of view to the majority – and that would require a difficultly achievable consensus.
But beyond the findings that this emergency survey gives, we are in a situation in
which the politicians, in first place the Government, cannot simply wait for developments
or jump the gun when there are no firm indications that an indefinite truce could become
definite. The Government has consistent indicators that there is a real chance that it will
be like this. And ti should go to any depths to achieve it. Aznar‘s statement from Lima
points in the right path, that is none other than concerted action of all the democratic
parties to explore the paths that would contribute to a lasting peace. The fact itself that
President Aznar yesterday went directly from the airport to the Zarzuela, to interview
with the King, transmits to the citizens without further explanation the message that we
find ourselves before an exceptional situation.
The absence of attacks should permit all of the parties to open a profound debate
and to not shy away from any issue. As the lehendakari Ardanza has recalled, we could
have arrived to the moment of opening the process of dialogue contemplated in Article 10
of the Pact of Ajuria Enea for at the moment there exists an ―unequivocal will‖ from
ETA to renounce violence. But this same text establishes the rule of democratic majority
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for any accord of political nature. It would be an unacceptable precedence to those who
carry more than 800 deaths on their backs.

Terror and Error (Terror y error) 25 September 1998
The global fight against terrorism, or better said the terrorisms, is up to everyone,
as Clinton claimed from the platform of the United Nations. But the President‘s claim
lost legitimacy after it came to light that the North American attack against a factory in
Sudan, this past 20 August, was based in false or improbable information. Could a forger
really have deceived the super power‘s Administration, as the North American press has
highlighted, in information that has been denied in an unconvincing way by the White
House? In Al Shifa, it seems, they were not manufacturing chemical weapons, but rather
pharmaceutical and agricultural products. The error, if it is actually an equivocation, is
serious. The Government of the United States, as former President Carter has asked,
should publically ask the Sudan for an apology and compensate the victims. Clinton,
internally weakened by the Lewinsky case, reacted too quickly to the terrible attacks
against the embassies of his country in Kenya and Tanzania, that caused 258 deaths, 12
of them North Americans. He looked for two objectives in order to bomb: the
manufacturing plant in the Sudan and a base in Afghanistan, where he did not reach the
millionaire Osama Bin Laden, who the United States puts behind these attacks. Haste is
not good advice in the fight against terrorism. Unilateral actions, ignoring international
rules, also are not the way.
The fight against terrorism has converted into the star issue in the General
Assembly of the United Nations. If the Spanish Minister Abel Matutes has asked for
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―collective instruments‖ to fight this scourge, it was France that was the most precise to
propose a ―universal convention against the financing of terrorism‖ that would allow
lifting banking secrecy in all countries in case of a judicial investigation into terrorist
crimes which would include freezing the accounts of those suspected of financing such
activities, thereby attacking its channels of support. International cooperation, and not
only advocating from the Western countries, will work when there are not geographic or
fiscal sanctuaries for those who use this type of violence. And if errors are not committed
like those of Clinton in the Sudan, that undermine the moral base of the fight against
terrorism.

Basque Plurality (La pluralidad vasca) 7 July 1999
The accession of a socialist to the presidency of the General Assembly of Álava
(the provincial parliament) is the anticipated confirmation that it will be the Popular Party
candidate – the most vote formation in the province – who leads the Provincial Council
(the Executive). Another member of the Popular Party, Alfonso Alonso, is the mayor of
Vitoria since Saturday, where Aznar's party won more comfortably. The institutional map
of the Basque Country after the agreements exactly reflects the picture that came out of
the ballot boxes on 13 June. The intense polarization lived the last year between
nationalists and non-nationalists has failed to override the substantial differences between
the PP and the PSE, on the one hand, and between the PNV and EH, on the other. Hence,
in the municipalities and counties of Euskadi, institutions closer to citizens and to actual
politics, it is much more difficult to reach general agreements such as that signed by all
the nationalist forces in the Basque Parliament. In many cases, the electoral verdict does
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not even allow it. Therefore, the principle that municipal and provincial institutions are
governed by the candidate of the list most voted has been generally imposed. In some
cases, unstable governments are anticipated, given that no party won an absolute majority
in the three Basque capitals or in the General Assembly of Álava, Guipúzcoa and
Vizcaya, and the only majority agreement applicable to the six institutions – the old
tripartite of the two moderate nationalist parties and the PSE – was ruined by the
sovereign winds driven by Lizarra accord.
Contemplating the the post-electoral Basque scenario – the three Basque capitals,
governed by a different party: the PNV, in Bilbao; the PP, in Vitoria; and the PSE in San
Sebastian, and broken in Álava the traditional flake of PNV in the councils – one
discovers until what point the bet Arzalluz‘s [political] party was wrong. And not for
trying to attract Herri Batasuna to institutional terrain, but for doing so by embracing the
political script of Arnaldo Otegi. Álava involves the most visible and felt failure from the
scene of nationalist hegemony in which the PNV embarked with the argument of
consolidating the ETA truce. By rewarding the PP, it does not seem that the Alavese
repudiate the PNV administration in institutions, but rather the intentions that they sensed
in the messages of the nationalist leaders. Far from expanding their electoral base, the
discourses of the ―new majority‖ and of the ―Basque ambit of decision‖ have made
nationalism lose one of the three territories which it has ruled for two decades.
The Alavese exception recalls that identity, ideological, cultural and territorial plurality is
a constituent note of Basque society, not a hassle from which one can free their self in the
next electoral convocation. But it also has its consequences in terms of power. For the
first time in 20 years, the PNV is going to be out of a Provincial Council, an organism of
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great importance in the Basque Country for the confederal character of its institutions.
Among their responsibilities, the Basque councils have one essential [responsibility]: to
raise, under the Economic Agreement, all taxes from their territory, that they make every
year one part to the Basque Government and the other (the quota) to the State. Unlike
other communities, there are many things in Euskadi that cannot be made against the
criterion of a council. For example, to address the merger of Basque savings banks, taht
now will have to forcibly consider a restructuring of power, above all in the case of the
Alavese Caja Vital Alava, or create the Basque Public Bank envisioned in the program of
the Basque Government (PNV-EA).
The complex is more difficult to manage than the simple, but that is the plural
reality of Euskadi, and that key is expressed, consult after consul, [by] their citizens.
They did it when ETA violence and intimidation was at its height, and they do it now that
there is reasonable hope that the cessation of terrorism is definitive. Therein lies the
challenge of politicians: to take plurality as a virtue and oblige oneself to seek agreements
and common areas; the opposite of exclusionary discourses and radical attitudes that
proliferate in Basque politics.

Against ETA (Frente a ETA) 17 September 2000
Police and judicial action is essential to counter ETA terrorism. From there the
latest arrests and judicial proceedings are encouraging. But the political problems in the
Basque Country, perfectly separable from totalitarian murder, require the capacity for
dialogue. The Basque citizens know this well, incapable of exercising their democratic
rights, they are reacting civically and peacefully to the unbearable harassment from
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violent persons. The arrest of 18 Ekin leaders, politically considered responsible for ETA,
and one of the most bloodthirsty etarra bosses, Iñaki de Rentería, in the south of France,
mark a turning point in the counterterrorism fight, which returns to recuperate the
initiative after months of uncertainty. The satisfaction with these police achievements
should not, however, convert into euphoria, in a moment of increasing tension in the
streets of the Basque Country. Full precaution is little against the reactions of the etarras,
like that which almost cost José Ramón Recalde his life. Yesterday, the Basque police
found a launcher with eight armed timed grenades near the Chillida Museum in Hernani,
shortly before the King and Queen of Spain were to inaugurate it. And not far away,
violent youth attacked José Ramón Chica, one of the two Socialist Councilors in the
Town Hall, in the name of EH.
There is no room for euphoria, above all because on Friday the responsible for the
Interior of the Basque Government provided authentic samples that the rule of law and
the civil liberties of citizens are in question in the territory under the responsibility of the
lehendakari Ibarretxe. The autonomous Basque police, following very clear political
orders, used force to dissolve peaceful demonstrations that marched through the streets of
San Sebastian in protest of the attack against Recalde. Guided by an intolerable and
hypocritical principle of equidistance, they were limited to avoiding contact between the
peaceful demonstration and the group of pro-etarras that chanted the slogans ―ETA, kill
them‖ and ―More ETA military‖. Going with the form of the law – the violent [persons]
had demonstration permits – they did not repress an illegal act of apologizing for
terrorism and of intimidating the peaceful citizens and they dissolved, in exchange, the
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tranquil protest of those who demanded the full exercise of the system of freedoms in the
Basque Country.
The Prime Minister reasonably asks for ―tenacity‖ and ―perseverance‖ in the
counterterrorism fight and encourages social mobilization against the abuses. But this
also requires the forces of public order to defend civil liberties, and obliges them to push
for political dialogue to build bridges in a society on the border of the abyss, which from
within aggravates social division.

Blow to Our Civilization (Golpe a nuestra civilización) 12 September 2001
The world finds itself in suspense after a series of terrorist attacks [reached] the
heart of the greatest power of the world: its financial center in New York (represented by
the symbolic Twin Towers) and the core of its military command (the Pentagon). It is
impossible at this time to count the number of victims, likely to be hundreds, if not
thousands, or who is behind this unprecedented offensive that reveals a limitless audacity
and fanaticism. It is the largest attack ever experienced by the United States on their own
territory, but above all, it is an integral aggression against its political system, against
democracy, and the free market. In short, against all of us who share the same democratic
principles that were so hard-won in our country.
After the chill that has shaken the world, and also fear, why not say it, it is time to
make an appeal for calm and trust in the capacity of the first international power and of
the allied defense system to cope with this indiscriminate assault. We should also be
prepared for a severe response. Spain is one of the United States‘ allies in the Atlantic
system of defense [NATO] and should act as such.
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The terrorist attack, make no mistake, it is at the essence of our political
civilization, and, regardless if its perpetrators are identified, it demonstrates the terrible
contaminating effect of conflicts as fierce as those of the Near East.
What has happened in the United States could repeat itself in Europe, given that
the emulation factor of terrorism, as recent history has demonstrated, is large in a media
[dominated] world. Test of this is that some European governments immediately formed
their crisis cabinets. The Spanish Prime Minister, José María Aznar, announced his
immediate return from his trip to Estonia, as did almost all of the European leaders who
were outside of their coordination centers. Vladimir Putin quickly offered his solidarity to
the United States, a reflection that highlights that, fortunately, the Cold War is a thing of
the past.
Hurrying to identify the perpetrators is bad advice, and moreover could generate
greater injustices. They cannot pay for the sins. Although it will be difficult, political
leaders have to avoid hysteria between themselves. Bush and his administration should
pursue those responsible, as the President has promised to do, but not fall to the
temptation of launching counter-offensives if it is not known for certain from whom or
where the attack came from.
The series of coordinated attacks requires a high level of organization,
cooperation, and finance. The chain of attacks, which started with the hijacking of four
airplanes, two of which would be flown by some kamikazes into the Twin Towers of New
York, draws a terrorist capacity unknown until now and a determination that connects
with the most extreme fanaticism. Many eyes, and the U.S. Government‘s suspicions,
have gone immediate toward some violent fundamentalist group, and in particular toward
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those that are promoted by the Saudi millionaire Osama Bin Laden, who sought refuge in
Afghanistan of the Taliban – a regime that yesterday condemned the attack – and who
three weeks ago forewarned of an ―unprecedented‖ attack against the United States.
Although many leaders of movements or Muslim States quickly condemned the
attacks, it does not stop being significant the climate in which yesterday many saw the
attacks in diverse Islamic populations, understanding that it meant a humiliation of the
United States. The television images of numerous Palestinian children dancing in
Jerusalem were sufficiently representative of this type of revenge of the suffering that
they have endured many times through Western silence. The Arab-Israeli conflict has a
global contaminating effect, which should have been tackled long ago. Arafat was quick
to distance himself from the attacks and express his condolences to the U.S.. Ariel Sharon
should learn the lessons from what has happened, and move toward détente.
Global Projection
At this point, no hypothesis regarding who is responsible for the attacks can be
ruled out. The Oklahoma massacre was an act of a fanatic American. Even if the attack
came from the Islamic world, it should not be demonized as a whole for a violent act of a
few. It is necessary to banish the idea that we are before a brutal test of the clash of
civilizations that Huntington predicted, when the American society, despite all its
problems, is especially plural and multicultural. To remove this temptation is part of the
complexity of an advanced and plural society, a characteristic with which we need not
only to live, but one from which we draw strength.
Terrorist acts such as those yesterday – that manifest in massive attacks like those
that cost dozens of lives in 1998 in the United States‘ embassies of Tanzania and Kenya –
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seek global public projection. The experts of violence of ideological intention have
warned for years about the new forms of terrorism that appeared at the end of the last
millennium. On the one hand, the appearance of religiously motivated terrorism capable
of removing any moral restraint to the use of violence; on the other, the combination
between the vulnerability of our intercommunicative societies and the relatively easy
access to means of massive destruction. The indications are that both factors were able to
cross to cause yesterday‘s catastrophe.
Bush‘s reaction and that of his Administration has been quick, cold, and effective.
When in doubt, U.S. airspace was closed, all federal buildings were evacuated and their
activities were suspended. Public life in the United States was in fact suspended
throughout a good part of the territory. But what could be, in theory, be a relatively small
group of terrorists, has generated a sensation of lack of control, powerlessness, and
vulnerability in the country with the most power in the world, and that until now has felt
practically invulnerable in its territory. The increased complexity of societies, such as the
American, makes them more vulnerable. The attack is a human tragedy; and it will also
generate a self-esteem crisis in the U.S.. Bush will have to demonstrate leadership
capacity so that the American society recovers confidence in itself.
The manner in which the attacks were produced highlights how absurd and
useless Bush‘s bet for an antimissile shield against possible aggressions from alleged
thug States is. A tremendous failure of the U.S. intelligence services, who expected a
terrorist attack against one of its embassies, but not an attack in their own territory, has
been revealed, a type of postmodern Pearl Harbor that has come to its own Pentagon,
incredibly poorly protected. And to fight against this type of terrorism, to avoid the
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recurrence of acts like those of yesterday, that represent a new type of war although it is
not between States, international cooperation will be most efficient. This indiscriminant
terrorism, fruit of the most evident fanaticism, is the new central threat that democracies
should deal with, with methods true to their values. The tragedy has been enormous, but
it would have been greater if the terrorists would have had nuclear weapons. Good
intelligence, based in indispensible international cooperation, is worth much more than a
lot of nuclear shields.
It is also the first act of hyperterrorism of the global information era. From the
first minutes, we were all watching the crisis live. But the globalized terrorists also count
on this. After the initial bafflement, the sensation of panic spread to the economic and
financial markets. In an incomprehensible manner, quotes were not suspended, while
Wall Street was, although its managers insisted that they resume their activities as soon
as possible. The price of petroleum shot up, to a point disastrous for the global economy.
The citizens of New York, Washington, and generally in all of the United States,
have lived and continue living in distressing times. The act of hyperterrorism has reached
us all. The smoke that Manhattan was immersed in yesterday makes recently born
citizens cry. The feeling is that this act marked the beginning of a 21st century plagued
with serious uncertainties.

Signs of Death (Señales de muerte) 4 December 2002
Yesterday, ETA again gave signs of life, that is to say of death, this time in
Santander. There were no victims because this time the advanced warning – given to a
newspaper that has to alert the Ertzaintza so that they tell the National Police – gave a
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range of 20 minutes to evacuate the parking lot where the device exploded. The method
of the car bombing is blind by definition, with or without advanced warning, and
sometimes it causes victims, as in the Hipercor in Santa Pola, and other times it does not.
But the objective is met in both cases: make it clear that ETA has not gone away, that
they can kill again.
The message has special meaning this time. It has been three months since the
beginning of the process of criminalizing Batasuna and the preventative suspension of its
activities, and the outrageous reaction from this movement‘s social base that predicted
those who would be opposed to both things has not taken place. The arrests of activists
has continued, in Spain and in France; the process for the judicial criminalization of
Batasuna is in progress and Judge Garzón has continued revealing the plot forged around
ETA. Yesterday, the National Court upheld the prosecution of 32 members of Ekin, the
agency coordinating the plot with double militancy, which makes fools of those described
as "waiters" in the first steps of the judge in that direction.
All of that has not provoked protests similar to those that were common. Street
violence has been reduced, and the social eco of the rudeness of the leaders of Batasuna
(now with great aim the so-called Sozialista Abertzaleak, SA: The same acronym as the
Assault Section of the Nazi party) is very relative. It is not that ETA has disappeared,
because so far this year it has placed thirteen car bombs and many people are still
threatened. The change consists in the affirmation of the rule of law, to end by two
parallel tracks with the impunity of those who have one foot inside and one outside the
law, is proving [to be] the most effective firewall of the generational reproduction of
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violence. It provides many young people [with] the alibi to disengage from the inertia of
low intensity terrorism
That is happening, and that is why ETA wanted to send the most indiscriminate
message possible by placing a car bomb in a parking lot.

Sleeper Cell (Célula durmiente) 25 January 2003
Yesterday‘s arrest, in various Catalan localities, of 16 people, the majority of
Algerian nationality, suspected of belonging to the terrorist network Al Qaeda that is
directed by Osama Bin Laden, reinforces the hypothesis of the important role that Islamic
terrorism has awarded Spain as a backup zone and as an installation of sleeper cells,
awaiting the order to act. With yesterday‘s arrests the total number of persons imprisoned
in Spain for their alleged link to Al Qaeda increased to 40 since the terrorist attacks of 11
September. The Prime Minister, then, is right to point out that the threat of Islamic
terrorism is not a fantasy. The facts point out that it is very well present in Spain, and that
only extreme vigilance, that which permitted the police operation yesterday, can avert
this threat and prevent it from converting into a real threat.
Aznar has assessed the operation as ―the disarticulation‖ of an important terrorist
network linked to Bin Laden, that ―was preparing for the commission of attacks with
explosives and chemical material‖. And although we will have to wait for the results of
the judicial investigation, the material intervened by the police – portable transmission
equipment, computers, explosives and chemical materials to make them – and the
connections of some of those detained with terrorist cells established in the United
Kingdom and France speak to the danger posed by the dismantled group. It has been
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these connections, especially those maintained with alleged terrorists recently detained in
the United Kingdom and in France, which led those countries‘ police [forces] to alert the
Spanish police to the existence of the dismantled network. Which demonstrates once
more, as if it were necessary, the importance of collaboration or even joint police work
between countries that face a terrorist threat that does not have borders and that can make
itself be felt anywhere. Needless to say yesterday‘s arrests cannot assume at all the
criminalization of the Maghreb immigrants that live and work in Cataluña.

Lawless Limbo (Limbo sin ley) 13 March 2003
Fourteen months after moving them from Afghanistan to the base at Guantanamo
Bay, in Cuba, the United States continues to keep some 650 prisoners in conditions of
inhumane isolation, among them one prisoner of Spanish nationality, for whom the
Government has not been able to get even the minimum judicial guarantees. A federal
tribunal in Washington has denied these prisoners the right to a trial in the United States,
considering that it is about foreigners on territory that does not fall under the jurisdiction
of its Constitution. The Minister of Justice has described the situation as ―an important
victory in the war against terrorism‖. Quite the opposite. The blind fight against terrorist
is blowing away civil liberties and the credibility of the United States with respect to
human rights.
Formally considered ―illegal combatants‖ so that the Geneva Convention of 1929
does not apply to them, the United States maintains these prisoners without the right to
family visitation or to legal assistance, in a base that constitutes a lawless limbo, an
anachronism in sovereign Cuban territory. Legal arguments aside, we are seeing an
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immoral act by a super power that extents the extraterritoriality of its laws in a near
universal form to protect its own citizens and soldiers.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will rectify this, since the Bush Administration,
judging by Ashcroft‘s assessment, will not. Just as it has not tackled the debate about
whether it is possible to torture prisoners to obtain information about the terrorist
networks they belong to. There is absolutely no control over what the CIA and other
agencies outside of the United States do when it comes to trying to extract information
from prisoners such as Bin Laden‘s lieutenant, detained in Pakistan. Acting this way
takes away all credibility for the alleged policy of promoting democracy and human
rights throughout the globe.

Political Priorities (Prioridades políticas) 23 April 2004
References to a new terrorist threat on one hand, and constitutional reforms on the
other, were the center of discussion between the King and the President of the Courts,
Manual Marín, in the opening session of the VIII Legislature. The Prime Minister also
referred to the constitutional reform when Francisco Rubio Llorente took the position of
President of the Council of Europe.
The response to Islamic terrorism is the immediate priority in the beginning of
this legislature. The efficiency demonstrated by the police in the identification and arrest
of the perpetrators of the 11-M massacre has been unanimously recognized. But the
investigation itself has revealed grave failures in its prevention: essential evidence was
underestimated; the role that Al Qaeda assigned to Spanish territory in its strategy was
assessed incorrectly, although 66 of its members had been arrested since 11-S [9/11]; few
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police officers were dedicated to the task of getting information about this terrorism;
there were coordination failures, etcetera.
The new director of the National Intelligence Center, Alberto Saiz, who came to
the position without previous experience, will have as his first mission to verify where
the failures were produced and how to find ways to deal with them. The ongoing
investigation in the United States about similar errors in relation to 11-S [9/11] is an
example that the Spanish Parliament cannot ignore. In any case, it will be essential that
the measures that the Government adopts have full parliamentary support.
The Constitutional reforms (and of some of the statutes of autonomy) will
certainly mark the political calendar of the next four years. They should be addressed,
said the King, ―with the same spirit of consensus‖ as that with which they were drafted.
Something that is not easy, because it is evident, as the Speaker of the House recalled,
that there exist very different visions and interests regarding these reforms. For them to
prosper, an accord between the two big parties, that represents 80% of the voters, is
needed. But who drives the reform, the PSOE, needs the support of the nationalist allies
to complete a majority, and their proposals do not necessarily coincide. All of this could
lead to a paralysis or, on the contrary, to the dynamization of political life. Because, as
Marín also recalled, the harmonization of different ideas and interests is the same as
uppercase Politics. A legislature is opening in which political talent will become a
necessity again.
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To Channel Without Trivializing (Canalizar sin banalizar) 11 May 2004
Although for distinct reasons, PP and PSOE are to channel toward a monitoring
commission for the Antiterrorism Pact, which will meet tomorrow, some of the
controversies that they keep facing. Rajoy demanded the meeting via a letter to Zapatero
so that the Minister could rectify his opinion that before 11-M there had been "political
insight". For its part, the Government committed itself to convene to discuss measures
that would improve antiterrorism efficacy.
Since there is such a framework, it seems logical to try to take advantage of it to
eliminate misunderstandings, since there have been some, before they become a pretext
for an antiterrorism policy of division and confrontation. To avoid it was one of the
objectives of the pact, and it could be considered applicable to any [form of] terrorism.
However, it would be little realistic to pretend to go further and convert the accord into a
framework for eventual shared initiatives against Islamic terrorism. The pact, its concrete
content, only makes sense against ETA. It is a public commitment that no change in
majority will modify the criterion of not negotiating political concessions with terrorists;
precisely because the expectation of achieving this has been the principle incentive of
ETA's continuation. For that it was a pact between the only parties with realistic
possibilities of governing, although other forces could join.
The accord develops this principle in relation to matters such as the Pact of
Lizarra, the Statute of Guernica, the penitentiary policy, eventual legislative reforms,
etcetera. It is to say, always in reference to the specific problems posed by ETA
terrorism. It would be artificial to try to apply those principles to Al Qaeda, which does
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not propose to change the Spanish Constitution to include self-determination, or deal with
legal organization, nor pretends to negotiate anything with the Government.
The meeting tomorrow should serve to clear up misunderstandings, to reaffirm the
compromise to take the topic of terrorism out of partisan confrontation, and perhaps both
parties will exchange ideas about how to tackle this new challenge; but it would trivialize
the pact to pretend that, given that it is called antiterrorist, that it serves as a guide to deal
with any terrorism: all are condemnable, regardless of the pretext that they claim, but that
does not mean, as Aznar seemed to believe, that all are equal or should be combated with
the same measures.

Defensive Measures (Medidas defensivas) 26 May 2004
The Minister of the Interior, José Antonio Alonso, has presented some of the
measures destined to combat Islamic terrorism that the Government is going to put into
action. It is a priority of the new Executive, per the compromise reiterated by Zapatero.
But it is also a task that presents great difficulties; due to the extreme fanaticism of this
type of terrorists, immune to almost any moral inhibition regarding the effects of their
actions, including their own lives, which increases their dangerousness and creates
obstacles for its prevention; and due to the absence of achievable political goals, which
prevents them from acting on cited pretexts. Its international character is another
difficulty, although it also favors concerted action of all nations.
Minister Alonso‘s measures are fundamentally legislative and organizational. We
hope that he does not fall in the syndrome that affected that previous Government to
respond to each political or police difficulty with a legal reform. Experience indicates that
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what is more efficient than changing legislation is to apply with tenacity measures that
already exist. But it is possible that some norms, such as the Law on the Protection of
Data, should include clauses that permit a more flexible application in relation to certain
transfers of funds or the identification of users of mobile telephone cards. It also seems
convenient a better control of lodgings, car rentals and the existence of explosives in
quarries and job sites. It is about limitations that do not question the liberal model of
coexistence.
In the organizational aspect, a Center for Information Coordination, internal and
exterior, will be created for Islamic terrorism. Being an almost virgin terrain, it must be
hoped that the traditional resistance of the distinct police bodies to share information will
not manifest in this case as obstructionism. The increase from 200 to 600 agents
specialized in this type of terrorism is an adequate measure for the situation, although its
efficacy will depend on the qualification of the human teams, which includes knowing
the Arabic language.
One last consideration is that it would be a error that this strengthening to combat
against Islamic terrorism was done at the cost of the fight against ETA. Maintaining
police efficiency and judicial strength, as well as democratic unity, against this band is
now the essential condition so that the (realistic) expectation of its definite defeat does
not fail.

Bush Cultivates Fear (Bush cultiva el miedo) 14 July 2004
Bush continues clinging to the strategy of fear, because he believes that with it he
can win a second term. His last notice has been to investigate, at the insistence of the
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Commission for Electoral Assistance, who would have authority to suspend the elections
of 2 November in case of an attack similar to that of 11-S [9/11]. Despite those who
claim that there is a legal vacuum, the response seems fairly clear: the decision would
correspond to, by law, Congress and the local authorities. Never to the Executive. There
is a close precedent: the postponement of the primaries by two weeks that should have
occurred that fateful 11 September 2001, for the New York municipalities. But not even
during the Civil War, nor in the two World Wars, did the U.S. suspend or postpone
national elections.
The Administration constantly stirs the spectrum of an attack before the elections,
so much so that a report from Congress has complained that the alert levels are
established without sufficient basis or explication. But the White House does not only
have deaf ears for criticism, but also reinforces its own speech. Bush continues to defend
preventative war and affirm that after the invasion of Iraq, despite not finding weapons of
mass destruction, he has stopped their proliferation, the world is more secure and the U.S.
is winning the ―war against terrorism‖. The speech could have an effective result, as, per
a survey published yesterday by The Washington Post, more citizens trust Bush than
Kerry when conducting the campaign against terrorism. But for the first time in this
series of surveys by the Post, less than half of the country believes that the U.S. is
winning this ―war‖. A record 38% had the opinion that it is even losing the war, and 53%,
another record, believe the war in Iraq has not been worth it.
The question is, until what point a President that arrived to the White House
thanks to lawyers and the Supreme Court with the vote recount in Florida is ready to
continue playing tricks and with fear to guarantee their reelection? The danger is that a
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party or a ruler is considered to be in a situation that some sociologists call postdemocratic, in which they feel authorized to whatever they want once they have won
power at the ballot box. Fortunately, there are still counterweights in democracies.

Are We Ready? (¿Estamos preparados?) 28 October 2004
Ten of the sixteen Islamists detained by order of Judge Garzón accused of
preparing an attack against the Audiencia Nacional were prisoners: three for crimes
related to Islamic terrorist networks and seven for small crimes. A profile, [taken] all
together, similar to the group of hardened fanatics and fanatical recruits that carried out
the slaughter of 11-M. Therefore, the measures that the Interior has started to put into
practice to reinforce the control of prisoner‘s activities that have this type of history, and
also those who have shown signs of getting close to the leaders who instruct, recruit, and
train them to become martyrs, are justified.
The increase of the prison population in general, and that of Maghreb origin in
particular, favors the conversion of prisons into pools of terrorists. More than 6,000 of the
nearly 60,000 prisoners that are currently in the 77 Spanish jails are Muslim. Regardless
of how dispersed they are, there will still be dozens of them in each establishment. The
number of internees related to Islamic terrorism has gone from three in 2000 to 52 this
year, per one of the reports sent by the Interior to the 11-M Commission. Prison – with a
lot of free time – favors the psychological influence of radical leaders that offer petty
criminals to continue what they were doing – for example, falsifying phone [SIM] cards,
– but now to the service of a great cause. And with the possibility of becoming martyrs.
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There are increasing indications that the 11-M plot went through the prisons. It is
known, for example, that Abu Dahdah, detained since 2001 as the alleged boss of Al
Qaeda in Spain, reported on Monday by a police officer as a likely instigator of the
March attacks, received visits from people related to the perpetrators. If to this the fact is
added that Judge Garzón just alerted about the inadequacy of the current legislation to
cope with the new terrorism, very distinct from that of ETA, it is evident that there is still
a lot of work to confront a challenge that will surely last.
The meeting for the Antiterrorist Pact planned for the 3rd of next month should
serve so that the two biggest parties, instead having a blasting row, they coordinate to
agree on the guidelines of what to do now, especially in the penitentiary and legislative
terrains.

Better Vibrations (Mejores vibraciones) 28 July 2005
The generalized threat of Islamic terrorism has made Blair and Zapatero put their
difference behind them. Pragmatism unites, above all in times of crisis. Even more so
when it represents parties of the same family and one notices that there are not a few
coincidences in antiterrorism material or in others of the European agenda, especially in
the camp of police and judicial cooperation, and in that of economic reform of the EU
that London advocates. The British Prime Minister, who invited the Spanish Prime
Minister to a lunch in Downing Street yesterday, has manifested a notable interest in an
Alliance of Civilizations, an initiative that the Spanish socialist leader exposed at the
U.N. in September 2004 to create a common front between western and Muslim
countries, and escape from the fatalism of a clash of civilizations.
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Blair wanted to address it directly over the tablecloth and said that he had
sufficient potential and importance for it be developed in the coming months. This idea
also has the sponsorship of the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who also
met with the British Premier, and who just publically received a boost from the Secretary
General of the U.N.. Zapatero‘s idea, that is in its initial approach is not exempt from
ambiguities and for that it requires a better definition, is considered by the PP to not be
serious. Yesterday, Mariano Rajoy did not gauge the significance that the initiative could
have beyond Spain when he affirmed, before the Downing Street meeting, that he had
faith that Zapatero would not expel his speaker. The reverse is exactly what happened,
something that Rajoy should take note of.
The War in Iraq and the close relationship between Blair and Aznar made the
relationship between the British Labour Party and Spanish Socialists more difficult, and
they did not get better when they arrived to the Government in 2004. Even less when
Zapatero decided to align with the Franco-German axis. But the situation has changed
dramatically in the wake of the latest EU crisis and the London [terrorist] attacks. Both
leaders agree that European modernization passes through a renewal of the social model
and the empowerment of the Lisbon Agenda and equally argue that the danger that
terrorism represents also requires maximizing the Union‘s antiterrorism legislation,
applying without restrictions the European Arrest Warrant and granting the police more
facilities in the fight against this threat.
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The Base of Shame (La base de la vergüenza) 15 February 2006
The cry for the United States to immediately close the shameful jail in
Guantanamo is general. After the Los Angeles Times’ revelation of the provisional report
from five experts from the U.N. Commission for Human Rights, tomorrow in the
European Parliament there will be a vote that also asks for the closure of this internment
center and for the U.S. to respect international law and its own laws.
Guantanamo has become a beacon of shame. Although the U.S. has delivered a
few dozen prisoners to their countries of origin, in this camp a few hundred prisoners
have been kept without trial since the invasion of Afghanistan, in October 2001, in a legal
vacuum which the European Parliament and diverse organizations have complained about
various times. The U.N. experts consider that in some cases they practice torture and
inhumane treatment, that prisoners‘ religious and sanitary rights are violated, or some one
hundred prisoners on hunger strike are force fed. The members of the European
Parliament recall that the law approved on the initiative of Republican Senator John
McCain, detained and tortured in the Vietnam War, obliges the U.S. to ensure that no
prisoner ―be subjected to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment‖.
The Bush Administration considers the U.N. experts‘ report to be based in
―hearsay‖, because its authors have not visited the base. The experts claim that this
possibility was rejected because only three of the five were given permission [to visit
Guantanamo], and without the ability to talk to the prisoners. But they did have access to
former prisoners and their families that are now in other countries.
Guantanamo is not an isolated case. Its existence feeds the hatred that nourishes
violent fanatics, like a horrendous display of the excesses of the so-called ―war against
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terrorism‖. The same happens with the CIA flights that deliver prisoners that could be
brutally interrogated in secret prisons in various countries, including Afghanistan. The
U.S. could win in respectability and security if the internment center were closed and it
gave those detained freedom, or at least, as the project of the European Parliament asks,
they were judged in American territory with all of its guarantees ―and without facing the
death penalty‖.

Strategic Partners (Socios estratégicos) 20 June 2006
The political relationship between Spain and the United States has experienced a
marked improvement in the last months. The interview yesterday in Washington between
Miguel Ángel Moratinos and Condoleezza Rice, reflected this. It is not a question of
minutes, neither of gestures – although a joint press conference is welcome – but of
interests and content.
Despite the disagreements regarding the Spanish withdrawal from Iraq and about
the war itself, or having positions that do not coincide regarding Cuba – although the
objective of a Cuban democracy would be shared post-Castro – the coinciding points
increase: the Near East; Afghanistan, where, despite the deterioration of the situation,
Spain, with NATO, is increasing its commitment; and the fight against terrorism.
Moratinos even announced the willingness to cooperate more in the reconstruction of
Iraq. However, it would be regrettable that, in deference to the ―partner and strategic
ally‖, the Spanish Government did not insist that everything about the embarrassing CIA
flights for the capture and illegal rendition of prisoners was brought to light.
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It is a big change that the Spanish Minister says that ―we need more of the United
States in Latin America‖, and that Spain should ―complement‖ this relation. Perhaps it
would have been more correct to address it as a triangular vision: Latin America-SpainU.S.. Not for Madrid, or for Washington, or for Latin America would the extension of
Chavez‘ power throughout the subcontinent be good. But in the analysis shared, it is
necessary to go to the root of things and explain the new factors such as indigenous
[movements] or the recuperation of sovereignty over resources. Moratinos often speaks
of a ―new West‖ based in values before geography and that should include the Latin
Americans that share them. Transatlantic relations should not only refer to the North
Atlantic.
The fact that yesterday the Friends of Spain caucus was reactivated in the United
States Congress, composed mostly of Republicans, is not a symptom of thawing, but of
construction and advances that should be captured during the first visit of the Secretary of
State to Madrid, before the end of the year, which Rice announced yesterday. The Courts
should correspond with a similar forum whose construction Moratinos will ask for upon
his return. When Spanish investments in the U.S. have increased 50%, when there are so
many interlocking and shared interests, the stubbornness of understanding and the
overcoming of disagreements has to be imposed, although neither Bush nor Zapatero
seem to be ready, yet, to meet one day themselves.
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The King and the Transition (El Rey y la transición) 26 December 2006
In a hopeful society, while extremely cautious regarding the Government‘s
attempts for a final dialogue against ETA terrorism, the King‘s invitation to ―deploy
every force that will permit us to reach, together, the unwavering objective of putting an
end to terrorism‖ constitutes a spur to continue trusting and to not waiver in the endeavor,
despite the obvious difficulties. The words from the Monarch are directed to the whole
society, but those who, above all, should take note are the PSOE and the PP, whose
divergences regarding the manner in which to reach this common objective are
outrageous. Another year more, the King has referred to terrorism, not to regret fatal
attacks, but to signal the duty of putting an end to terrorism within the law and the rule of
law and remembering the priceless debt contracted to society by its victims.
It is justified that the King continues insisting in the necessity of calming political
life and that the [political] parties work with an integrative spirit. His call, last year, to put
an end to the climate of tension installed in political life fell on deaf ears: the same
climate, murkier if possible, persists in the relations between the [political] parties. In
rightfully prudent terms, Don Juan Carlos transpires, for whomever wants to understand
it, the concern that this [political] party confrontation produces, far away from the
willingness of compromise that made the transition [to democracy] possible.
As already a constant in his latest messages, the King insists in the achievements
of democratic Spain in terms of stability, progress, and wellbeing. His perception of the
evolution of Spanish society continues to be optimistic; from there his insistence to stay
on the track that these achievements have made possible, which is none other than
reconciliation and the common will to construct a Spain that is democratic, modern,
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united, and respectful of its diversity under the umbrella of the Constitution. There is a
new topic in the King‘s list of concerns: the environment. It is to be hoped that this
concern is addressed by those who attack it with disorganized urban development and
with intentional or unwise fires so that, as the King signaled, the progress of Spaniards
does not end up jeopardized in the future.
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